You Can’t Always Get What You Want:  Data Access in US Small and Medium Sized Cities by Fusi, Federica (Author) et al.
  
You Can’t Always Get What You Want:  
Data Access in US Small and Medium Sized Cities  
by 
Federica Fusi 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Public Administration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved September 2018 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Mary K. Feeney, Chair 
Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen 
Karen Mossberger 
Eric W. Welch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
December 2018  
  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
This research examines data exchange between city departments and external 
stakeholders; particularly, why city departments have different capacity to access data 
from departments in the same city, other public agencies, private and nonprofit 
organizations. Data access is of theoretical interest because it provides the opportunity to 
investigate how public organizations and public managers deal with a portfolio of 
relationships in a loosely structured context characterized by dynamics of power and 
influence. Moreover, enhancing data access is important for public managers to increase 
the amount and diversity of information available to design, implement, and support 
public services and policies.  
Drawing from institutionalism, resource dependence theory, and collaboration 
scholarship, I developed a set of hypotheses that emphasize two dimensions of data 
access in local governments. First, a vertical dimension which includes institutions, the 
social environment - particularly power relationships - and coordination mechanisms 
implemented by managers. This dimension shows how exogenous - not controlled by 
public managers - and endogenous - controlled by public managers - factors contribute to 
a public organization’s ability to access resources. Second, a horizontal dimension which 
considers the characteristics of the actors involved in data exchange and emphasizes the 
institutional and social context of intra-organizational, intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral 
data access.  
Hypotheses are tested using survey data from a 2016 nationally representative 
sample of 500 US cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000. By focusing on 
  
  ii 
small- and medium-sized cities, I contribute to a literature that typically focuses on data 
sharing in US large cities and federal agencies. Results show that the influence of 
government agencies and the influence of civil society have opposite effect on data 
access, whereas government influence limits data access while influence from civil 
society increases capacity to access data. The effectiveness of coordination mechanisms 
varies according to the stakeholder type. Public managers rely on informal networks to 
exchange data with other departments in the city and other governmental agencies while 
they leverage lateral coordination mechanisms - informal but unplanned - to coordinate 
data access from nongovernmental organizations. I conclude by discussing the 
implications for practice and future research.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Researchers and public managers have shown growing interest in government 
data practices in the past decade. Examples of data practices include Open Data web 
portals implemented by the US federal government1 and major US cities,2 as well as 
initiatives to develop new methods for data collection, such as the Big Data working 
group promoted by the US Census Bureau3. Data practices also include partnerships 
between government agencies and external stakeholders, such as the one initiated by the 
California Office to Reform Education (CORE) districts to collect and share data among 
California major school systems4. Many other initiatives oriented towards “increase the 
amount or quality of data collected, better share them across or use them within agencies, 
or improve capacity to analyze and distribute summary statistics” can be found at local, 
state, and national level (Weitzman, Silver and Brazil, 2006, p. 387).  
City governments widely support data practices because they expect that 
improvements in data collection, diffusion, and use will lead to significant benefits for 
city activities and design and delivery of public services (Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016). 
For instance, police departments access data from national security agencies to coordinate 
                                                 
1 The Open Data portal of the US government is available here: https://www.data.gov/ 
2 For example, see the city of Phoenix - https://www.phoenix.gov/opendata or the city of Los Angeles - 
https://data.lacity.org/ 
3 For more information: https://www.census.gov/about/cac/sac/wg-big-data.html 
4 The CORE initiative is described here: http://coredistricts.org/  
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local interventions; finance departments use employment and hiring data from other 
departments to manage budgets and pay employees; community development 
departments rely on data about businesses, nonprofit organizations, schools, and other 
local initiatives to allocate resources and promote citizen involvement; and so on. 
Improving data collection and access can significantly reduce costs and increase the 
information available (Dawes, 1996).  
Moreover, city governments have gained a central role in the current policy 
environment characterized by high cross-organizational interdependence, rapid changes, 
participation, and transparency pressures. Cities have expressed great interest in data 
practices to improve their relationships with stakeholders (Kitchin, 2014). For instance, 
city managers leverage data to incentivize bottom-up processes of co-production and 
increase interaction with civil society actors (Attard, Orlandi, Scerri, & Auer, 2015). 
Open data portals aim at engaging citizens and promoting the development of citizen-
driven innovation and proposals for public policies. Open data portals also enhance 
interactions among public and private actors, from merging complementary datasets to 
using private data for better understanding matters of public interest (Susha, Janssen, & 
Verhulst, 2017). Data practices related to openness are oriented towards facilitating 
government data access and use and improving the quality and participative nature of 
decision-making.  
Data practices are a substantial research area for public management scholars. 
Several studies look at how cities are managing their data (Kitchin, 2014; Roberts, 2011; 
Susha et al., 2017), which challenges they face in exchanging data across stakeholders 
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(Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007), and how they use data for public purposes (Attard 
et al. 2015; Chan, 2013; Clarke & Margetts, 2014). This scholarship recognizes that data 
management faces different challenges and requires different solutions in public 
organizations than in private ones, as public managers pay greater attention to issues 
related to transparency, accountability, privacy, and security (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 
1986; Clarke & Margetts, 2014; Meijer, 2015). Nevertheless, research in this area is 
relatively new, and several theoretical and empirical gaps call for further research to 
understand data practices in different organizational contexts and for different purposes; 
disentangle theoretical implications; and provide practical advice to government.   
This research finds its niche by investigating data access across small- and 
medium-sized cities in the US. Evidence from a survey conducted in 2016 on a nationally 
representative sample of 500 cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000, shows 
that city departments cannot timely access data from other organizations and that data 
access decreases when data requests are submitted to non-governmental organizations 
(Feeney et al., 2016). Investigating such variation is essential to understand how to 
enhance city capacity to collect data and improve the availability of information for 
public managers and local politicians. I ask: Why are some city departments more able to 
access data from other organizations? What role do the institutions, the social 
environment, and coordination mechanisms play in shaping data access? To answer these 
questions, I develop an Integrative Framework for Data Access (IFDA) that explains the 
main factors shaping data access in the public sector.  
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The IFDA combines a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension 
includes the city’s institutional and social environment as well as coordination 
mechanisms used by local public managers. I suggest that while institutions and the 
social environment shape constraints and opportunities to access data at the macro-level, 
at the micro-level city managers design agreements and communicate with other 
managers to access data from other organizations. Despite their relevance in inter-
organizational research, few studies have investigated coordination in data sharing 
(Nedović-Budić & Pinto, 2000; Susha et al., 2017). This approach complements current 
literature, which mostly examines the implementation and use of technology tools and 
infrastructures while overlooking how formal and informal mechanisms might coexist 
with technology to facilitate access to data.  
The horizontal dimension highlights differences across relationship types. City 
departments can request data from departments within their city, other public agencies, 
and non-governmental organizations. Accessing data from the full portfolio of 
relationships increases data available to local managers and policymakers. Yet each 
relationship type is characterized by different social and institutional aspects that might 
hinder or facilitate data access. The horizontal dimension expands public management 
knowledge on how cities can access data from other organizations and how coordination 
mechanisms vary according to the type of relationship.  
I describe in more detail the context, research questions, theoretical approach, and 
contributions adopted in this study in the remaining of the introduction. First, I describe 
the technological, social and organizational context of data practices and how data 
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practices have become relevant for public management researchers and practitioners, 
specifically in city governments. Then, I discuss the research questions and the 
theoretical and empirical motivation of the study. Finally, I briefly illustrate the 
theoretical framework and discuss contributions for theory and practice. 
Research Context 
The growing diffusion of data practices among government agencies is the 
response to three phenomena that have strongly influenced government activities in 
recent decades: the advancement of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
which offer new tools for data management at a lower cost; the growing complexity of 
policy problems requiring several organizations to coordinate and share information on 
their activities; and citizens’ demands for transparency and accountability of 
governments, which lead politicians and public managers to seek for better ways to 
diffuse information. Synergies and interconnections among these phenomena have 
increased attention to data practices.  
The growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has provided 
new tools for the collection, storage, sharing, and use of data. For instance, governments 
can now collect data more efficiently and on a larger population via online surveys. They 
can also leverage new sources of data, such as traffic and mobile data, which provide 
more granular and frequently updated information and at lower costs (Bostic, 2015). 
Cloud-based platforms such as Dropbox and Google Drive have created the opportunity 
to simultaneous share data with multiple actors – including citizens - who can access the 
same digital archive from their own electronic devices. Finally, new techniques based on 
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machine learning and predictive analytics have simplified the analysis of real-time, high 
volume data to inform policy and decision- making processes. All in all, these 
developments have significantly reduced the costs and the complexity of collecting, using 
and sharing data, and public agencies are exploring ways to take advantage of these 
opportunities.  
Public managers expect that a greater availability of data will help them better 
understanding complex and rapidly changing policy problems, which government 
agencies struggle to address on their own. Rittel and Webber (1973) coined the term 
“wicked problems” to refer to societal problems – such as poverty, crime or social 
inclusion – whose definitions are highly ambiguous and socially constructed. Wicked 
problems require the involvement of several actors – across government levels, sectors 
and national boundaries - to guarantee legitimacy and implementation of policy solutions 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Sharing 
data across organizations is a first critical step to integrate activities and processes and 
achieve common goals (Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; Guo & Acar, 2005; 
Roberts, 2011). Growing urbanization, for instance, has created large metropolitan areas 
which require cities to coordinate and share data to provide public services, including 
transportation, welfare assistance, and public safety (Lefèvre, 1998; Parks & Oakerson, 
1989). Environmental policies are also implemented thanks to the combined action of 
multiple federal, state and local governments and nongovernmental actors who 
collaboratively manage and protect natural resources (Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 
2002).  
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Along with the complexity of policy problems, the specialization of tasks among 
policy actors has expanded the need to collaborate across disciplines and sectors (Hale, 
2011; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Emergency policies, for instance, require integration of 
knowledge and expertise from citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), state 
and local agencies to coordinate short and long-term interventions in the affected areas 
(Roberts, 2011). Cross-discipline collaboration is also typical in public health, where 
homeland security departments collaborate with public health and governmental 
institutions to prevent biosafety and bioterrorism concerns (Daley, 2009). Governments 
have incentives to share data to reduce the costs associated with data collection and 
analysis, avoid duplication of efforts, build policy solutions based on integrated expertise 
and knowledge, and gain insights on policy issues (Dawes, 1996). Although government 
officials are aware that socio-political factors might affect policy outcomes, they often 
perceive data as a final input to decision making (Weitzman, Silver, & Brazill, 2006).  
Finally, data practices are crucial to addressing societal pressures coming from 
citizens, nonprofit organizations, and other external stakeholders. Governments face 
rising mistrust from citizens (Pew Research, 2017) and leverage open data initiatives to 
increase transparency and accountability and regain citizen confidence (Bertot, Jaeger, & 
Grimes, 2010). Similarly, governments seek to expand participation in decision making 
and policy design by sharing information with the public (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 
2012; Hood, 2006; Meijer, 2015). The democratic model of government is slowly turning 
away from a representation-based approach, where citizens are called to elect and 
monitor their representatives, towards a participation-oriented approach, where citizens 
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are directly involved in government activities (Meijer, 2015). Researchers suggest that 
governments should increase open data to support bottom-up participation and citizen-
driven innovation processes (Attard et al., 2015). 
In summary, public managers have emphasized data practices because 
government agencies are facing a policy environment where actors are more 
interconnected to one another, and policy problems are more nuanced and loosely 
defined. Technology advancements promise the tools to digitally represent and interpret 
this increasingly complex reality by easing the collection, storage, and analysis of data. 
Information technologies offer “a latent capacity to share information across agency and 
program boundaries, to discover patterns and interactions once hidden in millions of 
separate paper records and to make decisions based on more complete data” (Dawes, 
1996, p. 377). Moreover, new IT tools provide opportunities to shift from top-down 
decision-making processes to bottom-up processes of co-production and interaction with 
civil society actors, therefore responding to pressures for accountability and transparency 
(Bertot et al., 2010; Desouza & Bhagwatwar, 2014).  
Data practices in city government. City governments find themselves at the 
center of rapid ICT developments, high cross-organizational interdependence, and 
pressure to increase participation and transparency. Consequently, they have expressed 
great interest in data practices to improve public service provision, manage their 
relationships with stakeholders, and address citizen concerns (Desouza & Bhagwatwar, 
2014; Kitchin, 2014; Meijer & Thaens, 2018). 
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With the global population becoming predominantly urban (UN Habitat, 2011), 
city governments emerge as the primary providers of public services. City governments 
have broad authority over critical public issues such as infrastructure development, 
energy, environment, migration, and transportation. They also have a vast influence on 
citizens' life and behavior as their status of “local, directly elected bodies” put them in a 
unique leadership position (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
2000, p. 40). Moreover, global policies often lack authority to impact individuals directly 
and rely on a combination of local and global actions to achieve their goals. For instance, 
city governments are key actors in climate change policies because they have authority to 
enforce transportation practices and rules to reduce emission levels (Betsill & Bulkeley, 
2004, 2006; Pitt & Bassett, 2013). Recently, some city mayors have taken a strong stance 
against the US federal government’s decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement on 
climate change (Walker, 2017) by renewing their commitment to its goals.  
City managers and politicians have warmly welcomed improvements in data 
collection and analysis, hoping a greater availability of data will aid to respond to 
citizen’s needs and global pressures (Townsend, 2013). City managers assume that more 
up-to-date, timeless, and granular data will lead to new and innovative solutions to 
manage wicked problems and interdependences (Bettencourt, 2014; Dodgson and Gann, 
2011). So-called “smart cities” are an example of such intense use of data practices. 
Smart cities leverage in situ and remote sensors to collect real-time information on urban 
phenomena and inform policy design (Koonin & Holland, 2014). Cities are also asking 
citizens to provide information about urban problems and analyze data (Desouza & 
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Bhagwatwar, 2014; Kim & Lee, 2012). Citizens can use mobile applications (e.g., 
"apps") to share information about their neighborhood (Ertiö, 2015) or they can 
download data from open data portals and propose local innovations and policies (Attard 
et al., 2015; Chan, 2013). 
City governments, however, face difficulties in implementing and adopting data 
practices. Practitioners and researchers highlight how managerial, organizational, 
institutional, and technical barriers can hold back city government efforts (Gil-Garcia & 
Sayogo, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016; Roberts, 2011; Tulloch & Harvey, 
2007; Welch, Feeney, & Park, 2016; Yang & Wu, 2016). In particular, small city 
governments lack financial and technical resources and managerial capacity to support 
initiatives such as smart cities or data sharing partnerships (Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; 
Homburg & Bekkers, 2002; Welch et al., 2016). Furthermore, they might lack support 
from local politicians scared of exposing government data because of privacy issues or 
concerns with negative criticism (Attard et al., 2015; Janssen, Charalabidis, & 
Zuiderwijk, 2012). For these reasons, city managers might refrain from participating in 
data sharing initiatives, expect lower benefits from data use and exchange, and 
discourage data practices (de Montalvo, 2003; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007).  
Research on data sharing should aim to understand how and what factors help city 
governments to overcome existing barriers and encourage data practices. City 
governments play a key role in providing data and information to the state and federal 
government. By working closely with local actors, city governments have access to local-
level data that are too costly to be collected by other public agencies. Increasing data 
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access for city governments is expected to have positive repercussions on the whole 
public sector. Moreover, data available to local governments directly impact decisions 
that affect citizens’ everyday life and contribute to improve the quality of life of US 
residents. 
Research Questions and Motivation 
This research investigates a specific aspect of data practices, namely data access. 
Data access is an organization’s capacity to timely obtain data from other organizations 
(further explanation: Chapter 3). Data access is essential because government agencies 
are often unable to autonomously collect the data they need, either because data 
collection is too expensive, or other organizations control the data. To overcome these 
problems, public managers request data from other organizations (Levine & White, 
1961). For instance, city departments might request data from local nonprofits on clients 
served or at-risk populations. Data access increases the diversity and availability of data, 
which in turn enhance government effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness to local 
needs (Rothenberg & Zyglidopoulos, 2007). However, there is variation in how 
successful city departments are in obtaining data from other organizations (Nedović-
Budić & Pinto, 2000). The following two anecdotes illustrate how data access can vary 
across public agencies.  
Some years ago, I worked for an Italian local government where the community 
development department was legally required to regularly collect data from local NGOs 
(e.g., the number of members or the number of awarded grants). To my surprise, 
nonprofit organizations sent their data via mail or brought them in person to the 
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department officers. The government lacked an online shared infrastructure, which 
significantly increased the time and resources required to collect the data. As a result, the 
data were often not up-to-date, and the department personnel spent considerable hours to 
contact nonprofit managers and remind them to send the data. While the department was 
ultimately able to access the data, employees faced inefficiencies, high workloads, and 
costs. 
More recently, I spoke with a colleague who worked for a major nonprofit in 
Arizona. She coordinated a data sharing system between local nonprofit organizations 
and the city government. In stark contrast with the Italian government, local nonprofits in 
Arizona rely on a cloud-based platform to exchange and access data. Each organization 
can upload its data as well as access and download data posted by others. Participants 
consider the system to be efficient because it simplifies data collection and facilitates the 
coordination of joint activities. They also note that the system requires trust and 
competence among users and assumes that the data are not subject to privacy and security 
concerns that could make open sharing undesirable or illegal.  
These anecdotes illustrate how some public organizations easily access data from 
external organizations while some others have irregular and fragmented access to such 
data, resulting in wasted time, stressed human resources, and outdated information. 
Similar findings emerge from previous research (Allard et al., 2018; Feeney et al., 2016; 
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018), suggesting that data access varies across public agencies. 
Allard and colleagues (2018) found that some public managers report that they can 
generally access data they need for their work while others complain several delays. A 
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study of a national sample of 500 small and medium-sized US cities confirms that most, 
but not all, city departments can timely access data from other organizations, but barriers 
increase when city governments request data from non-governmental organizations 
(Feeney et al., 2016). Based on this empirical evidence, this research focuses on data 
access to investigate the following research questions:  
1.    Why are some city departments more able to access data from other 
organizations?  
2.    What role do the institutions, social environment, and coordination 
mechanisms play in shaping data access? 
An Integrative Theoretical Framework 
The study proposes an integrative theoretical framework to explain data access in 
the public sector. The framework is entitled “Integrative Framework for Data Access” 
(IFDA) and includes two dimensions. The vertical dimension draws from previous 
research on institutions, resource dependency theory, collaboration studies, and 
information sharing. It argues that data access is a function of three dimensions. At the 
highest level, we find institutions that shape constraints and opportunities to access and 
exchange data across organizations. Then, the social environment shapes relationships 
across actors involved in the data exchange; in particular, influence dynamics might 
prevent organizations from providing data and therefore decrease access to data. Finally, 
at the micro-level, managers implement coordination strategies to access data. Strategies 
include formal and informal coordination mechanisms – from routines to personal 
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relationships with other managers. Qualitative studies often mention these strategies, but 
we lack an empirical and theoretical understanding of how they structure data flows. 
The horizontal dimension expands the framework across the full portfolio of 
stakeholders from which the city government might request data. While accessing data 
from a variety of organizations increases data availability and diversity, public managers 
face more challenges and barriers that might hinder data access. For instance, previous 
studies have shown that exchanging data across sectors is often complicated by cultural 
and value differences (Dawes et al., 2009; Roberts, 2011). Public management 
scholarship needs to expand our understanding of how social and institutional 
characteristics of cross-sector or intra-organizational relationships might affect data 
access. I consider three types of relationships: data access from other departments in the 
same city; data access from other public agencies; and data access from non-
governmental organizations. The horizontal dimension intersects with the vertical one 
when I discuss the coordination mechanisms for data access; public managers will report 
greater (or lower) data access depending on which organization they are asking data from 
and the coordination mechanisms they adopt.  
Contributions for Theory and Practice   
This research contributes to public management and data sharing scholarship both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, it focuses on data access, which public 
management research has rarely investigated. Data access provides insights into how 
public agencies can manage relationships with autonomous external stakeholders in a 
context where they might lack incentives to collaborate.  The IFDA emphasizes elements 
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at three different levels - institutions, social environment, and coordination mechanisms - 
to show how exogenous – not controlled by public managers – and endogenous – 
controlled by public managers – factors contribute to an organization’s ability to access 
resources. Empirically, it provides implications for city managers that wish to improve 
their external relationships, and for state and federal initiatives that support and promote 
data sharing initiatives. Finally, few studies apply quantitative methodologies to 
investigate data practices in small and medium-sized cities. 
Contribution to public management theory and research. Several studies have 
looked at data sharing initiatives, but few have investigated broad issues of data 
accessibility in the public sector. Gil-Garcia, Pardo, and Burke (2010) classify data 
sharing initiatives according to their focus. Some initiatives have a narrow focus, either 
they target a need (e.g., facilitate data access among a group of public agencies) or a 
policy problem (e.g., terrorist threats). Other initiatives have a broad focus and build 
systemic capacity for public agencies to access data for their daily activities. They found 
that the design of the initiative (broad vs. narrow focus) shapes the factors that matter for 
success. For instance, initiatives with a broad focus need trusted networks of actors while 
initiatives with a narrow focus rely on the deployment of effective infrastructure and 
integrated data. Up to now, research has mostly focused on narrowly focused initiatives, 
and we need more studies that investigate how to build systemic data access capacity in 
public agencies. By addressing this gap, this research aims to help public organizations to 
increase data availability and diversity.  
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Second, data access provides an opportunity to investigate how public 
organizations deal with their portfolio of stakeholders when relationships are loosely 
structured and likely characterized by power and influence dynamics (Willem & Buelens, 
2007). Stakeholders are not required to share data with the government and might lack 
incentives for accepting data requests (Azad & Wiggins, 1995; Willem & Buelens, 2007). 
This research focuses on how institutions, social environment, and coordination 
mechanisms influence the likelihood to access data when public managers interact with 
different types of stakeholders. Studies on collaboration between public agencies and 
external stakeholders suggest that willingness to collaborate and successful outcomes 
depend on the typology of actors involved (e.g., private versus public actors or 
hierarchical vs. peer-to-peer relationships), but research on data sharing rarely 
distinguishes between the types of actors involved (Guo & Acar, 2005; Mullin & Daley, 
2010; Roberts, 2011). 
Third, this research emphasizes the role of managers and how they coordinate 
data access across the portfolio of stakeholders. The examples discussed above show that 
city managers adopt different coordination mechanisms to exchange data with other 
organizations, leading to different outcomes concerning efficiency, frequency, and 
effectiveness of the exchange. Several contributions provide a theoretical foundation to 
understand how coordination mechanisms enhance data sharing (Dawes, 1996; Gil-
Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; Kim & Lee, 2006; Tulloch & Harvey, 2007; Welch et al., 2016; 
Willem & Buelens, 2007; Yang & Maxwell, 2011). For instance, both Gil-Garcia and 
colleagues (2010) and Yang and Maxwell (2011) highlight how personal networks are 
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critical to explaining data and information sharing across organizations. Welch et al. 
(2016) suggest that coercion and persuasion mechanisms shape data sharing 
relationships. I further expand this literature by suggesting that the effectiveness of these 
coordination mechanisms might differ across stakeholders. 
Contribution to practices. This research provides insights for practitioners and 
public managers. Results inform public managers about how to effectively manage data 
access with different types of organizations – namely, other departments in the same city, 
other public agencies, and non-governmental organizations, either nonprofit or for profit. 
Since the coordination mechanisms investigated in this study require limited resources, 
findings are implementable by department heads and city managers. 
Moreover, national and state agencies are subsidizing infrastructures and 
programs to promote data and information sharing at the local level. Several foundations 
are also providing incentives and supporting initiatives on data practices (e.g., the What 
Works Cities initiative by the Bloomberg Foundation5). Without a systematic 
understanding of the factors that positively or negatively affect data access, it may be 
hard to direct public and nonprofit organizations funding; identify local governments that 
require greater support because of the challenges they are facing; and provide policy 
suggestions on how cities might intervene at the micro level to reduce barriers for 
cooperation and exchange. Results from this study provide research-based evidence that 
can help orient interventions of public and nonprofit organizations at a large scale and 
identify city governments that need additional resources. 
                                                 
5 For more information, see: https://whatworkscities.bloomberg.org/  
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Finally, most research on data sharing has focused on national or state 
government agencies (Dawes et al., 2009; Dawes, Gharawi, & Burke, 2012; Higgins, 
Taylor, Lisboa, & Arshad, 2014) and has adopted a case study approach (Gil-Garcia et 
al., 2007; Roberts, 2011). Few studies have collected quantitative data on data access 
among cities in general, and specifically small- and medium-sized cities (exceptions 
include Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016 and Welch et al., 2016, among others). Small and 
medium-size cities have lower financial resources and technical capacity (Gil-Garcia & 
Sayogo, 2016; Hamin, Gurran, & Emlinger, 2014; Homburg & Bekkers, 2002) so as they 
are less likely to be included in large data sharing initiatives, lead them, or build data 
sharing infrastructure (Nedović-Budić & Pinto, 2000). This research offers insights for 
public managers and practitioners interested in building capacity for data exchange and 
access within small and medium-sized cities.   
Dissertation Structure 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents current research on 
data sharing and access. First, it describes data, information, and knowledge sharing 
studies in organizational studies and public management scholarship. Then, it defines 
"data" and discusses data used in public organizations. Finally, it presents theoretical and 
empirical findings from previous research; it concludes by highlighting the main research 
gaps addressed in this study. 
Chapter 3 presents the IFDA. It introduces the theoretical rationales behind the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions and frames them within current research in public 
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management. It discusses the importance of applying the IFDA to investigate data access 
in small and medium-sized US cities.  
Chapter 4 presents the research hypotheses. The hypotheses discuss institutions 
(privacy laws, legal mandate, open data quality, and institutional capacity); social 
environment (external and internal influence); coordination mechanisms (formal, lateral, 
informal coordination and technology tools); and the intersection between coordination 
mechanisms and stakeholder type (other departments in the same city, other public 
agencies, and non-governmental organizations).  
Chapter 5 presents the data collection and variable measurement. Data were 
collected as part of a 2016 national survey conducted on 500 small- and medium-sized 
US cities by the Center for Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy Studies at 
Arizona State University. The chapter describes the sample frame, survey design, data 
collection, and measurement of the variables. The chapter also introduces state-level data 
that were collected from external organizations and employed in the research. The 
chapter reviews the methodology utilized for the data collection and describes the 
variables.   
Chapter 6 discusses data analysis and presents the results of the empirical models. 
Three different statistical methods were used to analyze the data: a logit model with 
clustered robust standard errors; a multi-level logit model; and a seemingly unrelated 
regressions model. The chapter compares the three models and discusses their fit to the 
data.  
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Finally, Chapter 7 discusses significant findings, theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the study, limitations, and opportunities for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I contextualize this research within previous scholarship. Figure 1 
summarizes the structure of the chapter by indicating the main title of each section and 
subtopic. The chapter moves from a broad review of the primary studies on data, 
information, and knowledge sharing within organizations to scholarship on data sharing 
in public management. The first section offers a historical perspective of how researchers 
have conceptualized the role of information resources – knowledge, information, and data 
- in organizations over time. This evolution show why data sharing has gained a 
predominant role in current research, especially in public management. Then, I discuss 
the definition of “data” and I use the model developed by Spender in the late 1990s to 
describe data and information in public organizations. Spender's model is a useful lens to 
understand the unique characteristics of data and how these characteristics shape 
challenges and opportunities for data sharing within and across organizations. Finally, I 
provide an overview of the main theoretical approaches and empirical findings of current 
research on data sharing in the public sector. This final section sets the stage to introduce 
the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual map of the literature review 
Information Resources Use in Organizations: Short Historical Perspective 
Researchers have long been interested in how organizations and individuals 
acquire and process information resources – data, information, and knowledge (among 
others: Galbraith, 1973; Huysman & Wulf, 2006; March & Simon, 1958; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 2003; Thompson, 1967). In early studies, 
organizations were considered closed systems of production, isolated from the external 
environment and primarily shaped by managers’ decisions. Managers needed information 
only to maintain control over the organization and make decisions to improve efficiency 
and achieve organizational goals (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Selznick, 1949; Taylor, 1912). Information resources were internally produced, 
exchanged, and used, and researchers paid little attention to the exchange and sharing of 
information with external actors. Information, data, and knowledge were relevant as long 
as they provided insights on the organizational performance and internal outcomes, such 
as budget, finance, and production (Blau, 1955; Scott, 2003).  
Information resources use in organizations
•Difference between public and private organziations
•Closed vs open systems
Data as information resources
•Spender's (1996) model
•Information resources in public organizations 
Data sharing
• Definition and theoretical approaches
•Integrative frameworks
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In the 1960s and 70s, researchers moved away from a closed system approach and 
adopted an “open systems” perspective. Open system researchers assume that 
organizations are highly dependent on their external environment, which “shapes, 
supports, and infiltrates organizations” (Scott, 2003, p. 29). Environmental factors 
include other organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), sector characteristics (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977), networks and communities (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005), and institutions and 
norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Managers do not entirely control the organization 
performance because they cannot - or hardly can - influence environmental factors. 
Gaining access to information resources on external organizations, sector dynamics, 
norms and institutions, or networks became essential to maintain control over the 
environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Thompson, 1967). However, since other 
organizations control information, managers needed to interact and coordinate with them 
to access information. Open system researchers have increasingly focused on structures 
and incentives to facilitate resource access and exchange across organizations. These 
studies adopt a variety of theoretical perspectives, including social capital theory (Adler 
& Kwon, 2009; Chang & Chuang, 2011; Huysman & Wulf, 2006; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998), organizational design (Galbraith, 1973), and network analysis (Chow & Chan, 
2008; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005).  
Public management research has also looked at how public organizations 
exchange data and information with stakeholders. Public organizations are information-
intensive entities that collect and process large amounts of information to address the 
diversity of their stakeholder’s needs, administrate a variety of services, and intervene in 
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disaster and emergency management, among others (Bretschneider, 1990; Moon & 
Bretschneider, 2002; Willem & Buelens, 2007; Yang & Maxwell, 2011). Moreover, 
sharing of written internal documentation is fundamental to provide legal and technical 
justifications to actions performed by managers and administrators (Kornberger, Meyer, 
Brandtner, & Höllerer, 2017). In its well-known description of bureaucracy, Weber 
argues that the "public administration" is the ideal structure to manage and diffuse 
information across various organizational units (Weber, 1922).  
There are several differences in how private and public organizations use and 
exchange data, information, and knowledge. Willem and Buelens (2007) find that the 
incentive structure of public organizations reduces the effectiveness and frequency of 
knowledge sharing across employees. Bozeman and Bretschneider (1986) show that 
information systems are different in public organizations as public managers need data to 
evaluate organization outputs not only in terms of economic efficiency but also equity, 
fairness, and effectiveness. Moreover, public organizations are characterized by tensions 
between a closed bureaucratic structure aimed to protect the technical competencies of 
bureaucrats (Kornberger et al., 2017) and quests for transparency and openness coming 
from citizens and external stakeholders (Meijer, 2015).  
Over time, public organizations have evolved from closed bureaucracies to open 
organizations that frequently exchange data and information beyond organizational 
boundaries (Kim & Lee, 2006; Yang & Maxwell, 2011). Public organizations face a 
growing need to share information to coordinate with external stakeholders (Ansell & 
Gash, 2008; Hale, 2011; Kim & Lee, 2006; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Saidel, 1991). 
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Moreover, pressures for transparency and accountability from civil society actors have 
pushed organizations to expand access to government information (Bertot et al., 2010; 
Kim & Lee, 2012; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). According to Meijer (2015), the openness 
of public organizations is the result of political and societal development such as 
changing power relationships, new political actors and arenas, and technological and 
socio-cultural changes. 
In response to these changes, managers and practitioners have increased their 
attention to knowledge, information, and data practices (Al‐Alawi, Al‐Marzooqi, & 
Mohammed, 2007; Kim & Lee, 2006; Willem & Buelens, 2007) and a growing amount 
of research has investigated the role of information in various policy domains, from 
emergency management to health and environmental policies (Comfort, 2007; Gil-Garcia 
& Sayogo, 2016; Kim & Lee, 2006; Klompas et al., 2012; Koliba, Zia, & Lee, 2011; 
Roberts, 2011; Vest & Issel, 2014; Welch, Feeney, & Park, 2016; Yang & Maxwell, 
2011). An area of interest in the latest years is data use and exchange (Allard et al., 2018; 
Jennings & Hall, 2012). Data are the smallest unit of information available to managers 
and organizations, and provide novel information and knowledge to coordinate with other 
organizations, evaluate organization performance, and increase competitiveness. 
Researchers and practitioners are interested in how public organizations can acquire, 
analyze, and utilize data in their activities (Jennings & Hall, 2012). In the next section, I 
expand on the concept of ‘data’ and its unique characteristics.  
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Data as Information Resources   
Data represent the smallest type of information resources, the unit upon which 
information and knowledge are built (Machlup, 1983). Data consist of raw information 
that is not yet or is hardly elaborated and presents itself in the form of numbers, words, 
figures, recorded voices, videos, and pictures (Drake, Steckler, & Koch, 2004; Hess & 
Ostrom, 2003). Government agencies use data such as financial figures, geographical 
coordinates, police recordings, tax returns, and census data. Public managers extract 
information from data in the form of observed patterns and trends. Information can be 
represented in visual forms, such as graphs or tables, or in texts, such as reports and 
presentations. The combination and integration of multiple information create knowledge 
regarding a specific topic (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Because of their raw format, data have a great potential to provide novel 
information to organizations. Organizations and individuals can elaborate, aggregate, and 
analyze data in different ways, thus extracting unique information and knowledge that 
can feed innovation and discovery and provide a competitive advantage (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). The importance of data as an input for new knowledge and innovation 
explains the growing interest in technology to analyze real-time, diverse, and granular 
data, often referred to as Big Data (Jennings & Hall, 2012; Kitchin, 2014; Townsend, 
2013). Organizations and managers hope that the availability of data along with tools for 
managing and analyzing them will help produce new policy solutions and support 
decision-making processes.  
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The distinctive features of data compared to information and knowledge explain 
challenges and barriers to its exchange and use. In a widely cited model (Hess & Ostrom, 
2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Yang, Pardo, & Wu, 2014), Spender (1996) classifies 
information resources along two dimensions - tacit or explicit and individual or social. 
Tacit information resources are practices, policies, or skills that are not easily codified 
nor can they be explained to other individuals; therefore they are usually transmitted by 
example or long-term interactions. Instead, explicit information resources are codified 
into a structured language that can be understood by the individuals who receive the 
information. Individual information resources are controlled and recalled by a single 
individual, while social information resources are shared among individuals within a 
community and “reside in the tacit experience and enactment of the collectivity” (Adler 
& Kwon, 2002, p. 247).  
Research has shown that tacit and social information resources are more difficult 
to share (Anssi, 2008; Hau, Kim, Lee, & Kim, 2013) because they require the ability to 
explain, integrate, and appropriate concepts that groups of individuals have mastered 
through experience and long-term interactions (Black et al., 2003; Bock, Zmud, Kim, & 
Lee, 2005; Willem & Buelens, 2007). Social and tacit information resources are deeply 
embedded in the relationships across individuals, so that organizations need to develop 
close relationships, common goals, and trust among their members if they want to 
facilitate the sharing of tacit and social information resources (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; 
Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). By 
contrast, individual and explicit information resources are more easily shared by 
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individuals and organizations through standardized practices. For instance, organizations 
can hire more skilled managers or develop information systems that facilitate the transfer 
of codified information.  
Table 1 illustrates Spender’s model and provides examples of the different types 
of information resources in the public sector. Examples are drawn from Yang and Wu 
(2013) who illustrate the types of information resources more commonly used and shared 
by government agencies. Individual-explicit information resources include facts, data, 
and information that public managers and employees can consciously recall. Social-
explicit information resources include value-added information and administration-
oriented information. Value-added information is directly extracted by raw data that have 
been minimally elaborated or aggregated to fulfill the organization’s information needs. It 
might include summary statistics or indicators that city departments have created to 
monitor their performance or illustrate policy problems. Administration-oriented 
information are government documents, meeting minutes, and notifications on work 
activities. They are “signals that connect government agencies to run their daily 
operations appropriately” (Yang & Wu, 2016, p. 33). Both value-added information and 
administration-oriented information are explicit because they are codified and easily 
transferable across organizations, and social because they reflect organization practices, 
values, and policies.  
Administration-oriented and domain-oriented knowledge are tacit information 
resources. Administration-oriented knowledge includes best practices and abilities related 
to the management of public organizations. Domain-oriented knowledge refers to the 
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experience gained and best practices learned regarding a specific policy field. 
Administration- and domain-oriented knowledge can be social if they refer to 
organization skills and practices, or individual if they refer to the professional experience 
that public managers have accumulated by working in the public sector or within a 
specific policy field.  
Table 1.  
Type of information resources in public administration. 
 
 
Individual Social 
Explicit 
Facts, data  
(i.e. GIS data) 
Added-value information  
(summary statistics, indicators) 
& administrative information 
(minutes, reports) 
Tacit 
Administration-oriented  
& domain-oriented 
knowledge (professional 
experience and skills) 
Administration-oriented  
& domain-oriented knowledge 
(organizations’ practices) 
Adaptation from Spender (1996) and Yang and Wu (2013) 
Research Boundaries  
This research defines data as both raw and added-value information utilized by 
city departments to conduct their daily activities. The distinction between raw and value-
added information is blurred, and it is rarely applied in practice and research (Weitzman 
et al., 2006). Public managers utilize the term “data” to refer to financial statistics or 
budget aggregated numbers, which are added-value information in Spender’s model. 
Structured datasets that contain raw data should also be considered added-value 
information as they are designed based on the organization’s information needs. Yet, they 
are usually called "data" by public managers and employees. Finally, the distinction 
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between social and individual information resources is not relevant in this study. I assume 
that data are an explicit type of information resources that public managers can share 
through technical infrastructure and hardware supports (e.g., USB keys, CD-ROMs, hard 
disks) in contrast with knowledge that requires frequent, in-person, interactions to be 
shared.  
More specifically, this research focuses on "administrative data" – i.e., data that 
public organizations generate and use in their daily activities. Administrative data include 
business licenses, vehicle registrations, tax records, birth and death records, or nonprofit 
activity records, among others. A recent report from the Pew Charitable Trusts (2018) 
shows that public managers in all US state governments engage in the collection, 
analysis, and use of administrative data to improve government action and effectiveness. 
Administrative data provide a critical input for the development of novel information and 
knowledge; are easily compared across departments and agencies; and can be easily 
shared with the public to enhance accountability and transparency (Allard et al., 2018; 
Blau, 1955; Jennings & Hall, 2012; Yang & Wu, 2016). 
Public managers report that it is challenging to access administrative data beyond 
mandatory reporting and legal requirements (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018; Allard et al., 
2018). Because data are raw inputs, their value cannot be fully understood beforehand, 
and organizations might feel uncomfortable in sharing data with the government. 
Government agencies can use data to evaluate an organizations’ performance or criticize 
decision-making processes. Moreover, technical and institutional barriers, such as lack of 
capacity and low interoperability across systems, differences in organizational culture 
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and conflicts, and low trust, negatively affect the likelihood of sharing data with 
government agencies. Public management research provides several insights on barriers 
and incentives to share data. In the next section, I discuss the antecedents of data sharing 
in public organizations.  
Data Sharing: Theoretical Perspectives 
Data sharing is the transfer of data from one organization to another (Tulloch & 
Harvey, 2007). It can assume several forms (Roberts, 2011), from a “take it or leave it” 
approach where organizations provide public free access to data, to narrow agreements 
between two partners – i.e., a data user and a data provider (Susha, Janssen, & Verhulst, 
2017). Open data initiatives fall on the first extreme. On open data portals, public 
organizations provide a set of aggregate and de-identified datasets that any organization 
and individual can access and download (Attard et al., 2018). On the second extreme, 
there are transfers of data between two organizations, including cooperative agreements 
that specify rules to exchange sensitive and personal data, restrictions on use, and limits 
to third-party transfer and analysis (Susha et al., 2017). 
Between these extremes, data sharing assumes various forms from small 
collaborative projects, where groups of organizations occasionally share data, to 
structured networks where several actors regularly share data and information to 
coordinate everyday activities (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009; Dawes, Gharawi, & 
Burke, 2012; Weitzman, Silver, & Brazill, 2006). For instance, Dawes and colleagues 
(2009) coined the term “public sector knowledge networks” (PSKN) to distinguish 
information networks from networks finalized to the delivery and provisions of public 
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services. PSKNs are networks of public organizations whose primary purpose is to share 
information resources (Dawes et al., 2009; Eglene, Dawes, & Schneider, 2007). PSKNs 
can include nongovernmental and international organizations, and they can focus on a 
single collective problem or an entire policy domain (Dawes et al., 2012).  
However, there are substantial differences between open data and other data 
sharing initiatives. Open data portals respond to transparency, accountability, and 
participation demands from external stakeholders, particularly citizens 
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016). Data sharing initiatives respond to managerial 
needs to collaborate with other organizations, provide public services more efficiently, or 
access data to support decision-making processes and policy design. Data sharing 
initiatives are generally more complicated because organizations need to develop 
common agreements, negotiate conditions for using and sharing data, address privacy 
concerns - especially in the case of sensitive data -, and design common infrastructure 
(Chen & Lee, 2018; Dawes et al., 2009; Gil-Garcia, Pardo, & Burke, 2010; Susha et al., 
2017). Moreover, data sharing initiatives require significant financial and human 
resources to structure networks, coordinate data sharing, and integrate managerial and 
technical systems to transfer data. 
In the past 20 years public management research has spanned from investigating 
the antecedents of successful data sharing partnerships and networks (Dawes et al., 2012; 
Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016), willingness and frequency of data sharing within 
organizations and local governments departments (Bellamy, 6, Raab, Warren, & Heeney, 
2008; Dawes et al., 2009; Welch et al., 2016) to employees’ perceptions of 
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confidentiality and trade-offs between transparency and privacy (6, Bellamy, Raab, 
Warren, & Heeney, 2007). The next section outlines the most common theoretical 
approaches and main findings of data sharing research. The literature review shows a 
progressive shift from a rational approach focused on costs and benefits to a socio-
technical perspective which includes institutions and relationship characteristics. 
Integrative frameworks increasingly combine multiple approaches to explain data sharing 
within and across organizations.  
Rational choice perspective on data sharing. A rational choice framework 
argues that organizations engage in data sharing based on expected costs and benefits; 
organizations and individuals share data if they expect that the total costs will be lower 
than the total benefits (Dawes, 1996; de Montalvo, 2003; Gil-Garcia et al., 2010; 
Nedović-Budić & Pinto, 1999; Tulloch & Harvey, 2007). Costs can include the 
implementation of technical infrastructures, adoption of new tools, loss of autonomy, 
time and human resources spent in negotiations, and managerial efforts (de Montalvo, 
2003; Nedovic-Budic & Pinto, 1999). Benefits can include economies of scale, 
availability and diversity of information, and efficiency gains.  
Research drawing from a rational choice framework tends to emphasize 
managerial and organizational factors that affect the perceptions of costs and benefits, 
including perceived barriers, organizational resources and capacity, and organizational 
culture and structure.  
For instance, Dawes (1996) investigates data sharing barriers in the first data 
sharing initiatives across public agencies and she suggests three types of costs and 
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benefits that managers evaluate before sharing data: (1) political – i.e., external influence, 
power, accountability and support; (2) organizational – i.e., self-interest, networks, and 
professional norms; and (3) technical – i.e., information infrastructures and data 
structures. As public managers report higher barriers across these categories, they 
perceive greater costs and are less likely to engage in data sharing with other 
organizations.  
Other researchers have examined organizational resources and technical capacity 
arguing that organizations with lower financial and technical resources are less likely to 
engage in data sharing (Akbulut-Bailey, 2011). de Montalvo (2003) finds that public 
managers working in organizations with fewer resources do not expect to be able to 
engage in data sharing activities, perceive greater costs to increase their capacity, and 
therefore have lower incentives for sharing data. Similarly, Dawes (1996) and Gil-Garcia 
et al. (2007) argue that low capacity increases perceptions of costs while reducing the 
perceptions of benefits so as organizations are less motivated to share data.  
Finally, some researchers focus on the organization culture, which consists of the 
values, formal and informal norms, and behavior patterns diffused within the 
organization (Schein, 1985). Public organizations promoting openness and collaboration 
are more likely to engage in data sharing than organizations promoting a proprietary, 
competitive culture and establishing strict control over data management (6 et al., 2007; 
Nedović-Budić & Pinto, 2000). In a competitive environment, self-interest prevails. 
Managers are more likely to perceive high costs from sharing data (Dawes, 1996) and 
prefer to protect their organization’s position and assets rather than engage in inter-
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organizational exchanges (Gil-Garcia, Pardo, Baker, & others, 2007; Gil-Garcia & 
Sayogo, 2016; Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006). Vice versa, an 
organizational culture that promotes openness, public managers are more likely to 
perceive data sharing to be beneficial to organizational activities. 
Overall, a rational choice approach emphasizes internal factors, such as 
organizational culture, structure, management, and financial resources. Researchers 
assume that public organizations and managers act as rational agents and share data with 
others when benefits are higher than costs. This perspective provided significant insights 
and led first researchers to investigate barriers and challenges affecting the 
implementation of data sharing initiatives. However, more recent work recognizes that 
rational approaches fail to consider non-instrumental sources of motivation (Fountain, 
2007) and dedicate limited space to other social factors - institutions, relationships - 
which might shape data sharing.   
Technology and social-technical perspective to data sharing. Technology has 
played a substantial role in the data sharing literature. As governments have adopted new 
technology tools, scholars have investigated different dimensions of technology, such as 
security and privacy, interoperability and standardization, and IT design (Sayogo, Pardo, 
& Bloniarz, 2014; Welch et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2014). Data is a structured and codified 
type of information resource, which it is easy to transfer, store, and retrieve with the 
support of technology tools such as hard disks, cloud storage, compact discs, and online 
platforms (Akbulut-Bailey, 2011; Bajaj & Ram, 2007). However, public managers need 
to manage concerns about security and privacy as well as differences in technical 
  
  36 
capacity across organizations. Public management research offers two perspectives on 
technology and data sharing; one draws from a rational choice approach while the second 
is based on socio-technical theories.  
Early studies on technology drew from a rational choice approach (see section 
above) to argue that technical capacity is a necessary condition for organizations to lead 
successful data sharing initiatives. Technical capacity refers to the availability of IT 
infrastructures and tools along with an organization ability to implement, use, and 
manage them (Oliveira & Welch, 2013; Welch et al., 2016). Researchers find that high 
technical capacity greatly facilitates data sharing projects, but it is not a sufficient 
condition for data sharing (Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; Welch et al., 2016; Sayogo et al., 
2014; Vest & Issel, 2014; Yang et al., 2014). Other social and institutional barriers 
become important as technical capacity is addressed within data sharing initiatives.  
Interoperability across information systems is another key technical issue. Most 
organizations have information systems that are not or cannot be connected, hindering the 
opportunity to share data (Landsbergen & Wolken, 1998; Pardo et al., 2006; Vest & Issel, 
2014). Interoperability can also refer to the standardization of data, including common 
formatting of shared data and metadata, the management of ontologies, and the 
harmonization of definitions and methods for collecting data across organizations (Gil-
Garcia, 2010; Sayogo et al., 2014; Vest & Issel, 2014). There is heterogeneity in the 
formats that public organizations use to share data, “which include anything from images, 
PDF, and CVS files and Excel sheets, to higher structured XML files and database 
records” (Attard et al., 2018, p. 400). Lack of interoperability prevents public 
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organizations from providing and receiving data; because data are organized differently, 
organizations cannot combine datasets and face challenges in extracting information from 
inadequate formats.  
More recently, the study of technology in data sharing initiatives has moved 
beyond a rational approach to adopt a socio-technical perspective. Socio-technical 
theories argue that technology use and adoption are shaped by and depend on the social 
system in which technological tools, systems, and infrastructures are embedded (Bostrom 
& Heinen, 1977). The social system includes individuals, authority structure, 
organizational culture, and work characteristics, among others (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977; 
Feeney & Welch, 2014; Mehra, 2009; Oliveira & Welch, 2013). The impact of 
technology and its uses, applications, and outcomes are a function of how the social and 
the technological systems are integrated and how they interact with one another. 
A socio-technical perspective emphasizes how the design of infrastructure and 
tools for sharing data is shaped by the characteristics of the social environment in which 
organizations are embedded (Bekkers, 2007, 2009; Black et al., 2003; Yang et al., 2014). 
Bekkers (2009) finds that public organizations organize information sharing in different 
ways. A "centralized integration” model occurs when one organization coordinates and 
re-distributes information to others. In an "interface connections" model each 
organization is responsible for sharing with others, while in an "information broker" 
model a third party facilitates and coordinates information sharing. Finally, a "shared 
information infrastructure" model is designed so as information is stored and uploaded in 
a shared space.  
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Different factors influence how organizations integrate information. For instance, 
asymmetries of power influence the characteristics of the information shared; 
authorization to access sensitive data; privacy and security solutions; and design of 
infrastructure, including the degree of integration and centralization of the system (Yang 
et al., 2014). Asymmetry in technological capacity can also affect infrastructure design 
(Vest & Issel, 2014). When public agencies have a relatively similar size and few 
functions, share power over common issues, and have a similar technical capacity, they 
are more likely to agree on a decentralized data sharing system in which no single 
organization is predominant (Yang et al., 2014). Centralized systems are more difficult to 
implement if organizations have similar power and size because no organization wants to 
delegate part of its autonomy to a central player.  
Findings from socio-technical research challenge a rational choice approach to 
data sharing because costs and benefits are not the primary drivers of infrastructure 
design. Centralized systems are often less expensive and less complicated than 
decentralized ones, yet organizations prefer decentralized infrastructures (Yang et al. 
2014). Overall, researchers note that technology is a necessary condition to increase 
government exchange, access and use of data, but technology is not sufficient by itself 
(Azad, 1998; Gil-Garcia et al., 2010). Organizations need to combine human, technical, 
institutional and social factors to understand the performance of data sharing projects and 
initiatives (Dawes et al., 2009, 2012; Roberts, 2011).  
Inter-organizational relationships and data sharing. Studies on inter-
organizational relationships include a variety of perspectives that investigate the 
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characteristics of inter-organizational relationships including dependence and autonomy; 
trust and reciprocity; value and culture conflicts; and structures and incentives to 
overcome inter-organizational differences.  
Resource dependency theory and inter-organization relationship studies suggest 
that data sharing depends on the characteristics of organization relationships, such as 
necessity, asymmetries, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy, as well as the 
mechanisms that regulate and support them (Azad & Wiggins, 1995; Oliver, 1990). For 
instance, organizations aim to maintain their autonomy. They engage in cooperative 
behaviors, including data sharing, only if the loss of autonomy is minimal or is 
compensated by greater outcomes and benefits for the organization (Azad & Wiggins, 
1995). Moreover, organizations might be more likely to engage in data sharing if they 
face the necessity to coordinate with others, or the need to acquire legitimacy within their 
environment by engaging with other organizations.  
Other studies highlight that past relationships across organizations affect data 
sharing, such as the willingness to provide data to common initiatives (Chen & Lee, 
2018; Dawes et al., 2009; Gil-Garcia, Pardo, & Burke, 2010), and show that perceptions 
of trust, fairness, and equity in inter-organizational relationships are fundamental to 
achieve collaboration and data sharing (Black et al., 2003; Chen & Lee, 2018; Chow & 
Chan, 2008; Gil-Garcia et al., 2010; Nedović-Budić & Pinto, 2000; Karlsson, Frostenson, 
Prenkert, Kolkowska, & Helin, 2017). 
Trust are positive expectations of others’ behavior and a “willingness to be 
vulnerable” by relying on others (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 394). Trust 
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can develop through frequent and long-term interactions among organizations which 
shape expectations towards behaviors and attitudes of others (Black et al., 2003). For 
instance, trust increases expectations of reciprocity, which facilitate coordination, 
collaboration, and sharing of resources, because organizations expect that they will 
receive something in return and are more willing to invest resources into inter-
organizational relationships. When actors lack or have low trust towards others, they 
might have negative expectations towards relationship outcomes and they need to 
implement strategies to prevent abuse and free riders, therefore increasing transaction 
costs, time, and effort required to support collaboration and resource sharing (Chow & 
Chan, 2008; Newell & Swan, 2000). 
Karlsson and colleagues (2017) show that trust has a positive effect on inter-
organizational information sharing in the public sector. Public managers can develop trust 
among parties involved by preventing the occurrence of events that undermine trust, such 
as information misuse or unmet expectations. Gil-Garcia et al. (2010) work echoes this 
finding and shows that cross-boundary information sharing relies on "trusted social 
networks," where past and present cooperation experiences among individuals are central 
to the develop of trust and, therefore, willingness to share data. Looking at a data network 
across public organizations in a metropolitan area in Nebraska, Chen and Lee (2017) find 
that public organizations who trust their partners are more likely to actively engage in the 
data network and collaborate to move forward the network goals. They note that trust 
develops either through frequent inter-personal interactions among managers, or through 
institutions, such as rules, data standards, and norms. Public managers who frequently 
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interact develop a set of expectations regarding the behavior of other organizations, 
which increasing their willingness to rely on them, provide information, and collaborate. 
Institutions provide a set of shared expectations on how other organizations will behave 
because of their formal commitment to the network (trust stemming from institutions will 
be discussed to greater extent in Chapter 3).  
Interpersonal relationships also help to overcome distrust and conflictual values 
among otherwise different groups, organizations, and departments (Chen & Lee, 2018). 
Relationships across organizations entail differences and similarities of values embedded 
in their culture (Drake et al., 2004; Sayogo, Pardo, & Bloniarz, 2014; Yang & Maxwell, 
2011). As they collaborate, organizations need to deal with value conflicts that might 
hinder data exchange. Drake and colleagues (2004) discuss differences in values across 
three subcultures in the public sector - scientific, political and bureaucratic – which lead 
to different approaches to data and information use. Because of their training and 
professional beliefs, scientists mostly aim to analyze data and create reliable information. 
Politicians face the challenge to balance competing interests and they primarily utilize 
data and information to prioritize, deliberate, and justify decisions. Bureaucrats are 
concerned about legal requirements and consider data a commodity that feeds decision-
making processes and organizational operations. Sub-cultures makes sharing data more 
difficult because of differences in values and expectations that lower trust and 
reciprocity. Furthermore, individuals differently organize data and information within 
datasets and indicators based on their sub-culture. Cultural differences might obstruct 
data use by other organizations which are not familiar with knowledge practices, values, 
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and norms that are embedded into data (Atabakhsh, Larson, Petersen, Violette, & Chen, 
2004).  
Organizations can design structures and incentives to overcome difficulties 
stemming from the lack of trust or cultural differences. A project manager plays an 
important leadership role by coordinating the different actors and moderating cultural and 
organizational differences (Akbulut-Bailey, 2011; Black et al., 2003; Nedović-Budić & 
Pinto, 1999; Sayogo et al., 2014). Well-managed data sharing projects are more likely to 
successfully address challenges stemming from cultural clashes (Azad, 1998; Gil-Garcia 
& Sayogo, 2016). They are also more likely to secure funding and resources needed to 
successfully share information and data, which increase trust towards the project's ability 
to achieve its goals and provide incentives for organizations to participate (Chen & Lee, 
2018; Fusi et al., 2018; Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016). Finally, a project manager might 
facilitate the development of common data standards (Chen & Lee, 2018) which remove 
social and cognitive barriers that might prevent the exchange of information resources 
(Yang & Wu, 2016). 
Other researchers emphasize the collaborative and voluntary nature of data 
sharing initiatives and focus on the conditions under which organizations provide their 
data. Conditions can include privacy terms and non-transfer agreements; responsibilities 
on shared datasets; limitations to commercial use or reproducibility; restrictions on scope 
and access; and so on. Susha et al. (2017) examine "data collaboratives", which are 
initiatives where private and public organizations cooperate to design incentives for the 
exchange and use of and access to a common pool of data. Data collaboratives face 
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significant coordination problems and tackle them with a variety of instruments, ranging 
from negotiated agreements between two or more parties to unilateral agreements where 
the data provider establishes terms of data use and transfer without negotiating with the 
counterpart. Organizations can also adopt an intermediary model where a third-party 
organization facilitates the provider-user relationship, either by facilitating the 
negotiation of common conditions or matching providers and users that have similar 
needs (Attard, Orlandi, Scerri, & Auer, 2015; Susha et al., 2017; Zuiderwijk & Janssen, 
2014). 
In summary, literature investigating inter-organizational relationships in data 
sharing draws from a variety of theoretical backgrounds, ranging from social exchange 
and social capital theory to studies on network and collaboration. Findings consistently 
show that trust significantly facilitates data sharing and public organizations need to 
design managerial and collaborative structure that create incentives for sharing data or 
promote trust by regulating data use and transfer.   
Institutions. The perspectives described so far - rational choice approach, socio-
technical theories, and inter-organizational relationship studies - marginalize the 
institutional context in which public organizations are embedded and ignore "non-
instrumental sources of motivation that stem from institutions" (Fountain, 2001, p. 65). 
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social 
interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3). Institutions shape organizational preferences and 
constrain organizational behavior and action by establishing common expectations, rules, 
and norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fountain, 2001). The institutional environment 
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has a strong influence on public organizations as they need to respond to legal and 
political pressures in order to maintain legitimacy among external stakeholders (Bozeman 
& Bretschneider, 1986; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Rainey, 2009). 
There is mixed evidence regarding how institutions shape data exchange. 
Researchers suggest that formal institutions which mandate data sharing (e.g., rules, 
regulations, and organizational policies) facilitate data exchange within and across 
organizations (Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; Karlson et al. 2017; Landsbergen & Wolken, 
1998; Yang & Maxwell, 2011). Formal institutions exert coercive pressures over public 
organizations and managers who are compelled to conform to these prescriptions. For 
instance, researchers find that Freedom of Information laws mandating government 
agencies to provide data upon requests from external stakeholders increase the provision 
of data and information compared to other written or informal requests (Worthy, John, & 
Vannoni, 2017). Public employees are more responsive and willing to cooperate with 
applicant requests when facing a legal obligation.  
However, literature also suggests that bureaucrats might resist the mandatory 
provision of information. Bureaucrats can ignore institutional mandates due to resource 
constraints, internal divergences over the interpretation of the rules, or a lack of 
knowledge about rules and laws (Bauhr & Grimes, 2013; Worthy, John, & Vannoni, 
2017). Institutional provisions might be in contrast with internal policies, other 
regulations protecting transparency and personal information, and, more broadly, with 
traditional bureaucratic values that emphasize internal expertise and processes over 
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accountability and openness (Meijer, 2015). When institutions create uncertainty over the 
appropriate behavior, they leave space for public managers to act at their discretion.  
The tension between openness and privacy is the focus of the work conducted by 
6 and colleagues (6 et al., 2007; Bellamy et al., 2008) who investigate how public 
employees balance and align their actions with a web of formal and informal 
requirements; how formal requirements impact data sharing practices, particularly 
perceptions of confidentiality and trust; and the effect of both formal and informal 
institutions on interagency data sharing. Public employees face an imperative to share 
data and information with other organizations to improve public service provision and 
policy effectiveness. At the same time, they are required to comply with regulations and 
laws that address privacy and security concerns to prevent the release of sensitive 
information. 6 and colleagues find that formal institutions increase trust among agencies 
and managers' confidence in sharing data outside the organizational boundaries. 
Managers who work in highly institutionalized contexts are more confident that they 
understand other agencies’ behavior and are able to judge when it is appropriate to share 
data. Managers also report that they rely on informal relationships and draw from their 
professional training and norms to deal with privacy concerns that are not addressed by 
regulation. Because regulation is still at its infancy, managers’ initiative and discretion 
play an important role to bend or comply with formal rules. 
Finally, Fountain draws attention to the institutional pressures that are internal to 
the public sector, such as the vertical structure of the bureaucracy, accountability, 
legislation, and budgeting. Public organizations are increasingly organized into horizontal 
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forms of collaboration and interaction, such as networks. Yet, Fountain notes that the 
hierarchical and departmentalized structure of public agencies still hinder data sharing. In 
particular, formal and informal norms related to accountability, legislation, and budgeting 
procedures reinforce the separation of departmental activities and resources, 
institutionalize hierarchical responsibilities, and, overall, do not “fit” with the 
requirements of a collaborative and horizontal inter-organizational model of information 
and data sharing.  
The study of institutions in data sharing is still at its infancy. Several findings are 
based on a small number of case studies which pay little attention to high-level 
institutions. Moreover, studies are generally limited to data sharing among public 
agencies, and we know little about how laws, regulations, and organizational policies 
affect cross-sector data sharing. Finally, hypotheses on institutional drivers of data 
sharing are often based on theory, but they have not been tested empirically.  
Integrative frameworks for data sharing. As data sharing literature grows, 
researchers have combined theoretical approaches and empirical findings into integrative 
frameworks that provide a more comprehensive understanding of data sharing practices 
within and across government agencies. These frameworks depict the complex 
relationships among organizational, socio-technical, relational, and institutional factors 
and describe how they influence data sharing. Here, I highlight three main integrative 
theoretical frameworks that have been commonly applied in public management 
scholarship (6 et al., 2007; Fountain, 2007; Gil-Garcia, Pardo, & Burke, 2010; Yang & 
Maxwell, 2011).  
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Gil-Garcia et al. (2010) developed a framework entitled “Cross Boundary Inter-
Agency Information Sharing” (CBIIS) to highlight the integration between technological 
components -such as technical infrastructures, interoperability, and shared data - and 
social ones - such as trusted social networks. The framework emphasizes the role of 
technology in data sharing while recognizing that technology implementation and 
adoption require trusted social networks among public managers. Trusted social networks 
buffer the conflicts that arise in the development of shared socio-technical systems and 
foster collaboration among organizations.  
The strength of the framework is to highlight the critical technical components 
that government agencies need to consider while designing data sharing infrastructure. 
However, it falls short in including other social components, such as institutional and 
inter-organizational factors, that influence data sharing and infrastructure design (see 
previous sections on socio-technical perspectives and institutions) beyond the trust 
embedded in social networks. 
Fountain (2006) integrated institutionalism with network theory and public 
management scholarship to propose a "multi-level framework for integrated information 
systems" (MIIS). The MIIS suggests that data flows are shaped by three types of factors: 
(i) formal institutions, including the legal framework, regulations, and contracts; (ii) 
organizational procedures, rules, and routines that shape public employees' behavior and 
transaction; and (iii) common practices and norms that are built by organizational groups 
and teams through collaboration. Data exchanges can occur at any of these levels and 
levels can mutually influence one another. For instance, high-level, formal institutions 
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can shape organizational practices as well as preferences and incentives for the formation 
of groups and teams within organizations. Vice versa, relationships formed within groups 
and teams can modify institutions and design new organizational practices and norms for 
sharing data.  
Fountain’s framework tackles the complexity of data sharing and moves beyond 
the study of collaborative initiatives. Fountain considers data and information sharing as 
an essential component of the management of public organizations and an underlying 
theme to the adoption of new technologies. Her work explicitly theorizes the impact that 
the traditional structure and institutions of the public sector – e.g., bureaucracy and 
hierarchy - have on information flows. However, her framework does not address the 
challenges and barriers that public managers face when seeking data and information 
outside the boundaries of the public sector (Dawes et al., 2009, 2012). The framework 
also marginalizes the role of inter-organizational relationships and assign a limited role to 
technology infrastructure and design. Previous research has suggested that technology 
design depends not only upon internal culture and structure but also power and 
dependencies embedded in inter-organizational relationships (Yang & Wu, 2016). 
Finally, Yang and Maxwell (2011) revised previous work on data and information 
sharing and proposed a set of models to explain data sharing within and across public 
organizations. They recognize that data sharing occurs at different levels - across 
individuals, across units, and across organizations - and argue that different factors shape 
data sharing within each level. At the individual level, public employees' attitudes toward 
data sharing and their perceptions of power and privacy shape data sharing. For instance, 
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public employees with higher privacy concerns are less likely to share data. Across 
departments, data sharing is shaped by organizational culture and norms, social networks, 
reward structure, and power games, and common beliefs. Across organizations, 
technological, organizational, and political factors affect data sharing. Factors at different 
levels might be interrelated. For instance, social networks, trust, and individual attitudes 
might mediate the effect of legislatures and politics on data sharing. Within 
organizations, individual attitudes might shape the development of social networks, 
which in turn affect intra-organizational data sharing.  
The value of Yang and Maxwell’s literature review is to emphasize the different 
factors that researchers have investigated so far. Moreover, they highlight how current 
research lacks an empirical test of the indirect relationships that might occur across 
organizational, political, institutional, and technological factors. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the current literature on data sharing, starting from a broad 
overview of research on information use in organizations to the definition of information 
resource types – data, information, and knowledge – and the theoretical approaches 
currently applied in public management research.  
I define "data" as raw information that is not yet or is hardly elaborated and 
presents itself in the form of numbers, words, figures, recorded voice, videos, and 
pictures. Data are a crucial input to organizations because managers can use data to 
develop novel information and knowledge and improve organizational outcomes. Public 
organizations have a growing interest in data as technology has provided new, cheaper, 
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and more efficient tools to collect, manage, analyze and store data. Yet, the availability of 
data is still highly dependent on the ability of managers to access data from other 
organizations.  
Data sharing is the transfer of data from one organization to another. It can 
assume several forms, from one-to-one exchanges of data to collaborative projects and 
structured networks. Researchers have approached data sharing from different theoretical 
perspectives:  rational choice frameworks focusing on costs and benefits as well as 
studies discussing institutions, inter-organizational relationships, and socio-technical 
factors. Integrated frameworks for data sharing advance research by combining multiple 
theoretical perspectives to capture the multi-level structure and the complex relationships 
that influence data sharing. Results from the application of integrative frameworks 
suggest that a single theoretical approach might not explain the complexity of sharing 
data and information. 
From the review of the literature, I identify four main gaps that public 
management scholarships should address to inform public managers on how to improve 
access to and sharing of data. 
First, few studies have considered how public managers exchange data with 
internal and external stakeholders in their daily activities. Most research is influenced by 
a collaborative governance approach which assumes that organizations are willing to 
share data and information collaboratively. For instance, case studies mostly focus on 
collaborative initiatives that promote data sharing within a policy domain or among 
actors that have common interests - e.g., face the same policy problem. Collaborative 
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initiatives emphasize trust, governance, and common problems and goals but give limited 
attention to conflicts, power dynamics, and tensions that might arise in inter-
organizational relationships. In reality, it is reasonable to assume that most data 
exchanges occur outside structured relationships. In their day-to-day activities, public 
managers request data from organizations that might or might not share them because 
they have no or little incentives to share data. Yet few studies look at data sharing that 
occurs across loosely connected organizations (Jennings & Hall, 2012; Welch et al., 
2016), and most of them examine only intra-organizational sharing (6 et al., 2007; Kim & 
Lee, 2006; Willem & Buelens, 2007).  
Second, we know little about public managers' role in data sharing and how they 
negotiate and manage the exchange of data and information across a variety of 
stakeholders. Current research largely focuses on the management of data sharing 
initiatives, including the deployment of technology tools and infrastructure, long-term 
funding, project scope, timing, communication, and demonstrable progress. Management 
assumes that organizations develop common organizational structures and practices (6, 
2004), which constitute the premise for integrating data sharing processes. However, 
most public organizations are unlikely to adopt integrated solutions to share data because 
of their limited capacity and financial constraints. Public managers more likely opt to 
balance a mix of formal and informal coordination mechanisms to achieve collaboration 
with external stakeholders (6, 2004; Guo & Acar, 2005). A key question that public 
management research should address is under what conditions formal and informal 
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coordination mechanisms are successful and how public managers should leverage 
formal or informal coordination to access data from a variety of stakeholders.  
Third, most studies consider data sharing within and across public organizations, 
but they rarely investigate data sharing across sectors. Qualitative studies have found that 
barriers to exchange data are higher when public organizations engage with 
nongovernmental organizations (Azad & Wiggins, 1995; Cuganesan, Hart, & Steele, 
2017; Dawes et al., 2009). Research on cross-sector collaboration also provides evidence 
that relationships with nongovernmental actors are more challenging than same-sector 
relationships, and public managers adopt different strategies across their relationship 
portfolio (Esteve, Boyne, Sierra, & Ysa, 2013). In order to increase data availability and 
ultimately improve decision-making processes, we need to consider the whole portfolio 
of relationships of public organizations and how antecedents of data sharing might differ 
across stakeholders.  
Finally, most contributions to data sharing literature are theoretical or utilize data 
from few case studies (Dawes et al., 2009, 2012; Fountain, 2007; Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 
2016; Roberts, 2011). Few studies use large-scale quantitative methods to understand 
data sharing in the public sector (Welch et al., 2016). While case studies offer rich data to 
build theoretical hypotheses, quantitative analyses might provide generalizable results to 
guide policies at a national and federal level.  
In the next chapter I propose an “Integrative Framework for Data Access” (IFDA) 
in the public sector. The IFDA aims to contribute to current literature by focusing its 
attention to the main gaps identified in this section.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR DATA ACCESS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Despite the several studies discussed in Chapter 2, there remains a persistent 
interest in how managers can establish practices to access data from other organizations 
and improve data sharing within their agencies and outside organizational boundaries. 
This research assumes that public managers are information seekers who search and aim 
to obtain data from other organizations (Allard et al., 2018; Jennings & Hall, 2012; 
Levin, 1991; Susha et al., 2017). As public organizations are more interconnected within 
broad nets of relationships, public managers face a growing number of challenges and 
pressures to obtain information from a variety of sources to feed decision-making 
processes (Graber, 1992; Lee, 2013). The term “data access” indicates an organization’s 
capacity to timely obtain data from other organizations. If access to information can 
improve decision-making processes, then understanding the determinants and likelihood 
of accessing data is fundamental to improve public outcomes and service quality. Public 
organizations with greater data access capacity will have greater availability of 
information and data to improve their performance. Moreover, public managers who can 
access data promptly can rely on up-to-date information to guide decision-making 
processes. 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework of this research entitled 
“Integrated Framework for Data Access” (IFDA). The chapter presents each dimension 
and component of the theoretical framework. First, it illustrates the vertical dimension, 
which includes institutions, social environment, and coordination mechanisms. Second, it 
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presents the horizontal dimension, which accounts for the portfolio of relationships from 
which public organizations request data. Finally, it describes the research context which 
includes cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000 in the US.  
Introduction to the Integrated Framework for Data Access 
Data access is of theoretical interest because it provides the opportunity to 
investigate how public organizations and managers deal with a portfolio of relationships 
in a loosely structured environment. As highlighted before, a collaborative approach to 
data sharing fails to acknowledge how public agencies can improve data access as part of 
their daily activities and routines. While collaboration and cooperation across multiple 
actors encourage data use and positively affect trust, data sharing is most often 
challenged by proprietary and security concerns regarding data use and misuse, and 
power dynamics among data owners that wish to maintain control over information and 
data.  
The Integrated Framework for Data Access (IFDA) emphasizes how data sharing 
efforts are often initiated by public organizations that need to access data to make 
decisions, control their environment, and provide adequate services to their constituencies 
(Graber, 1992; Lee, 2013). The IFDA draws from an open system approach which 
considers organizations embedded in a wide web of loosely structured relationships with 
other organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Scott, 2003). Obtaining resources from 
these relationships is necessary for an organization to survive, but it requires effort as 
other organizations often lack or have low incentives to collaborate. For instance, 
organizations might resist providing data to public agencies because it might damage 
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their activities or erode their competitive advantage. Public managers play a crucial role 
because they can utilize strategies to bend inter-organizational relationships and therefore 
increase data access capacity within organizations.  
The IFDA includes both a vertical and a horizontal dimension as illustrated in 
figure 2. The "vertical" dimension integrates institutional theory, resource dependence 
theory, and collaboration studies and highlights the multi-level structure of the factors 
that influence data access. Previous studies have widely suggested the appropriateness of 
a multilevel approach to investigate data sharing (Fountain, 2007; Yang & Maxwell, 
2011). At the highest level, the institutional and social environment influence the 
behavior of the organizations. Institutional theory suggests that regulations and norms 
provide incentives and rewards for organizations that adopt prescribed behaviors and 
actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Resource dependency 
perspective argues that the exchange of resources - such as data - is influenced by the 
social structure of the environment in which public organizations are embedded, 
particularly power relationships. Data is a strategic resource and power affects the 
decision of organizations to disclose or withhold information to public agencies (Graber, 
1992).  
At the lowest level, coordination mechanisms show how public managers 
structure dependencies and relationships with other organizations that are not 
subordinated to them by hierarchy or market mechanisms (Malone & Crowston, 1994; 
Susha et al., 2017). Coordination mechanisms explain how collaboration and resource 
exchange occur between two or more organizations. For instance, city government 
  
  56 
managers can develop formalized arrangements, leverage personal networks, or 
communicate with other managers to facilitate data exchange among organizations 
(Tulloch & Harvey, 2007; Willem & Buelens, 2007). Coordination can also refer to data 
sharing agreements to regulate control, responsibilities, and data ownership in data 
sharing projects or organizational routines to exchange data (Nedović-Budić & Pinto, 
1999; Susha et al., 2017). The data sharing literature hints at coordination mechanisms 
but lacks a solid theoretical and empirical framework to examine them.   
The “horizontal” dimension emphasizes the portfolio of relationships from which 
public agencies request data. Public organizations can request data from other 
departments in their organization, other public agencies, or nongovernmental 
organizations. Previous literature suggests that there are differences between intra- and 
inter-organizational relationships as well as between same and cross-sector relationships 
when it comes to collaboration, interaction, and data sharing (Daley, 2009; Dawes, 
Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009; Eglene, Dawes, & Schneider, 2007). Researchers have 
advanced hypotheses on how data exchange is structured across this portfolio of 
relationships, but they have not systematically and theoretically examined the validity 
and contingencies of those prescriptions. Understanding differences across stakeholder 
types is important to increase data access capacity in public organizations. When 
departments obtain data and information from outside organizations but do not share 
them internally, public organizations might end up duplicating their efforts to collect 
data. Similarly, if internal data exchange is efficient, but departments have little access to 
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external information, there might be little new information to feed decision-making 
processes.  
This research expands current studies by investigating the social and institutional 
aspects that characterize each relationship type. In the IFDA, the horizontal dimension 
intersects with the coordination mechanisms to explore how coordination mechanisms 
apply across the portfolio of relationships of a public agency and how different barriers 
might affect data access in each relationship type.  
Figure 2 shows the IFDA. The study’s core hypothesis is that data access (the 
dependent variable) will be explained by systematic differences in the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions, such as differences across institutional settings, social 
environment, coordination mechanisms, and the portfolio of relationships. The research 
focuses on three types of data access: data access from other departments in the city, data 
access from other public agencies, including federal, state or local agencies, and data 
access from nongovernmental organizations, including both nonprofit and private for-
profit organizations.  
 
Figure 2. Integrative Framework for Data Sharing (IFDA) 
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Vertical Dimensions: Institutions, Organizational Context and Coordination 
Mechanisms. 
The vertical dimension of the framework describes how and why institutions, 
social environment, and coordination mechanisms affect data access in the public sector. 
Each dimension is briefly described below.  
Institutions. As discussed in the previous chapter, institutions are “humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction” (North, 
1990, p. 97). The institutional environment in which organizations are embedded can 
include the political context, economics rules, culture, regulations, and laws, among 
others. Institutions can be either formal such as laws and regulations, or informal 
stemming from practices, norms, and values that regulate society, organizations, and 
groups.  
Institutions transversally apply to all organizations and individuals, thereby 
shaping the framework within which organizations interact, exchange, and collaborate 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Researchers who focus on 
institutions recognize that “organizations compete not just for resources and customers, 
but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Therefore, organizations show a tendency to 
conform to institutional pressures in order to be accepted by other actors, access 
resources, and collaborate.  
There is a vast literature that investigates the role of institutions in collaboration 
and resource exchange. Studies on collaboration between public organizations and 
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nongovernmental actors show that the institutional environment legitimizes collaboration 
and models the social, legal, and political structure that facilitates or hinders interactions 
across organizations (Allard et al., 2018; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Daley, 2009; 
Dawes et al., 2009; Smith, 2009). 
Particularly, institutions provide a reference framework for organizations when 
they need to adapt to new structures or are forced to change internal procedures and 
routines (Dawes et al., 2009; Tolbert, 1985). Dawes and colleagues (2009, p. 398) note 
that “without an enabling policy framework, the risk-averse culture of government is 
likely to dominate decisions and actions.” Institutions enable the adoption of new 
practices and facilitate change within public agencies by defining non-instrumental 
incentives (Fountain, 2001). In some cases, institutions explicitly codify changes and 
mandate inter-organizational collaboration via formal norms and rules. In some others, 
institutions are used to signal the behaviors that are socially accepted in the environment 
by other organizations.  
Institutional theory has also suggested that institutions might play an important 
role in trust-building processes. Research has widely shown that trust among actors is one 
of the main antecedents of data sharing and collaboration (Chen & Lee, 2018; Dawes, 
Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009; Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; Thomson & Perry, 2006). As 
mentioned above, trust is the “willingness to be vulnerable” and to take risks by 
interacting, exchanging resources, and collaborative with other actors. Trust stems from 
frequent interactions, whereas actors interacting more often are more likely to develop 
positive expectations about others. Yet trust developed within a dyadic relationship 
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benefits only the actors involved. Moreover, differences across actors and emerging 
conflicts might challenge trust in the long run (see: section “inter-organizational 
relationships and data sharing”).  
Institutional studies note that when trust stems from institutions, it benefits not 
only the actors involved in the relationship but the broader context in which an 
organization operates (Smith, 2009). Social norms, for instance, encourage actors to 
maintain a certain behavior and make them more predictable, thereby increasing 
organizations’ willingness to “trust” him. A shared legal framework can define 
expectations and set limits to organizational action; under these conditions, organizations 
might be more willing to cooperate because institutions ensure the safety and legitimacy 
of the collaboration (Smith, 2009). 
In the IFDA, I distinguish between coercive and normative pressures that 
institutions might exert over organizations. Privacy laws and legal mandates to share data 
are primary sources of coercive pressures over organizations because they codify 
expectations, create constraints that organizations need to comply with, and define 
national and local incentive structures to share data (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Berry & 
Berry, 2007). Formal institutions might either enable data sharing by establishing 
common rules for organizations and increasing trust in the environment, or hinder data 
sharing as organizations become afraid of violating legal prescriptions.  
Normative pressures occur when institutions shape preferences and cultural 
expectations of organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fountain, 2007). For instance, 
open data research shows that citizens and external stakeholders might exert pressures for 
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public organizations to provide their data online in an open access format 
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016). Normative pressures are particularly effective when 
behaviors and actions of actors are highly visible to others. For instance, studies have 
shown that the adoption of a website and other e-government tools by some organizations 
has created normative pressures towards other organizations to adopt similar tools and 
conform to the expectations of the environment in order to maintain legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; West, Mayer-Schönberger, 
& Lazer, 2007). In the case of data sharing, visible informal institutions might include 
websites promoting transparency and openness, task forces, strategic documents, or 
organizational position dedicate to data management (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018; 
Tolbert, 1985). 
Social environment. City departments are increasingly connected with one 
another and with other nongovernmental organizations in order to address the complexity 
of policy design and public service delivery (Hale, 2011; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Social relationships are instrumental to organizations because they facilitate or hinder 
access to resources needed to achieve organizational goals (Levine & White, 1961). 
Research on data sharing suggests that relationships may vary by type, characteristics, 
and frequency of interactions in ways that promote or hinder the formation of data 
exchange relationships (Dawes et al., 2009; Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; for a complete 
review see chapter 2).  
Power dynamics are an important predictor of data sharing. Power is defined as 
the capacity of one organization to pressure another one and orient its decisions to 
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address the needs of its membership (Emerson, 1962, 1976; Molm, 1994). Resource 
dependency theory suggests that power is key to understand the nature of relationships 
and the flow of resources among organizations; organizations engage in transactions and 
exchanges with other organizations to either maintain, improve, or reinforce their power 
position (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When external organizations hold power over public 
organizations, they might be more likely to refuse to share data and withhold the 
requested information. By contrast, public agencies in a power position might have easier 
access to data from other stakeholders.  
In a recent article, Meijer (2018) highlights the data ecosystems in which cities 
are embedded and the power dynamics among involved actors. He describes examples of 
private companies, such as Airbnb and Uber, which refuse to provide data to public 
agencies. Power dynamics reflect the value associated to data access and use as well as 
political goals of actors involved (Garcia, Pardo, and Nam 2016). Data are raw inputs that 
might provide organizations with novel information and knowledge to improve their 
performance and gain a competitive advantage over other organizations. They can also be 
manipulated and used to support positions or strategies that damage the data owner 
(Meijer, 2018; Meijer & Thaens, 2018; Stone, 2001). As they represent such critical 
resources, data exchanges are characterized by issues of power across organizations. 
Coordination mechanisms. Current scholarship lacks a systemic investigation of 
coordination mechanisms for data sharing. Collaboration and network management 
studies suggest that government managers need to balance the integration of formal 
institutional structures, such as memoranda of understanding, with informal coordination 
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based on personal relationships and commitment (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Thomson & 
Perry, 2006). Based on these studies, the IFDA recognizes that managers design and 
implement diverse coordination mechanisms to exchange data with other stakeholders 
and test their effectiveness across the portfolio of relationships.  
Researchers have classified coordination mechanisms according to different 
dimensions. March and Simon (1958) differentiate between coordination "by plan" when 
common activities are managed in advance and coordination "by feedback" when 
common activities are managed ex-post. Malone and Crowston (1994) note that 
coordination might address different types of interdependence across organizational tasks 
and operations: prerequisite interdependence, shared resource, and simultaneity. Mandell 
and Steelman (2003) differentiate between intermittent coordination through temporary 
task forces coordinating specific tasks or domains, and permanent coordination through 
formal arrangements.  
In data sharing literature, several researchers have used formalization as the 
discriminant factor to distinguish among coordination mechanisms for exchanging data, 
information, and knowledge (Guo & Acar, 2005; Weitzman, Silver, & Brazill, 2006; 
Willem & Buelens, 2007). Formalization refers to the extent to which coordination is 
implemented and adopted at the organizational level through written agreements. At one 
extreme, organizations develop formalized routines to exchange information resources; 
on the other, public managers exchange data through personal relationships. Roberts 
(2011) finds that data exchange in the public sector occurs through either personal 
relationships among public managers and employees or structured coordination if 
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organizations develop rules to control the data sharing process, plan activities, and 
establish formal roles. Similarly, Weitzman and colleagues (2006) note that data 
exchange mechanisms “can be positioned along a continuum of formality from highly 
structured, formalized agreements to systematically collect information to informal data-
sharing relationships among agencies or analysts within agencies” (p. 391).  
The IFDA draws from the work conducted by Willem and Buelens (2007) who 
classify coordination mechanisms in formal, lateral, and informal coordination. This 
classification includes most mechanisms that have been discussed in previous research 
(Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016; Kim & Lee, 2006; Tulloch & Harvey, 2007; 
Welch et al., 2016; Yang & Maxwell, 2011). Formal coordination is based on written 
agreements among organizations to design routines to regularly exchange data and 
information. Routines can take the form of regular exchanges of data via email; 
submissions of data through IT systems; or scheduled uploads of data on a cloud 
platform. Lateral coordination relies on written agreements that are developed between 
two or more organizations on a case-by-case basis. For instance, public managers can 
sign a data sharing agreement to provide a dataset to another organization or submit a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain data from another public agency. 
Compared to formal coordination, lateral coordination does not assume that the exchange 
of data will repeat in the future and does not lead to regular exchanges of data among the 
organizations. Finally, public managers can access data through informal coordination by 
leveraging personal and professional relationships. They can contact previous coworkers, 
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friends, and other personal and professional connections in other organizations in order to 
obtain data. 
Horizontal Dimension: Relationship Portfolio 
Government agencies have become increasingly dependent from external 
stakeholders due to the growing complexity of the policy environment, globalization, 
reform movements to limit government, and advancements in technology (Fishenden & 
Thompson, 2013; Guo & Acar, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). For instance, 
government agencies are partnering with nongovernmental organizations to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness of public services and develop new solutions in the face of 
significant budget cuts, particularly at the state and local level (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). 
Other government agencies are privatizing or outsourcing public services to save 
financial and human resources (Alonso, Clifton, & Díaz-Fuentes, 2015; Avery, 2000; 
Girth, Hefetz, Johnston, & Warner, 2012; Marvel & Marvel, 2008) or working with 
stakeholders to address complex policy problems (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Lubell, 
Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002) and intervene in disasters and crises (Kapucu & Hu, 
2016; Wukich, Siciliano, Enia, & Boylan, 2017). 
As government agencies more extensively work with external stakeholders, they 
increasingly need to share data with a variety of external and internal stakeholders to 
coordinate common activities, oversee goals, assess the performance, and target the 
provision of public services, among others (Jennings & Hall, 2012). The diversity of a 
public agency's stakeholders impacts data access because of the different institutional and 
social factors that characterized intra- vs. inter-organizational relationships and same- vs. 
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cross-sector relationships (Daley, 2009; Yang & Maxwell, 2011). While extensive and 
varied networks might provide access to more valuable data, their complexity can be 
difficult to manage because of cultural and cognitive differences, goal conflict, technical 
barriers, and power issues (Dawes, 2009).  
Previous research shows that departments in the same city share norms, culture, 
and values which facilitate the exchange of information resources (Bolino, Turnley, & 
Bloodgood, 2002; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Similarities in professional norms also 
facilitate networks of public organizations, but the bureaucratization of managerial 
activities, jurisdictional boundaries, and task specialization obstacle data and information 
sharing (Daley, 2009). Differences in values and professional norms are particularly stark 
in cross-sector relationships, where public managers need to remove cognitive and 
cultural barriers that might hinder data access (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006; 
Daley, 2009; Guo & Acar, 2005). 
This research explores differences across the portfolio of data sharing 
relationships by examining three types of stakeholders: other departments in the same 
city, other public agencies, and non-governmental organizations, including for-profit and 
non-profit organizations. Examining data sharing antecedents across stakeholder types is 
important for at least two reasons. First, we need to understand how data sharing is 
regulated within and across organizations to increase data access capacity within the 
public sector. If department heads effectively obtain data and information from other 
organizations, but they do not share with other departments in the city, public 
organizations might duplicate effort to access data or data access might provide benefits 
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to only a few departments (Bate & Robert, 2002; Szulanski, 2000). Likewise, if public 
managers only share internally, they might face a shortage of information about the 
environment or have access only to redundant information across departments.  
Second, research has little explored factors that are unique to each context and 
factors that are common across the relationship portfolio (Yang & Maxwell, 2011). From 
a theoretical perspective, combining research on intra- and inter-organizational data 
sharing can provide new insights into how data sharing is structured. Empirically, results 
can help public managers to identify effective ways to increase data access.  
Application of the Integrative Framework for Data Sharing: Data Access in Small 
and Medium Sized Governments.   
I apply the IFDA to investigate data access across US small- and medium-sized 
cities. Data access is an essential part of public managers' work but obtaining data from 
other organizations might require significant time, efforts, and resources (Allard et al. 
2017). Large cities are likely to have the resources to lead the adoption and 
implementation of technologies to collect and share data and to bend formal rules that 
might hinder data sharing by creating new partnerships and collaborative initiatives 
(Jimenez, Mossberger, & Wu, 2012). Instead, small- and medium-sized cities often lack 
both the organizational and managerial capacity to lead inter-organizational consortiums 
and have to rely on individual entrepreneurship to mobilize resources (Fusi & Feeney, 
2016). Moreover, previous studies show that private interests and local power groups 
significantly influence policymaking in small cities, increasing the likelihood that public 
managers will face power dynamics and tensions in accessing data and information 
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(Hamin, Gurran, & Emlinger, 2014; Hamin et al., 2014). Finally, small- and medium-
sized cities benefit less from digital activist groups that promote citizen-driven open data 
and crowdsourcing initiatives that increase data availability in large cities (Graham, 
Hogan, Straumann, & Medhat, 2014). These differences across small and large cities 
make it particularly important to investigate data access in this research setting.  
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESES 
Chapter 4 outlines the hypotheses of the study. According to the IFDA, data 
access is a function of institutions, social environment, and coordination mechanisms 
(vertical dimension) as well as stakeholder differences across the portfolio of 
relationships of a city department (horizontal dimension). This chapter applies the IFDA 
and develops hypotheses on the antecedents of data access in small- and medium-sized 
cities in the US. Figure 3 summarizes the empirical framework.  
The chapter is structured as follows: first, I focus on coercive pressures stemming 
from privacy laws and legal mandate, as well as normative pressures stemming from state 
institutional capacity and visible signals, such as open data portals. Then I move to the 
social environment and discuss how stakeholders' influence impacts on data access. 
Finally, I discuss coordination mechanisms – formal, lateral, informal and technology 
tools – and their effectiveness across the relationship portfolio.  
 
Figure 3. Summary of the hypotheses 
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Institutions 
State governments are an important source of coercive and normative pressures 
for small- and medium-sized city governments, as they establish most of the policies, 
rules, and regulations that city governments need to comply with. State governments hold 
a position of power over city governments and can set expectations, provide symbolic 
incentives, and influence organizational decisions. For instance, state governments 
provide financial resources – grants, subsidies – which create incentives to comply with 
normative pressures or legally force organizations to comply with funding rules. Here I 
consider both coercive pressures stemming from state-level privacy laws and legal 
mandates and normative pressures stemming from state-level institutional capacity and 
signals of transparency.  
Coercive pressures: Privacy laws. Privacy laws bind organization actions and 
behavior by establishing rules to share and use data. Through privacy laws, state 
governments aim to balance the need for sharing data across organizations to enhance 
organization performance, accountability, and transparency with the need for protecting 
the individual rights of their citizens.  
In the United States, privacy laws are relatively weak as compared to other 
countries (Baumer, Earp, & Poindexter, 2004; Leuan, 2017; Steinhardt, 2010). There is 
no comprehensive federal law regulating privacy rights; the few existing legal provisions 
are contained in policy-specific bills, such the Health Insurance Portability and Protection 
Act and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. Most privacy laws are proposed 
and enacted by state governments to regulate issues concerning data collection, use, and 
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diffusion; third-party sharing of data; data breaches notification; individual right to 
privacy; and organizations’ duties (Leuan, 2017). Because state governments establish 
privacy laws, the institutional landscape is highly fragmented. A study conducted by a 
US law firm finds that most US states have enacted only fundamental data-related laws to 
protect citizens from unauthorized access to their data, especially when data contain 
sensitive information. Few states explicitly recognize individuals’ rights to privacy and 
protect the use and transfer of data (“Data Protection and Security Solutions for State and 
Local Government,” n.d.). 
There is mixed evidence on the effect of privacy laws on data access (Yang & 
Maxwell, 2011). On the one hand, privacy laws might increase data access. As noted in 
the previous chapter, a legal framework can act as a substitute for trust as it establishes 
minimum requirements and expectations that parties involved are required to respect 
(Smith, 2009). For instance, organizations providing data to city departments might be 
afraid of data breaches, unauthorized use of data, or other security issues. External 
stakeholders often perceive governments as lacking capacity to manage the security of 
data and information; stricter privacy laws might reduce such concerns as they establish 
minimum levels of security and plan actions that governments are required to implement. 
When state governments provide clear indications about privacy rights and limits, they 
influence trust across organizations and facilitate the exchange of resources (Fountain, 
2001; Smith, 2009).  
Moreover, privacy laws might increase perceptions of legitimacy as they 
authorize the sharing of data and information. The scope of privacy laws is to establish 
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which data and information organizations can or cannot share. Previous studies find that 
employees often refrain from providing data to other organizations because they perceive 
data sharing as risky behavior and are worried about negative consequences that can 
occur by disclosing organizational information (6, 2004). Explicit legal provisions 
increase confidence and awareness across employees on whether they can provide data 
and information to third parties, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will share 
data.  
On the other hand, privacy laws might prescribe specific limitations hindering 
data sharing. In some cases, privacy laws prevent organizations from transferring data to 
third parties or limit the type of information that organizations can share. In a recent 
study conducted by the Pew Charitable Trusts, a manager from a state government 
agency complains that privacy laws prevent the integration of databases across public 
organizations because they ban the use and sharing of individual identifiers (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2018). Privacy laws might also increase concerns about compliance 
with legal requirements. 6 and colleagues (2004) find that coercive institutions can 
increases costs and concerns among public employees who need to comply with process-
based requirements. By establishing boundaries for sharing data and treatment of 
information, privacy laws place constraints and pressures upon organizations and 
managers who might be worried about conforming to privacy laws and refraining from 
exchanging data with other organizations. Privacy laws can be a major obstacle to data 
sharing projects, even when organizations are willing to share their data (Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2018). 
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In the case of city governments, I argue that privacy laws are likely to provide 
incentives for external organizations to provide data to city departments. Local 
governments are at the center of discussions regarding privacy and security concerns 
(Newcombe, 2017; Norris, Joshi, Laura, & Tim, 2018). Given the low technical capacity 
of small cities, external stakeholders might be unwilling to share data without an 
adequate legal framework to protect data use and disclosure. Therefore, in states where 
privacy laws are stricter, external stakeholders might be more willing to collaborate with 
the local government as they feel more comfortable about data and information treatment. 
Privacy laws might reinforce the position of the local government and facilitate data 
access. Therefore, I expect that:  
H1a: State privacy laws will be positively correlated with data access.    
Coercive pressures: legal mandate of sharing data. While privacy laws provide 
a general framework for sharing data, state governments can force organizations to 
provide data to government agencies and departments. State governments often mandate 
data sharing to facilitate the implementation and design of public policies; evaluate 
organization activities and obtain benefits and funding from the government; or comply 
with regulations concerning reporting and accountability. Nonprofit organizations, for 
instance, are required to provide their financial information to government agencies, such 
as the IRS, to demonstrate compliance with the nonprofit regulation. City departments are 
required to share information with police departments for matters related to security and 
order.  
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Legal mandates exert strong coercive pressures; organizations are willing to 
comply with legal prescriptions to avoid fines and penalties. Several researchers find that 
legal authority is an important antecedent of data and information sharing (Chen & Lee, 
2017; Dawes, Cresswell & Pardo, 2009). Most government agencies report that data 
sharing mandates play a fundamental role in ensuring data access from external 
stakeholders, both other public organizations and nongovernmental ones (Allard et al., 
2017). In some cases, managers even acknowledge that state legal mandates are the most 
effective mechanism to access data from other organizations. Legal mandates simplify 
data access by establishing clear responsibilities and roles, ownership over data, and 
procedures for sharing (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018). 
Based on previous evidence, I expect that state legal mandates will be positively 
correlated with data access. Empirical and theoretical studies on data sharing and open 
government find that the adoption of laws that are supportive of data sharing has a 
positive effect on inter-organizational exchange of data and information (Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2018; Piotrowski, Rosenbloom, Kang, & Ingrams, 2018; Worthy, John, & 
Vannoni, 2017). In small- and medium-sized local governments, legal mandates might be 
particularly crucial as public managers lack the institutional capacity to influence other 
organizations’ behavior. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H1b: A legal mandate to share data across organizations will be positively 
correlated with data access.    
Normative pressures: institutional capacity. Normative pressures push 
organizations to conform to cultural norms. Organizations comply with normative 
  
  75 
pressures and adopt behaviors that align with the environmental context because they 
wish to maintain stable relationships with other organizations and gain access to 
resources (Jun & Weare, 2010; Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977; 
Scott 2011). Normative pressures can push organizations to adapt even when institutions 
are in contrast with their structure and goals or do not lead to improvements in the 
organization performance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977). 
Normative pressures are higher when cultural norms stem from actors that are in a 
position of power because they hold financial, material, and symbolic resources 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and, therefore, have greater influence over other 
organizations (Chen & Lee 2017; Gazley, 2008). State governments, for instance, provide 
significant financial resources to local governments and award legitimacy to local 
government activities. Cultural norms that are pushed forwards by state governments are 
likely very effective in influencing city governments’ behavior.  
State governments can dictate cultural norms by designing institutional 
arrangements that support sharing and openness of government data, and therefore 
building “institutional capacity” that guarantees government ability to accomplish its 
goals and support policy action (Peters & Pierre, 1998). By creating institutional 
capacity, state governments show commitment towards specific policy goals, promote the 
convergence of goals across actors, and set general expectations for city governments 
(Smith, 2009). For instance, research on e-government shows that state-level institutional 
capacity in the form of dedicated legislative committees or independent information 
technology executive departments positively affect the likelihood that cities will adopt 
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new information technologies (Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016; McNeal et al., 2003a). 
Studies on inter-organizational collaboration also show that when state governments 
commit human and financial resources to create infrastructures that facilitate coordination 
and interaction across city governments, public managers are more likely to collaborate 
(Smith, 2009).  
Dawes and colleagues (2009) find that public managers perceive the lack of 
support from high-level government agencies to be a severe barrier to access data and 
information from other stakeholders. State governments can build institutional capacity 
for data sharing in several ways: they can allocate funding and resources to data sharing 
initiatives; establish a Chief Data Officer to manage data and data sharing policies; or 
design standardized data sharing agreements to help public managers comply with 
privacy laws and citizen rights. When state governments adopt practices, structures, and 
incentives that are conducive of data sharing, city governments might be more likely to 
report high data access as organizations will conform to the institutional environment 
(Chen & Lee, 2018; Yang & Maxwell, 2011). In fact, when state governments build 
institutional capacity to support data sharing, it is more likely that organizations will feel 
greater normative pressures to provide data to city departments. Therefore: 
H1c: State governments’ institutional capacity will be positively correlated with 
data access.    
Normative pressures: Open data portals. Visible actions and social cues are 
another way through which state governments can promote and diffuse cultural norms. 
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Organizations rely on social cues and inputs from the environment to understand which 
behaviors and actions are acceptable by others.  
Signals from the environment can guide public organizations and managers when 
they have to interpret data use and sharing rules. 6 and colleagues (2014) note data 
sharing rules are often ambiguous and do not apply to all concrete cases that public 
managers encounter. Therefore, public managers rely on their interpretation of the ethics 
and rationales underlying the regulation to fill legislative gaps. Institutional theory 
suggests that public managers’ interpretation is likely influenced by cultural norms that 
guide expectations and acceptable behaviors among actors in the same environment. If 
cultural norms are favorable to openness and transparency, public managers are more 
likely to align with them by providing data to other organizations.  
I suggest that state governments can set cultural norms and shape expectations on 
data sharing by promoting open data portals. Open data portals are highly visible social 
cues signaling a state government's commitment towards transparency and accountability 
(Jun & Weare, 2011). Open data portals vary significantly across state governments. 
Some states have put considerable efforts into building and promoting open data, setting 
an example for local governments and other organizations. Others provide little 
information online, limit access to data, or offer only incomplete, not up-to-date data to 
the public.  
Because open data portals are social cues that indicate commitment towards 
transparency and accountability and signal acceptable norms and behaviors across 
organizations, I suggest that in states where open data portals are of higher quality, city 
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departments will enjoy greater data access from other organizations. Quality – such as the 
extensiveness and accessibility of open data – signals commitment from the government 
to a culture of transparency which will positively affect relational trust across 
organizations and will promote an interpretation of existing rules and regulations that 
favors data sharing. Therefore: 
H1d: Quality of state government open data portals will be positively correlated 
with data access.    
Social Environment 
The social environment incorporates the dynamics of power that characterize the 
relationship between a city department and its external stakeholders. Power is defined as 
the ability of an organization to pressure another organization to address its own interests. 
Power dynamic are widely addressed by resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and recent studies in public management that recognize data access as an issue of 
power among organizations involved (Meijer, 2018). 
Influence. City departments are part of loosely structured policy systems in which 
they share power over decision-making processes with a multitude of stakeholders, such 
as local committees, representatives of the civil society, and interest groups (Moore, 
1995). Stakeholders receive representation power and mandate from their membership 
and constrain a city department’s activities by exerting pressures towards the goals and 
interests they represent (Dawes, 1996; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). The degree to 
which stakeholders can influence a city department’s activities varies according to the 
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material and symbolic resources that they control, including funding, reputation, 
advocacy, legitimacy, and political support (Saidel, 1991; Suárez, 2011).  
City departments have an interest in accessing data from other organizations, 
especially when these organizations hold great influence over decision-making processes. 
First, influential stakeholders are more likely to attract the attention of city departments 
because they participate in and shape policymaking processes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Second, city departments are interested in collecting data and information from 
influential stakeholders; data and information might help public managers to balance 
information asymmetries, gain more control over the policy environment, and increase 
their centrality in the policy discussion. However, collaborating and exchanging 
resources with influential stakeholders is more difficult, and public managers face a 
greater likelihood of conflicts (Simo & Bies, 2007).  
Previous research has shown that power dynamics negatively affect data exchange 
across organizations generally and within the public sector specifically (Dawes, 1996). 
Pardo and colleagues (2006) find that regulatory agencies refrain from sharing data 
because they fear losing relevance and power in their policy domain. Similarly, Gil-
Garcia and colleagues (2005) and Azad and Wiggins (1995) observe that public agencies 
consider the relative influence of other organizations over their activities before engaging 
in data sharing with them. If public agencies believe that external organizations already 
have too much influence on policymaking, they will be less likely to share data. Once 
organizations share data with others, they can hardly control how data are used (Blau, 
1955). Organizations receiving data might utilize them in ways that damage the original 
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data owner, for instance by creating new information and knowledge that allow them to 
gain a competitive advantage or increase control over the environment. Providing data to 
the city departments might change an organization’s relative position and increase the 
city influence over them (Yang & Maxwell, 2011). The collaboration literature confirms 
similar dynamics across organizations in different sectors, where influence and power 
negatively affect the exchange of resources and collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 
2006; Simo & Bies, 2007; Thomson & Perry, 2006).   
Given the evidence from previous studies, I expect that increases in the level of 
influence of external organizations will negatively affect data access, while city 
departments that experience lower levels of external influence – i.e., they are central in 
their policy environment – will report greater data access.  
H2a: Influence of external organizations will be negatively correlated with data 
access.   
Coordination Mechanisms & Relationship Portfolio  
Public managers apply a mix of coordination mechanisms to increase the 
likelihood to access data. The horizontal dimension of the IFDA suggests that the 
effectiveness of coordination mechanisms vary across the portfolio of relationships. This 
insight draws from a large body of literature suggesting that there are sector-based 
institutional and social differences that public managers need to consider when 
exchanging data (Daley, 2009; Roberts, 2011). The next paragraphs explore three forms 
of coordination mechanisms – formal, lateral, and informal – and how they apply to data 
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access from other departments in the city, other public agencies, or non-governmental 
organizations.  
Formal coordination. Formal coordination – e.g., the development of written 
data sharing agreements and routines – has received much attention in data sharing 
literature. Researchers find that formal coordination facilitates data exchanges by 
explicitly addressing political and security risks as well as social and technical barriers 
that commonly hinder data sharing (Dawes et al., 2009). By formally coordinating data 
exchange, organizations agree on common rules and data standards, design shared 
policies, establish responsibilities and rules, and distribute benefits and costs among 
parties involved in the exchange (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo 2009; Landsbergen & 
Wolken 2001; Simo & Bies 2007).  
Formal coordination, however, entails lengthy negotiations among partners to 
agree on sensitive issues such as confidentiality, privacy, responsibilities, and costs 
(Allard et al., 2018; Dawes et al., 2009; Simo & Bies, 2007). Moreover, organizations 
might need to adopt new organizational practices and routines to comply with data 
sharing agreements. Because of this, formal coordination might decrease autonomy while 
increasing interdependence among organizations (Azad and Wiggins, 1995; Malatesta & 
Smith, 2014; Weitzman et al., 2006). Finally, while formal coordination simplifies and 
speeds up the process of exchanging data by establishing routines, organizations might 
still encounter barriers if they want to access different data or modify the agreements to 
face emerging challenges or needs. Formal coordination is limited to what organizations 
have agreed upon (Willem & Buelens, 2007). 
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I suggest that managers who utilize formal coordination mechanisms are more 
likely to access data from other public agencies. Previous studies show that formal 
coordination is common in inter-organizational relationships generally (Bryson et al., 
2006), and specifically in inter-organizational relationships among public agencies 
(Allard et al. 2007; Weitzman et al., 2006). The vertical structure of the government 
bureaucracy influences relationships among public agencies and promotes values such as 
authority, clarity of roles and responsibilities, and accountability (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2001; Eglene, Dawes, & Schneider, 2007; Fountain, 2007). Formal coordination is well 
suited under these conditions.  
In public organizations, a shared bureaucratic culture increases social integration, 
defined as “the degree to which ind-ividuals are institutionally bound and accountable to 
a bounded group or collectivity” (6, 2007, p. 408-409). Public organizations and 
employees are subjected to the same institutional structure and respond to similar 
professional and cultural norms (Fountain, 2007). For instance, public managers respond 
to higher accountability standards than nonpublic managers and can rely on similar 
professional training to provide guidance on acceptable behaviors and expectations 
(Kornberger, Meyer, Brandtner, & Höllerer, 2017). Shared norms and culture increase 
trust and cognitive homogeneity among public employees, which decrease the costs and 
time needed to develop shared agreements (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  
At the same time, relationships among public organizations are characterized by 
clear divisions across government levels, branches and jurisdictional areas (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2001; Daley, 2009; Dawes et al., 2009). These divisions can hinder public 
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managers' ability and willingness to work together and exchange data and information. 
Public managers might compete against each other or pursue incompatible missions, 
which increases the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, the diversity of rules and 
regulations that bind the actions of different public agencies might slow down 
collaboration and interaction (Daley, 2009).  
Formal coordination is adapted to access data from other public agencies because 
formal agreements and routines align well with the bureaucratic values of authority and 
accountability that characterize public sector relationships. Formal coordination promotes 
organization accountability by clearly assigning responsibilities, roles, and costs, and 
ensures that organizations comply with rules and regulations that govern their 
functioning. Moreover, formal coordination addresses issues of jurisdictional competence 
by establishing limits and purposes of data access. For instance, agreements can establish 
norms limiting the use of data for specific purposes or the transfer of data to a third party 
(Susha, Janssen, & Verhulst, 2017). Finally, the underlying common culture and norms 
across public organizations facilitate the negotiations of formal agreements because 
public employees act within a common cognitive, regulatory, and cultural framework. 
Therefore, I suggest that: 
H3a: Formal coordination mechanisms will be positively correlated with data 
access from other public agencies. 
Lateral coordination. Lateral coordination occurs when managers submit a 
formal data request to another organization or develop data sharing agreements that 
regulate occasional data transfers. Compared to formal coordination, organizations that 
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engage in lateral coordination do not develop routines for sharing data. Instead, data 
sharing remains unplanned and subject to case-by-case agreements. When public 
managers submit a formal request, the receiving organization can decide whether to 
accept the request or deny it and not provide data.  
There are potential advantages and disadvantages to lateral coordination. Because 
it is unplanned, lateral coordination allows organizations to manage privacy and conflicts 
on a case-by-case basis, thereby maintaining control over data use and transfer (Willem 
& Buelens, 2007). Organizations can also learn from their experience and adjust over 
time depending on the outcomes of previous exchanges (Willem & Buelens, 2007). 
Furthermore, lateral coordination allows organizations to explore new opportunities to 
exchange data with a variety of actors. Relationships are less formalized and stable and 
negotiation time and costs are low because the agreements can be re-negotiated and are 
not binding in the long term (Galbraith, 1973). 
However, lateral coordination increases the risk of not obtaining access to data 
because organizations can refuse to fulfill the request. Cultural, organizational, and 
institutional barriers across organizations might hinder data sharing because lateral 
coordination does not adequately address concerns about data misuses and security. 
Moreover, public managers might need to engage in lengthy negotiations and await an 
uncertain outcome. The length of the process might negatively affect the timeliness of 
data access and therefore the relevance of the information that public managers can 
extract from data.  
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I suggest that lateral coordination is positively correlated with data access in 
cross-sector relationships. Because of its flexibility, lateral coordination is a good fit for 
complex contexts where formal coordination can be a costly and lengthy process 
(Galbraith, 1973; Willem & Buelens, 2007). It is also more suitable when organizations 
are less dependent on one another and do not wish to sustain the costs of developing 
shared routines or adopting interoperable systems (Fishenden & Thompson, 2013; 
Willem & Buelens, 2007). All these conditions apply in cross-sector relationships. 
Cross-sector relationships are increasingly common in the public sector (Bryson 
et al., 2006; Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2017; Quick & Feldman, 2014). However, while 
public agencies are often legally required to interact with one another, interactions with 
nongovernmental organizations occur at the initiative of individual organizations. Cross-
sector relationships are complicated by stark cultural and cognitive differences related to 
the diversity of norms and values between public, nonprofit, and private organizations 
which increase conflicts and hinder collaborative agreements (Bryson et al., 2006; Daley, 
2009; Guo & Acar, 2005). For instance, private organizations have lower accountability 
and transparency requirements and are often less willing to share data with other 
organizations. Reasons vary and might include fear of data misuse or concerns about 
competition (Graber, 1992). As nongovernmental organizations are less dependent on 
public agencies, they also have fewer incentives to collaborate, especially when 
collaboration requires them to adjust their own routines (Roberts, 2011).  
Lateral coordination might facilitate data access in cross-sector relationships 
because it allows organizations to negotiate conditions for data access and change them 
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over time. In lateral coordination, organizations do not engage in the long-term but 
address concerns that are specific to each data exchange. This flexibility is important 
when there are high cultural and cognitive barriers and organizations learn over time how 
to moderate them (Chen & Lee, 2018). Moreover, lateral coordination requires lower 
incentives for organizations to collaborate and does not reduce an organization’s 
autonomy. Private for-profit and nonprofit organizations are more willing to cooperate 
under these conditions which allow them to engage with the public sector without losing 
their independence and by maintaining their routines and structure. Therefore, I expect 
that:  
H3b: Lateral coordination will be positively correlated with data access from 
non-governmental organizations. 
Informal coordination. Informal coordination occurs when public managers 
access data through personal relationships. Social exchange and social capital theory have 
long recognized the importance of social relationships in exchanging resources (Blau, 
1955; Molm, Whitham, & Melamed, 2012; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2002). 
Personal networks are linked to high trust and reciprocity, which decrease concerns about 
security and data misuse as well as cultural and cognitive barriers, thereby facilitating 
exchange and negotiation (Chen & Lee, 2018; Gil-Garcia, Pardo, & Burke, 2010). 
However, social networks also require time to be created and place high demands on 
public managers who need to invest additional efforts and resources to build personal 
relationships (Allard et al., 2018; Berman, West, & Richter, 2002). Social networks are 
based on social obligations and have high maintenance costs as managers need to 
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maintain frequent interaction, reciprocate exchanges of resources and feed trust over time 
(Burt, 2000; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Finally, interpersonal networks rely on 
individuals’ willingness to provide data. Compared to both formal and lateral 
coordination, informal coordination might occur without written agreements or 
communication, and managers and employees have higher discretion in complying with 
data requests. The lack of formal or written agreements might also increase threats related 
to data use, security, and management of sensitive information.  
Public managers have extensive personal and professional networks that span 
across public, private, and nonprofit organizations, both inside and outside the city 
boundaries. Public managers often leverage their networks to gain and control access to 
resources, including data and information (Aiken, Bacharach, & French, 1980; Malone & 
Crowston, 1994; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). I suggest that informal coordination is 
positively correlated with data access in intra-organizational and cross-sector 
relationships.  
Departmentalization is a natural barrier to the access of data and information 
across organizational units. Departmentalization refers to differences in the goals, values, 
culture, and structure of departments within an organization, which prevent public 
managers from drawing from other departments’ experience and information (Argote, 
Gruenfeld, Naquin, & Turner, 2001; Daley, 2009; Drew, 2015). For instance, 
departments in different policy areas respond to different professional and social norms, 
which increase fragmentation within a city organization and decrease willingness to 
collaborate and share data (Cohen, 2017; Roberts, 2011).   
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Managers are likely to develop personal relationships within their organizations 
because the geographic proximity of members facilitates interaction (Tsai & Ghoshal, 
1998). Additionally, intra-organizational relationships are characterized by a common 
sense of solidarity and a shared understanding of professional norms and organizational 
culture (Bolino et al., 2002; Romzek et al., 2014; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). These 
conditions facilitate data access because public managers can anticipate the behavior of 
their colleagues and are knowledgeable about limits, boundaries, and issues involved in 
data sharing (6, Bellamy, Raab, Warren, & Heeney, 2007). Finally, through personal 
relationships, public managers can ask questions about the data, metadata and data 
collection, and gain a better understanding of the value that data can provide. 
Communication reduces cognitive barriers and increases the likelihood of exchanging 
data (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Informal coordination might also be effective in cross-sector relationships, where 
self-interest and diverse professional frameworks are the main barriers to data exchange 
(Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2010). Previous studies show that conflicts are higher in 
cross-sector relationships (Simo & Bies, 2007), where actors are more likely to have 
different scopes and purposes for sharing data (6 et al., 2007). Preexisting relationships, 
both personal and professional, might generate trust and social norms that positively 
affect the likelihood of accessing data (Dawes et al. 2009). Previous research has used the 
term “boundary spanners” to indicate individuals that promote interaction across sectors 
with the scope of facilitating the transfer of information and other resources (Meerkerk & 
Edelenbos, 2017). Boundary spanners bridge and reconcile cognitive barriers that might 
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hinder exchange (Aiken et al., 1980) and are associated with more effective management 
of conflicts that arise in cross-sector relationships (6 et al., 2007; Simo & Bies, 2007). I, 
therefore, expect that: 
H3c: Informal coordination mechanisms will be positively correlated with data 
access from other departments in the city. 
H3d: Informal coordination mechanisms will be positively correlated with data 
access from non-governmental organizations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA AND METHOD 
This chapter describes data collection, variables, and method. The study focuses 
on a nationally representative sample of 500 US cities with populations from 25,000 to 
250,000. In figure 4 a black dot indicates each city included in the study. Small- and 
medium-sized cities are a relevant research setting because they represent approximately 
27% of the US population – more than 85 million individuals (US Census Bureau, 2010).  
Data are drawn from a variety of sources. The survey data comes from the 2016 
National Study of Technology in City Government titled “Data sharing, civic 
engagement, and technology us in local government agencies” and conducted by the 
Center for Science, Technology and Environmental Policy Studies (CSTEPS) at Arizona 
State University (ASU). The survey was used to collect department-level data about how 
often department heads request data; how often they obtain data, and from which other 
organizations; which barriers they encounter when requesting data; and coordination 
mechanisms they utilize more often. Other sources include data collected by the Sunlight 
Foundation on state open data portal and data provided by the Pew Charitable Trusts on 
state government institutional capacity. 
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Figure 4. Map of 500 cities included in the study  
Survey Data 
The survey data were drawn from the National Study of Technology in City 
Government titled “Data sharing, civic engagement, and technology us in local 
government agencies” and conducted by the CSTEPS in 2016. The survey instruments 
consist of several questions about participation (e.g., frequency, stakeholder types, and 
legal requirements); technology use (e.g., purpose and frequency of technology use, 
technology management, perceived technology outcomes, and perceptions of 
technology); department climate and work environment (e.g., organization values and 
work-life balance); and data sharing (e.g., frequency of data exchange, barriers to data 
exchange, and coordination mechanisms).  
The sample frame includes all 184 cities with populations ranging from 100,000 
to 250,000 and a randomly selected sample of 316 cities with populations ranging from 
25,000 to 99,999. The director or deputy director from five departments in each city were 
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invited to participate: Mayor’s office, finance, police, community development, and parks 
and recreation. The sample includes a total of 2,500 department heads in 500 US cities. 
The survey items were tested in previous versions of the survey that were 
conducted by CSTEPS in 2010, 2012, and 2014 on the same sample frame. The research 
team revised the items according to inputs from previous surveys. The data sharing 
section was newly designed to collect data for this study. I conducted a set of cognitive 
interviews (N=3) with public managers to ensure that the survey items did not include 
jargon or terms that public managers might find unclear or ambiguous. The interview 
protocol is presented in Appendix A. The interviews were conducted with managers from 
three departments - finance, Mayor’s office, and police6 - in three cities whose size is 
between 25,000 and 250,000 inhabitants. The interviews asked questions to confirm that 
respondents were able to: understand the meaning of the survey items; provide the 
information that the instrument intended to collect; and find the best answer among the 
options provided. Results showed that the respondents correctly described the object of 
the inquiry and understand the term "data" in line with the definition provided in the 
survey. Respondents reported that questions were clear and understandable and did not 
report difficulties in selecting a response among the options provided. For instance, 
respondents confirmed that the data frequency categories (annually – quarterly – monthly 
– weekly) reflect a common terminology used in government activities. In some cases, 
respondents reported that the categories were redundant (e.g., the list of technological 
                                                 
6 Current human resources manager previously employed in police departments. Questions focused on 
activities in the police department. 
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barriers) or that extreme options were not available (e.g., “my organization does not 
request data”). These items were modified or added to the survey as appropriate.  
Participants’ contact information were collected from city websites or by calling 
the city and requesting contact information. The survey was administered online over 
three months, from September 27th to December 27th, 2016. After removing wrong and 
bad email addresses and managers who had retired or left their position, the sample was 
reduced to 2,166 eligible individuals. We received a total of 667 responses for a response 
rate of 30%, including both complete and partial surveys retained because the respondent 
answered more than half of the questions. The response rate was calculated following the 
procedure of the American Association for Public Opinion Researchers (RR2 - AAPOR, 
2016).  
We received responses from 385 cities from 45 states7. The average city size is 
87,400 inhabitants. When comparing respondents to non-respondents, the research team 
found that respondents are more likely from community development, parks and 
recreation, and police departments (p<0.05) and they more frequently work for council-
manager cities (75%).  There is no significant difference in city size between respondents 
and non-respondents (p>0.05).  
The data sharing section opened with a screening question asking respondents 
whether their department “obtains data generated by other organizations to do its work.” 
Only respondents who replied “Yes” were asked to respond to other questions concerning 
                                                 
7 Our survey did not include responses from Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  
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data sharing. Nearly two-thirds (70%) of the city department heads reported obtaining 
data from other organizations to do their work8. 
Other Data Sources 
I combine survey data with other sources of data to measure the state-level 
institutional environment in which city departments are embedded. I utilize data from 
three sources: the Sunlight Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and Comparitech.  
The Sunlight Foundation is “a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that 
uses civic technologies, open data, policy analysis, and journalism to make our 
government and politics more accountable and transparent to all.” (Sunlight Foundation, 
n.d.). As part of its effort, the foundation has developed an "Open States" report that 
compares open data portals across state governments. Data were collected and made 
available in 2013. The research team integrated online data collected online with short 
interviews with state legislators to ensure the accuracy of the information collected. 
Changes to the original dataset are regularly reported in the methodology section on the 
Sunlight Foundation website9.   
The Pew Charitable Trusts conducted a study in 2018 entitled “How States Use 
Data to Inform Decisions. A national review of the use of administrative data to improve 
state decision-making” (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018). The study focuses on 
administrative data, defined as “data collected and maintained by a federal, state, or local 
government; government agency; or contractor or grantee of the agency, primarily for the 
                                                 
8 A discussion about possible selection biases in the analysis is provided in Appendix B. Estimation of an 
Heckman selection model shows no evidence of a selection bias.  
9 Full information can be found here: https://openstates.org/reportcard/#changelog  
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routine management of programs such as TANF, Medicaid, the corrections system, 
unemployment insurance systems, and child support payment systems” (p. 46). Pew 
Charitable Trusts undertook two data collection efforts. First, data were collected using 
the Lexis Advance database to identify “bills, statutes, and executive orders related to 
data use in eight major subject areas: governance, privacy, warehouse, inventory, 
integration, sharing, security, and integrity” (Pew Research Trusts, 2018, p. 46). Then, 
the research team interviewed 341 officials across all the 50 US states and the District of 
Columbia to understand data usage and institutions supporting data sharing. Interviews 
were conducted with officials in six government functions: auditing or evaluating, 
budgeting, performance management, legislative research, information technology 
management, and centralized data analytics or data management and human services 
agency officials. Interviews were analyzed using an iterative qualitative coding procedure 
to identify common topics and patterns across interviews. This research utilizes data 
collected through the search in the Lexis Advance database to measure state government 
institutional capacity. Data were made available in their original format by the Pew 
Charitable Trusts research team. 
Finally, I utilize data collected by a journalistic initiative comparing state 
legislation on issues related to online privacy across US states10. The research compares 
state laws regulating how private and public organizations can disclose data and 
information and transfer them to third parties (Bischoff, 2017). To confirm the validity of 
                                                 
10 Further information can be found here https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/which-us-
states-best-protect-online-privacy/  
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the research, I compared the results with other similar sources; results are similar with 
states that have stringent laws (e.g., California) and more “relaxed” states (Leuan, 2017). 
Variables 
This section describes the measurement and descriptive statistics of the variables 
employed in the models that will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
Dependent variable: data access. In the survey, we asked managers to think 
about “data that your organization uses for its activities such as organizational 
performance, employee behavior, transactions, citizen, businesses or other non-profit 
activity, budget and financial statistics, geospatial data (e.g., GIS data), and so on." We 
then asked: “Approximately what share of your organization's requests for data are 
fulfilled without requiring your organization to follow up or make additional requests?”. 
The question aims to capture the effectiveness of department heads to access data from 
other organizations in a timely manner. The question was asked for three types of 
stakeholders: 
(1)    "Other governmental departments in your city or town"  
(2)    "Government organizations outside your city (other cities, county, state, 
federal)" 
(3)    "Non-governmental organizations (private and non-profit)" 
Respondents could indicate one of the following response categories: “No 
requests”, “Few requests”, “Some requests”, “Most requests”. The survey item is 
depicted in figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Survey items used to construct the dependent variable 
From the survey question, I develop three categorical dependent variables labeled: 
Data Access from Other Departments in the City; Data Access from Other Public 
Agencies; and Data Access from Non-Governmental Organizations. Given the few 
observations in the "No Request" category (respectively, 2.7%; 3.4%; 8.3%), which 
might cause problems in the model estimation, I grouped the categories "No Requests" 
and "Few Requests" into one category. Therefore, each variable includes three categories: 
1 = "None to few requests - Low data access"; 2 = "Some requests - Medium data 
access"; and 3 = "Most requests - High data access".  
Figure 6 reports the frequency of respondents for each category of each dependent 
variable. On average, city department heads report greater data access from other 
departments in the city, with 55% of respondents indicating that "most requests" are 
fulfilled without the need to follow up; it follows data access from other public agencies 
(45%) and non-governmental organizations (37%). 
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Figure 6. Data access, frequency by stakeholder type 
 
Institutions. Institutions include four variables: Privacy Laws; Legal Mandate; 
Institutional Capacity; and Open Data Portals.  
Privacy Laws is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100, which serves as a 
proxy for a state government’s engagement and attention to the development and 
enactment of privacy laws. The score is based on the fourteen criteria reported in table 2. 
The average score is 60.01 (s.d. 16.06). The highest score is 85.70 in California and 
Delaware. The lowest score is 28.6 in Alabama, South Dakota, and Wyoming.  
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Table 2.  
Number of states implementing privacy laws, by privacy law type.  
Criteria # of states 
1. Internet Service Providers barred from sharing info with third parties 2 
2. Internet Service Provides require explicit consent to share customer 
data 50 
3. Must dispose of customer data after set period of time (Government) 15 
4. Must dispose of customer data after set period of time (Companies) 31 
5. Require to disclose when a breach occurs (Companies 47 
6. Laws protect privacy of e-reader data (Libraries) 4 
7. Social media privacy (employers 26 
8. Social media privacy (educational institutions) 16 
9. Shield law to protect journalists (SL) 40 
10. Shield law to protect journalists (CRP) 36 
11. Laws to protect employee privacy 5 
12. Laws to protect K-12 student information 36 
13. Laws to protect children’s privacy 50 
14. Laws to protect Internet of Thing data.  1 
Source: Compari Tech. Retrieved 3rd March 2018 from https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-
privacy/which-us-states-best-protect-online-privacy/ 
Legal Mandate is a department-level variable measuring the extent to which 
external organizations are mandated to provide data to the city department. Respondents 
could indicate if other departments in the city, other public agencies, and non-
governmental organizations were legally requested to provide “all”, “most”, “some”, or 
“no” data to them. I create three continuous independent variables: Legal Mandate - 
Other Departments in the City, Legal Mandate - Other Public Agencies, and Legal 
Mandate - Nongovernmental organizations. All variables range from 1 = “no legal 
requirements” to 4 = “all requests are subject to legal mandate”. The average of Legal 
Mandate - Other Departments in the City is 2.45 (s.d. 1.08). The average for Legal 
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Mandate - Other Public Agencies is 2.37 (s.d. 0.97). The average for Legal Mandate - 
Nongovernmental organizations is 1.66 (s.d. 0.82). 
Institutional Capacity is a state-level variable based on the Pew Charitable Trusts 
data on data sharing laws across US states (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018). The variable 
counts the number of statewide laws concerning governance, warehouse, inventory, 
integration, sharing, agreement, security, and integrity of data across all policy areas. 
Detailed information per each state is reported in Appendix C. The variable ranges from 
0 to 10, with an average of 4.95 (s.d. 3.41).  
Open Data Portal is a state-level categorical variable that indicates the quality of 
open data portals across state governments. For each state, researchers from the Sunlight 
Foundation evaluated six dimensions of open data quality: completeness, timeliness, ease 
of access, machine readability, use of common standards, and permanence. The criteria 
used to evaluate each dimension are reported in Appendix D. The maximum score is 7 
while the mean is 2.65 (s.d. 1.24). Alabama, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Nebraska 
scored the highest. Several states received a minimum score of 1 point: Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.  
Social environment. The social environment is measured using three variables 
derived from the survey data: City Actor Influence, Government Influence, and Civil 
Society Influence. The survey asked respondents to indicate how influential a set of 
actors are on the city’s policy-making process. Responses ranged from 1 = "No 
influence" to 5 = "Strong influence". Actors include the mayor, mayor’s council, other 
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city departments, governor, state legislature, state courts, the federal government, 
business groups, advocacy groups, public opinion, and media. A factor analysis shows 
that three factors can be extracted (eigenvalues > 1) as shown in table 3. 
Table 3.  
Influence items, factor analysis.  
 Component 
 1 2 3 
Mayor 0.10 0.10 0.87 
Mayor's Council 0.11 0.16 0.84 
Other city departments 0.14 0.34 0.56 
Governor 0.78 0.08 0.18 
State legislature 0.82 0.11 0.14 
State courts 0.81 0.12 -0.03 
Federal governments 0.72 0.15 0.12 
Business groups 0.26 0.72 0.22 
Advocacy groups 0.15 0.79 0.10 
Public opinion  -0.03 0.80 0.12 
Media 0.14 0.70 0.17 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
The three factors reflect (1) influence from city actors, such as the mayor, 
mayor’s council and other city departments, (2) influence from higher government levels, 
such as the governor, state legislature, state courts and the federal government, and (3) 
influence from the civil society, including business and advocacy groups, public opinion 
and media. I created three average scales ranging from 1 to 5 for each group of actors. 
City Actor Influence has a Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.73 and a mean of 3.53 (s.d. 0.86). 
Government Influence has a Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.84 and a mean of 2.25 (s.d. 
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0.79). Civil society Influence has a Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.81 and a mean of 2.62 
(s.d. 0.74).  
Coordination mechanisms. I measure four types of coordination mechanisms: 
Formal Coordination; Lateral Coordination; and Informal Coordination. Formal 
coordination is measured by asking respondents: “My organization has well established 
routines to regularly receive data from other organizations”. The response scale ranges 
from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree.” Average is 3.7 (s.d. = 0.79). 
Lateral coordination measures how frequently the city department submits formal written 
or online requests to other organizations to obtain data. Scale ranges from 1 = "Never" to 
5 = "Always"; the average is 2.95 (s.d. = 0.82). Informal coordination measures how 
often a department head contacts someone he or she knows in another organization to get 
access to the data. Scale ranges from 1 = "Never" to 5 = "Always". The average is 3.62 
(s.d. = 0.82).  
Table 4 shows the correlation between each pair of coordination mechanisms. 
Lateral coordination is most strongly correlated with other coordination mechanisms; the 
correlation between formal and lateral coordination is equal to 0.14 and between informal 
and lateral coordination is 0.16. The low correlations across coordination mechanisms 
suggest that respondents perceive each coordination mechanism as a distinctive strategy 
to access data.   
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Table 4.  
Correlation across coordination mechanisms.  
 Formal Lateral Informal 
Formal 1.00   
Lateral 0.14 1.00  
Informal 0.02 0.16 1.00 
Control variables. Control variables include Technological Barriers, Socio-
political Barriers, Technical Capacity, Department Type, Principal City, Population Size, 
Department Size, and Form of Government.  
To account for barriers that might prevent access to data, I include two variables, 
Technological Barriers and Socio-political Barriers. Technological barriers are widely 
cited in the literature and refer to situations where “data were not stored electronically” or 
“data were not transferable because of incompatibility across information systems” 
(Dawes, 1996). Socio-political barriers include items such as “data were too politically 
sensitive to be shared” or “management did not want to share data because of fear of 
public criticism”. Each item ranges from 1= "Never" to 5 = "Very Often". Table 5 shows 
the full list of items.  
I performed a factor analysis to confirm the two scales. The results are presented 
in Table 5. The factor analysis shows two factors, one including technical barriers and 
one including socio-political elements. Each factor has an eigenvalue greater than 1 and 
the total variance explained is 58.5%. I created two scales by averaging the items. The 
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.70 for the Technological Barriers scale and 0.82 for the Socio-
political Barriers scale, showing good and excellent fit, respectively. The technical 
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barriers scale has an average of 2.78 (s.d. = 0.71), while the socio-political barriers scale 
has an average of 2.28 (s.d. = 0.7) indicating that respondents are more likely to 
encounter technical rather than socio-political barriers.  
Table 5.  
Technical and Socio-political barriers to data exchange.  
Rotated Component Matrix 
Variables 
Component 
Socio-
political 
Technical 
The other organization did not have the requested data -.125 .724 
The requested data was not electronically stored or 
available in a retrievable electronic format. 
.064 .787 
The data were not transferable because of 
incompatibility across information systems. 
.311 .716 
Our organization was not equipped to store, receive, or 
analyze the data. 
.406 .515 
Because of regulatory and privacy issues, the other 
organization was prohibited from sending us the data. 
.611 .381 
There were too many rules and levels of approval to 
access the data (i.e. written consent, legal 
authorization, court orders, etc.). 
.672 .336 
The data were too politically sensitive to be shared. .772 .111 
The management did not want to share the data 
because of fear of public criticism. 
.870 -.052 
The management did not want to share the data 
because of competing interests with our organization 
.782 -.012 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
Technical Capacity is an average scale of five items: “My agency is ill-equipped 
to manage important questions about online security and privacy”, “Staff in my office are 
resistant to change related to technology”, “Management lacks software applications that 
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would make work more efficient”, “There is a mismatch between our department’s needs 
and what technology can provide”, and “My agency is too busy to effectively monitor, 
control, and use the data we collect”. A factor analysis shows that items load on one 
factor; a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.73 confirms the reliability of the scale. The average for 
the scale is equal to 3.28 (s.d. = 0.68). 
File sharing technology measures whether a city department utilizes information 
sharing tools such as cloud-based technologies (e.g. Dropbox, Google drive). The 
variable is coded as 1 if the department utilizes file sharing technology or 0 if it does not. 
On average 79% of departments utilize data sharing technologies.  
Department Type is a set of dummy variables indicating the department type. The 
reference category is the Mayor’s Office. Among our respondents, 14.5% work in the 
mayor’s office, 28% in community development, 16.5% in finance, 19% in parks and 
recreation, and 22% in the police department. Previous research has found that variation 
in data sharing practices is a function of the policy sector (6, Bellamy, Raab, Warren, & 
Heeney, 2007) and suggested that departments might be subject to different professional 
and normative standards (Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016). 
Department Size is the self-reported number of full-time employees (FTEs) 
working for the department. Larger departments might have more resources and a greater 
influence on their external environment. On average, department size is 158.63 FTEs, but 
there is great variation in the sample with a standard deviation of 425.63 FTEs. The 
variable is logged to account for this variation. I also include a Principal City variable and 
a Population variable. Principal City is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
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department is a principal center of a metropolitan area (=1) or not (=0). About one third 
(27%) of the cities in the sample is a principal city. The Population variable is included in 
logarithmic form (mean = 11.2, s.d. = 0.66) and draws from the population reported by 
the 2005 US Census Bureau. Finally, Form of Government indicates whether the city is a 
Mayor-Council (= 1) or a Council – Manager (= 0) government. 24% of the cities in the 
sample are a Mayor-Council government.  
Descriptive statistics are reported in table 6, while correlations are reported in 
Appendix E.
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Table 6.  
Descriptive statistics. 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Privacy Laws 463 60.00 16.10 28.60 85.70 
Legal Mandate-Other depts. in the city 447 2.40 1.10 1.00 4.00 
Legal Mandate-Other public agencies 445 2.40 1.00 1.00 4.00 
Legal Mandate-Non-govern. Org. 447 1.70 0.80 1.00 4.00 
Institutional Capacity 463 4.95 3.42 0.00 10.00 
Open Data Portals 463 2.65 1.24 1.00 5.00 
City Influence 463 3.53 0.86 1.00 5.00 
Government Influence 463 2.25 2.25 1.00 5.00 
Civil Society Influence 463 2.62 2.62 1.00 5.00 
Formal Coordination 458 3.70 0.79 1.00 5.00 
Lateral Coordination 439 3.05 0.82 1.00 5.00 
Informal Coordination  440 3.62 0.82 1.00 5.00 
Technological Barriers 437 2.78 0.71 1.00 5.00 
Socio-political Barriers 435 2.28 0.70 1.00 4.80 
Technical Capacity 462 3.28 0.68 1.00 5.00 
File Sharing Technology 444 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Principal City 463 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mayor's office 463 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Community development 463 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Finance 463 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Parks and recreation 463 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Police 471 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Population Size (log) 463 11.2 0.66 10.14 12.43 
Department size 447 158.63 425.63 1.00 4500.00 
Department size (log) 447 3.71 1.60 0.00 8.41 
Form of Government - Mayor Council 463 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
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CHAPTER 6 
DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the data analysis, which investigates variation in data 
access across the portfolio of relationships of a city department: other departments in the 
same city; other public agencies; and non-governmental organizations. The chapter is 
divided into two sections. The first section discusses the model fit and presents the 
estimation of three models: an ordered logit model with clustered standard errors, a 
multilevel ordered logit model, and a seemingly unrelated regressions model. All models 
were estimated using Stata v.15, including user-written command cmp (Roodman, 2011) 
for the seemingly unrelated regressions model and gologit2 for the generalized ordered 
probit models (Williams, 2006). Despite some minor differences, the three models 
provide consistent results, both considering the significance and sign of the coefficients. 
The second section discusses the results, including statistical interpretation of the 
coefficients and hypotheses testing.  
Model Estimation 
The analysis focuses on three dependent variables: Data Access from Other 
Departments in the City; Data Access from Public Agencies; Data Access from Non-
Governmental Organizations. Each dependent variable (DV) contains three ordered 
categories: "low data access", "medium data access" and "high data access". Therefore, I 
utilize an ordered model, which is appropriate when the dependent variable consists of 
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ordinal categories (Long, 1997). Ordered categorical variables are censored variables as 
respondents would have been able to identify their position along a continuous variable if 
given a choice (Long, 1997). The estimation of an ordered model assumes an underlying 
continuous variable y* observed through y. The variable y provides incomplete 
information because it is observed only within specified categories; the τ are thresholds 
or cut-points of each category, whereas the extreme categories are delimited by -∞ and 
+∞, so that: 
𝑦  {
1 → 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠                     𝑖𝑓 𝜏 = −∞ ≤  𝑦𝑖
∗ <  𝜏1 
2 → 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠                        𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 ≤  𝑦1
∗  < 𝜏2
3 → 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠               𝑖𝑓 𝜏2  ≤  𝑦𝑖
∗  <  𝜏3 =  +∞
} 
The underlying variable y* is used to fit the vector β.  
Multicollinearity. Before estimating the models, I checked for multicollinearity 
issues. Multicollinearity occurs when one independent variable can be linearly predicted 
by other independent variables with a fair degree of accuracy (Lewis-Beck & Lewis-
Beck, 1980). Multicollinearity might cause inflated standard errors, model sensitivity to 
small changes, and incorrect estimation of the parameter sign (Greene, 2000). Since 
multicollinearity is a property of the β vector - not of the model - it can be tested before 
estimating the model.  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to check for multicollinearity; a high 
VIF indicates that a variable is not orthogonal to the other variables, thereby implying 
collinearity. Researchers consider worrisome a VIF higher than ten; it corresponds to a 
tolerance factor lower than 0.1. The square root of the VIF indicates how much larger 
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each standard error is, as compared to its value in a model in which variables are 
completely uncorrelated. Results of the multicollinearity analysis are reported in table 7. 
The analysis accounts for missing values in each dependent variable. None of the 
variables has a square root VIF higher than 2, suggesting that there is very low 
multicollinearity in the data (Lewis-Beck & Lewis-Beck, 1980). The average VIF in each 
model is equal to 1.56. Overall, the data do not present multicollinearity issues. 
Table 7.  
VIF estimation. 
 
Data access from 
other depts.  
in the city 
Data access 
from other 
public agencies 
Data access 
from non-gov. 
orgs. 
 VIF VIF
2 VIF VIF2 VIF 
VIF
2 
Institutions  
Privacy Laws 1.75 1.32 1.73 1.32 1.74 1.32 
Legal Mandate 1.11 1.05 1.14 1.07 1.10 1.05 
Instit. capacity 1.95 1.40 1.94 1.39 1.95 1.40 
Open govern. 1.35 1.16 1.37 1.17 1.36 1.17 
Social environment 
City Influence 1.53 1.24 1.52 1.23 1.52 1.23 
Civil Soc. Influence 1.68 1.29 1.67 1.29 1.66 1.29 
Government Influence 1.51 1.23 1.50 1.22 1.50 1.23 
Coordination 
mechanisms 
Formal Coordination 1.18 1.09 1.19 1.09 1.17 1.08 
Lateral Coordination 1.15 1.07 1.14 1.07 1.17 1.08 
Informal Coordination 1.12 1.06 1.11 1.05 1.12 1.06 
Control variables 
Principal City 1.31 1.14 1.28 1.13 1.29 1.14 
Social Barriers 1.26 1.12 1.27 1.12 1.26 1.12 
Technical Barriers 1.25 1.12 1.25 1.12 1.26 1.12 
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Dept. Size 1.95 1.40 1.93 1.39 1.94 1.39 
Technical Capacity 1.15 1.07 1.16 1.08 1.15 1.07 
File Sharing Tech. 1.14 1.07 1.14 1.07 1.13 1.07 
Form of Government 1.25 1.12 1.23 1.11 1.23 1.11 
Population 1.62 1.27 1.61 1.27 1.62 1.27 
Comm. Development 2.65 1.63 2.62 1.62 2.62 1.62 
Finance 2.16 1.47 2.16 1.47 2.13 1.46 
Parks and Recreation 1.98 1.41 1.98 1.41 1.98 1.41 
Police 2.50 1.58 2.50 1.58 2.44 1.56 
Mean VIF     1.57 
Weights. All analyses are weighted to reflect the sampling procedure. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the sample was designed to include all 184 cities with 
populations ranging from 100,000 to 250,000 and a randomly selected sample of 316 
cities with populations ranging from 25,000 to 99,999. Given the sampling strategy, 
proportional sampling weights are used to adjust for the probability that a city was 
included in the sample. The proportional sampling weights are the inverse of the 
probability to be included in the sample.  
Table 8 reports the design weights; they were calculated based on city size. Cities 
with populations between 100,000 and 250,000 have a weight equal to 1, while small 
cities are assigned a weight between 3.159 and 3.177. Weights are implemented using the 
‘svy’ framework in Stata.  
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Table 8.  
Weights applied in the analysis. 
Weight factor N cities pop N cities sample 
Weights 
(pop/sample) 
25K-50K 591 186 3.1774 
50K-75K 278 88 3.159 
75K-100K 133 42 3.1667 
100-125K 68 68 1 
125-150K 37 37 1 
150-175K 23 23 1 
175-200K 28 28 1 
200-225K 18 18 1 
225-250K 10 10 1 
Total 1186 500  
Ordered Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors  
As a first step, I estimated each model using an ordered logit estimator with 
clustered robust standard errors (clustered SE). Clustered SEs are appropriate because 
observations are nested within cities and states; therefore, the errors terms are not 
independent but correlated within clusters. Violations of the assumption of independence 
of the error terms cause overestimation of the statistical significance even when the 
interclass correlation is small (ICC) (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2012; White, 1980). 
When data are clustered within different levels (city - state), researchers suggest 
clustering at the highest level, as computation of the SEs will be more conservative 
(Cameron & Miller, 2015). Clustered standard errors also adjust for heteroscedasticity 
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issues, and they are referred to as clustered robust standard errors.  I present the equation 
of each regression below: 
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 =                                                                                       
𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
+  𝛽4 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽6𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+  𝛽7 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
+  𝛽9 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽10 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+  𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 +  𝛽12𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽13𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜
− 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽14 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽15 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
+  𝛽16 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽17 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑜𝑔)
+  𝛽18𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 +  𝛽19𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀𝑔  
Where: 𝑔 = 1, … . , 𝐺 
The results of the three ordered logit models with clustered robust errors are 
reported in table 9. I reported coefficients, clustered standard errors, and the odds ratio 
transformation of the coefficients. Statistically significant coefficients (p-value < 0.1) are 
bold. All models contain 402 observations clustered in 44 states. The “data access from 
other departments in the city” model has a pseudo-R-squared equal to 0.083. The model 
is significant compared to a null model containing only control variables (Wald test, 
probability < 0.001 - chi2(11) = 53.10). The “data access from other public agencies” 
model has pseudo-R-squared equal to 0.08. The model is significant compared to a null 
model containing only control variables (Wald test, probability < 0.001 - chi2(11) = 
46.59). The “data access from non-governmental organizations” model has a pseudo-R-
squared equal to 0.075. The model is significant compared to null model containing only 
control variables (Wald test, probability < 0.001 - chi2(11) = 59.82). In all models the log 
likelihood increases, while the AIC and BIC decrease, as we move from a null to a full 
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model, suggesting that the full model is an improvement of the null model. Table 9 
reports odds ratio to simplify interpretation of the coefficients. An odds ratio shows an 
increase in the probability of an outcome when the independent variable increases of one 
unit. 
  
 
 
1
1
5 
Table 9.  
Data access from other departments in the city, other public agencies, and non-governmental organization - Logit model with 
clustered robust SE. 
 
Data access from  
other departments in the city 
Data access from other  
public agencies 
Data access from  
nongovernmental organizations 
 Beta Odds ratio SE Beta Odds ratio SE Beta Odds ratio SE 
Institutions    
Privacy Laws 0.00 1.00 0.01   0.00 1.00 0.01   -0.01 0.99 0.01   
Legal Mandate 0.38 1.46 0.16 * 0.34 1.40 0.14 * 0.26 1.30 0.13 * 
Institutional capacity 0.01 1.01 0.04   0.04 1.04 0.03   0.07 1.07 0.04 + 
Open Data Portals 0.03 1.03 0.08   -0.13 0.88 0.09   -0.13 0.88 0.10   
Social environment   
City Influence 0.05 1.05 0.17   -0.03 0.97 0.12   0.01 1.01 0.12   
Civil Society Influence 0.35 1.43 0.20  + 0.53 1.70 0.17 ** 0.52 1.68 0.20 ** 
Government Influence -0.24 0.79 0.18   -0.39 0.68 0.14 ** -0.37 0.69 0.14 ** 
Coordination mechanisms   
Formal Coordination 0.09 1.09 0.16   0.23 1.26 0.15   0.15 1.16 0.18   
Lateral Coordination -0.07 0.93 0.15   0.10 1.10 0.18   0.31 1.36 0.16 * 
Informal Coordination 0.43 1.53 0.14 ** 0.33 1.40 0.17 * 0.21 1.23 0.18   
Control variables   
Principal City 0.77 2.16 0.28 ** 0.48 1.62 0.30   0.71 2.03 0.32 * 
Social Barriers -0.40 0.67 0.22  + -0.45 0.64 0.21 * -0.31 0.73 0.16  + 
Technical Barriers 0.18 1.20 0.21   0.10 1.11 0.21   0.10 1.10 0.16   
  
 
 
1
1
6 
File Sharing Technology 0.39 1.48 0.26   0.16 1.17 0.26   0.68 1.98 0.25 ** 
Dept. Size -0.01 0.99 0.10   -0.09 0.91 0.10   -0.03 0.97 0.09   
Technical Capacity -0.32 0.72 0.21   -0.22 0.80 0.17   -0.38 0.68 0.15 ** 
Form of Government -0.15 0.86 0.24   -0.04 0.96 0.23   0.24 1.27 0.29   
Population -0.39 0.68 0.16 * -0.18 0.84 0.17   -0.41 0.66 0.15 ** 
Community Development -0.56 0.57 0.40   -0.77 0.46 0.39 * -0.25 0.78 0.39   
Finance -0.64 0.53 0.53   -0.61 0.54 0.45   -0.20 0.82 0.37   
Parks and Recreation -0.70 0.50 0.46   -0.63 0.53 0.46   -0.50 0.61 0.33   
Police 0.53 1.70 0.55   0.84 2.31 0.43  + 0.75 2.11 0.36 * 
Cut 1 2.37 10.73 -8.57   -2.09 0.12 2.01   -3.97 0.02 1.61   
Cut 2 -2.46 0.09 2.32   -0.34 0.71 1.96   -2.24 0.11 1.63 *** 
Obs. 402 402 402 
Log pseudo-likelihood -840.18 -898.48 -943.95 
Null model log likelihood -914.68 -978.47 -1020.12 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 
AIC 1728.36 1844.96 1935.89 
BIC 1824.27 1940.87 2031.81 
Significance levels: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 - Reference categories: Mayor’s Office
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Parallel line assumptions. Ordered models rely on the parallel line assumption 
stating that the cumulative probability curves are parallel for each category j. Because of 
this, the relationship between each category j and the independent variables is the same. 
In other words: 
Pr(𝑌 = 𝐽𝑖|𝑋) =     (𝑥𝛽1) 
When the assumption is true, we can assume that: 
𝛽1 =  𝛽2 =  𝛽3 
The Brant test (Brant, 1990) is usually employed to check the parallel line assumption in 
ordered models. It is a conservative test which often rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are equal, even if the assumption does hold (Peterson & Harrell, 1990). 
Moreover, when survey weights are applied, the Brant test is not appropriate; a Wald test 
is preferable.   
The ologit2 package in Stata estimates a series of Wald tests on each variable to 
check if coefficients differ across categories and if the parallel line assumption holds. The 
test progressively constraints the variable with the least significant Wald test to have a 
coefficient equal across equations (i.e., to fit the parallel line assumption). Stata repeats 
the process until all variables for which the Wald test is non-significant are constrained to 
have equal coefficients across categories. When the process ends, if the Wald test 
remains not significant, the assumption is met.  
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In the "data access from other departments in the city" model, there is no evidence 
to reject the parallel line assumption. Instead, in the "data access from other public 
agencies" and "data access from non-governmental organizations" models, there is 
evidence that a few coefficients do not meet the parallel line assumption. In the "data 
access from other public agencies" model, the informal coordination variable (p-value 
<0.05) and the privacy variable (p-value < 0.01) do not meet the parallel line assumption. 
In the "data access from non-governmental organizations" model, the privacy variable (p-
value<0.05) does not meet the parallel line assumption. 
Researchers have different opinions about how to estimate the model when the 
parallel line assumption is not met. Researchers frequently switch to a multinomial 
model, where coefficients freely vary across categories.  The downside of a multinomial 
approach is that we lose the information contained in the ordering when the model is 
estimated. Therefore, some researchers advise against switching to a multinomial model; 
the switch implies to move from a known but misspecified model to one that is merely 
suspect (Long, 1997). Finally, in a multinomial model, some parameters might become 
statistically insignificant because of the higher number of parameters that need to be 
estimated (Williams 2005).  
Another option is to estimate a partial non-proportional odds model that relaxes 
the parallel line assumption only for the variables that failed the Wald test (Long & 
Freese, 2005). This option is helpful to observe how these variables behave when their 
coefficients are allowed to vary. I estimate the partial non-proportional odds model using 
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the generalized ordered logit framework in Stata (gologit2) and selecting the coefficients 
that should be allowed to vary. The autofit option in the gologit2 package “uses an 
iterative process to identify the partial proportional odds model that best fits the data” 
(William, 2005, p. 3). Results for the variables that failed the parallel line assumption test 
are summarized in table 10. The interpretation of results for a partial non-proportional 
odds model does not differ from an ordered logit model. 
In the "data access from other public agencies" model, informal coordination increases 
the likelihood to report low data access vs. the likelihood to report medium or high data 
access. The coefficient is positive and significant. By contrast, the coefficient is not 
significant when we compare low and medium data access vs. high access. Similarly, the 
privacy law coefficient is significant when comparing low vs. medium and high data 
access, but not when comparing low and medium vs. high data access.  
In "data access from non-governmental organizations" model, the variable privacy 
law shows opposite sign when comparing low vs. medium and high data access and low 
and medium vs. high data access, but it is not significant. 
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Table 10.  
Estimation of betas, standard errors, and p-values for variables that did not hold the 
parallel line assumption. 
Public agencies B SE P-Value 
Informal coordination (1 vs 2+3) .57 .22 0.01 
Informal coordination (1+2 vs 3) . 18 .17 0.28 
Privacy (1 vs 2+3) .02 .01 0.1 
Privacy (1+2 vs 3) -.009 .01 0.25 
Non-governmental orgs. B SE P-Value 
Privacy (1 vs 2+3) .003 .008 0.70 
Privacy (1+2 vs 3) -.013 .008 0.12 
 1 = low data access; 2 = medium data access; 3 = high data access 
Multi-level Model 
Given the data structure, a multilevel model could also be appropriate. A 
multilevel model assumes that factors at two or more levels explain the variation in the 
DV. In this case, the model includes variables at the department level (level-1) and 
variables at the state level (level-2). The equation for the model is specified as follows: 
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒋(𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍 𝟏) =                                                                                      
 
𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽5𝑗𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽6𝑗𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽7𝑗 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽2𝑗 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑗𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽11𝑗𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽8𝑗𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽9𝑗𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜 − 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽10𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽11𝑗 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽13𝑗 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽14𝑗 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽15𝑗 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑜𝑔)𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽16𝑗𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑗
 
 
𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 (𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍 𝟐):                                                                                      
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𝛽0𝑗 =  𝑦00 +  𝑦01𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑗 +  𝑦02 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑓 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑗 + 𝑦03 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑗
+  𝑈0𝑗  
 
The first step to estimate a multilevel model is to calculate the intraclass 
correlation index (ICC). The ICC represents the proportion of variance explained by 
level-2 variables on the total variance of the model. In the case of a logit model, the 
variance for level-1 is fixed and corresponds to: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀|𝑥) = 𝜋2/ 3 
Therefore, the ICC formula for a multi-level logit model is: 
𝜎2𝑣 / ( 𝜎2𝑣 +  (𝜋2/ 3)) 
To estimate the level-2 variance, I fit a null model (i.e., a model including only 
the intercept). The cluster number is 42. The average number of observations is 9.6 per 
cluster, ranging from a minimum of 1 observation to a maximum of 81 observations. The 
ICC for each model is reported in table 11.  
The "non-governmental organizations" model has the highest ICC, while it the 
"other departments in the city" model has the lowest ICC. These values suggest that state-
level variables account for more variation in inter-organizational data access than in intra-
organizational data access. In both the "other public agencies" and the "non-governmental 
organizations" model, the ICC is high enough to justify a multilevel model. In the "other 
departments in the city" model, the ICC is relatively low for a multilevel model (Clarke 
& Wheaton, 2007).  
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Table 11 also reports the design effect and the actual sample size. The design 
effect indicates how many observations we would need to achieve the same N power, had 
the observations been independent of each other. For instance, in the "other departments 
in the city" model, a design effect equal to 1.5 means that we would need 1.5 times 
observations (Maas & Hox, 2005; Snijders & Bosker, 1993). The design effect ranges 
from 1.5 to 3.2. The actual sample size represents the size of the sample used for the 
estimation of the standard errors given the number of observations in the analysis and the 
design effect. The ICC, the design effect, and the actual sample size are correlated 
measures, such that a higher ICC corresponds to a higher design effect and a lower actual 
sample size.  
Table 11.  
Level-2 variance, ICC, and design effect of three multi-level data access models.  
Model 
Level 2 
variance 
ICC Design effect 
Actual 
sample size 
Internal departments 0.205 0.059 1.504 267.28 
Public agencies 0.594 0.153 2.316 173.59 
Non-governmental orgs 1.140 0.257 3.213 125.12 
 
First, I estimate a model with only level-1 variables; then, I included level-2 
variables. The model has a random intercept and fixed slopes. Table 12 reports the 
results. Significant results (p < 0.1) are bold. I also performed a Wald test to compare an 
unrestricted model where all β coefficients can vary with a restricted model where level-2 
variable coefficients are set equal to zero. Because weights are used in the analysis, a 
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Wald test is more appropriate than a Likelihood Ratio test. The Wald test suggests that 
the full model is an improvement compared to the null model (p<0.001).
  
 
 
1
2
4 
Table 12.  
Data access from other departments in the city, other public agencies, and non-governmental organization - Multilevel model 
estimator. 
 
Data access from other depts. in 
the city 
Data access from other  
 public agencies 
Data access from 
nongovernmental organizations 
 Beta 
Odds 
ratio SE   Beta 
Odds 
ratio SE   Beta 
Odds 
ratio SE   
Institutions                          
Privacy Laws 0.00 1.00 0.01   -0.01 0.99 0.01   -0.01 0.99 0.01   
Legal Mandate 0.38 1.46 0.16 * 0.35 1.42 0.15 * 0.23 1.26 0.13  + 
Institutional Capacity 0.04 1.04 0.07   0.08 1.08 0.08   0.15 1.16 0.09  + 
Open Data Portals 0.08 1.08 0.12   -0.19 0.83 0.17   -0.14 0.87 0.15   
Social environment                         
City Influence 0.14 1.16 0.18   -0.03 0.97 0.13   -0.02 0.98 0.13   
Civil Society Influence 0.28 1.33 0.21   0.54 1.72 0.20 ** 0.48 1.61 0.22 * 
Government Influence -0.29 0.75 0.20   -0.41 0.67 0.15 ** -0.37 0.69 0.16 * 
Coordination mechanisms                         
Formal Coordination 0.10 1.10 0.16   0.24 1.27 0.15   0.17 1.19 0.19   
Lateral Coordination -0.13 0.88 0.16   0.04 1.04 0.19   0.23 1.26 0.17   
Informal Coordination 0.48 1.62 0.16 ** 0.40 1.49 0.18 * 0.29 1.33 0.17  + 
Control variables                         
Principal City 0.85 2.34 0.31 ** 0.54 1.72 0.32  + 0.69 2.00 0.34 * 
Social Barriers -0.40 0.67 0.24   -0.46 0.63 0.23 * -0.31 0.74 0.19   
Technical Barriers 0.20 1.23 0.23   0.15 1.16 0.23   0.16 1.18 0.18   
  
 
 
1
2
5 
File Sharing Technology 0.41 1.51 0.25  + 0.18 1.20 0.27   0.80 2.22 0.23 *** 
Dept Size 0.00 1.00 0.10   -0.09 0.92 0.12   -0.04 0.97 0.11   
Technical Capacity -0.36 0.70 0.21  + -0.19 0.82 0.18   -0.35 0.70 0.16 * 
Form of Government -0.19 0.83 0.27   -0.15 0.86 0.25   0.16 1.18 0.34   
Population -0.39 0.68 0.19 * -0.16 0.86 0.20   -0.39 0.68 0.16 * 
Community Development -0.62 0.54 0.43   -0.80 0.45 0.44  + -0.22 0.80 0.44   
Finance -0.68 0.50 0.55   -0.61 0.54 0.50   -0.19 0.83 0.43   
Parks and Recreation -0.78 0.46 0.49   -0.65 0.52 0.49   -0.61 0.55 0.37  + 
Police 0.57 1.77 0.58   0.93 2.55 0.48 * 0.80 2.23 0.37 * 
Cut 1 -3.71   2.65   -1.75 0.17 2.36   -3.55 0.03 1.84  + 
Cut 2 -2.18   2.59   0.08 1.09 2.30   -1.67 0.19 1.82   
State variation 0.41   0.40   0.72 2.05 0.78   1.04 2.82 0.58   
Observations 402 402 402 
Clusters 42 42 42 
Averaged cluster 9.6 9.6 9.6 
Log likelihood -836.2109 -895.2611 -925.7676 
AIC 1722.422 1840.522 1901.535 
BIC 1822.333 1940.433 2001.447 
Significance levels: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 - Reference category: Mayor’s Office
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Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
Up to now, each model was estimated separately. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that the three equations are correlated, as the same respondent has reported data 
access across the whole portfolio of relationships. Moreover, we might expect that 
departments which are better at accessing data from other city departments might also be 
better at accessing data from other organizations. Empirically, the three dependent 
variables are highly correlated (>0.5) suggesting that there might be common factors 
explaining their variation (correlations are reported in table 13). If that is the case, the 
error terms of the regressions are correlated, and a seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) estimator is preferable.  
The SUR estimator was developed by Zellner (1963) and accounts for the 
likelihood that the error terms of two or more regressions are not independent. If the error 
terms are uncorrelated, then the SUR estimator is not different from other estimators. But, 
when the error terms are correlated, we gain a more efficient estimator by jointly 
estimating the equations and taking into account the full covariance structure (Greene, 
2000; Zellner; 1963)11.   
 
                                                 
11 The SUR estimator provides efficiency gains if the matrix of the observations differs across equations 
(e.g., at least one variable is different across equations). In the presented models, the variable Legal 
Mandate is measured differently across the three equations such that it is possible to apply a SUR 
estimator. 
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Table 13.  
Correlation across dependent variables 
Data access from 
Other depts. 
in the city  
Public 
agencies 
Non-governmental 
organizations 
Other depts. in the city 1.00   
Other public agencies 0.76 1.00  
Non-governmental organizations 0.62 0.72 1.00 
The SUR model was estimated using the "cmp" command in Stata (Roodman, 
2011). "cmp" is a flexible statistical framework, which relies on a maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimator to estimate systems of two or more equations across a wide range of 
variable types. Given the nature of the DVs, I utilize an ordered model with a probit 
link12. Design weights and clustered robust standard errors are applied to each regression 
as described in previous sections. A SUR multilevel model can also be estimated in 
"cmp" but unfortunately, the model does not converge. Non-convergence is common in 
seemingly unrelated multi-level models given the number of parameters that require 
estimation (Roodman, 2011). To try to reach convergence, I estimate the model first, 
assuming that all error terms are correlated and then, assuming that only error terms at 
level-1 are correlated; this latter option generally facilitates the estimation of the 
parameters. In both cases, the model did not converge. 
Results from the SUR model are shown in table 16. Odd ratios are not reported 
because the estimation is based on a probit link. Probit coefficients represent a change in 
                                                 
12 The logit link is not available under the cmp package.  
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the z-score of the underlying variable (Long, 1997). Significant coefficients (p < 0.1) are 
bold. Correlations across the equations are reported in table 14. The rhos13 – the 
correlations of the residuals between each pair of regressions - are significant for all pair 
of regressions, confirming that error terms are correlated. A series of Walt tests 
comparing the full model with a constrained model where the correlation across error 
terms is set, first equal to zero for each pair of regression, and then equal to zero for all 
pairs of equations, confirm the appropriateness of a SUR system (p<0.001). Results of 
the Wald tests for each applied constraint are reported in table 15. 
Table 14.  
Correlations across regression in the SUR model presented in table 16. 
 Beta SE P-value Confidence Interval 
/atanhrho_12 1.36 0.11 0 *** 1.15 1.57 
/atanhrho_13 0.94 0.10 0 *** 0.74 1.14 
/atanhrho_23 1.23 0.11 0 *** 1.00 1.45 
rho_12 0.88       0.03 0.92 
rho_13 0.74       0.05 0.82 
rho_23 0.84       0.03 0.90 
Table 15.  
Applied constraints to the SUR system in table 16 and Wald test results. 
Constraints Chi2 DF Prob > chi2 
Rho_12 = 0 158.47 1 0.000 
Rho_13 = 0 82.41 1 0.000 
Rho_23 = 0 118.58 1 0.000 
Rho_12, Rho_13 and Rho_23 = 0 283.94 3 0.000 
                                                 
13 The cmp estimates the Fisher's z transformed rho 
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Table 16.  
Data access from other departments in the city, other public agencies, and non-governmental organization – Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model  
 
 
Data access from other 
depts. in the city 
Data access from other 
public agencies 
Data access from 
nongovernmental 
organizations 
 Beta SE 
 Beta SE  Beta SE   
Institutions 
Privacy Laws -0.00 0.00   -0.00 0.00   -0.00 0.01   
Legal Mandate 0.17 0.06 ** 0.13 0.04 *** 0.16 0.06 ** 
Open government 0.02 0.05   -0.09 0.05  + -0.06 0.06   
Institutional capacity 0.00 0.02   0.02 0.02   0.04 0.02   
Social environment 
City Influence 0.03 0.10  -0.04 0.07   0.01 0.07   
Civil Society Influence 0.28 0.13 * 0.41 0.09 *** 0.31 0.10 ** 
Government Influence -0.18 0.10  + -0.25 0.09 ** -0.22 0.08 ** 
Coordination mechanisms 
Formal Coordination 0.08 0.08  0.16 0.09  + 0.11 0.10   
Lateral Coordination -0.06 0.09  0.07 0.10   0.17 0.09  + 
Informal Coordination 0.26 0.09 ** 0.20 0.09 * 0.13 0.10   
Control variables 
Principal City 0.47 0.15 ** 0.29 0.17  + 0.41 0.20 * 
Social Barriers -0.24 0.13  + -0.27 0.12 * -0.19 0.09 * 
Technical Barriers 0.10 0.13   0.03 0.12   0.05 0.08   
Dept Size -0.02 0.05   -0.06 0.06   -0.03 0.06   
  
 
 
1
3
0 
Technical Capacity -0.20 0.11  + -0.14 0.09   -0.23 0.08 ** 
File Sharing Technology 0.20 0.14  0.07 0.16   0.37 0.15 ** 
Form of Government -0.14 0.15   -0.01 0.13   0.11 0.17   
Population -0.27 0.08 *** -0.13 0.09   -0.23 0.09 * 
Community Development -0.33 0.22   -0.48 0.20 * -0.16 0.23   
Finance -0.29 0.28   -0.27 0.25   -0.11 0.22   
Parks and Recreation -0.40 0.24  + -0.34 0.26   -0.29 0.20   
Police 0.37 0.29   0.58 0.24 * 0.48 0.21 * 
Cut 1 -2.84 1.27 * -1.56 1.16   -2.15 0.97 * 
Cut 2 -2.03 1.25   -0.61 1.14   -1.14 0.98   
Significance levels: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, Reference categories: Mayor’s Office
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Summary 
I estimated three different models to assess the most appropriate fit to the data and 
check the robustness of the results. I used a probit model with clustered SEs as the 
baseline model. I then estimated two other models: a multilevel model and a system of 
seemingly unrelated regressions model. Here I briefly summarize the fit of each model 
before proceeding to discuss the results in the light of the hypotheses outlined in chapter 
4.  
The clustered SEs model shows that an ordered logit estimator is appropriate as 
the parallel line assumption is met. Only four variables were found problematic. A partial 
non-proportional odds model suggests that there are only small differences across 
categories to be considered in the interpretation of the findings.  
The multilevel model considers the two-level structure of the data and facilitates 
inference on level-2 variables. It considers that the variance of the dependent variable is 
explained by both department (level-1) and state (level 2) factors. The ICC is low in the 
"other departments in the city" model (ICC < 0.1), but it is moderated in the "other public 
agencies" (0.1 > ICC > 0.2) and "non-governmental organizations" model (0.2 > ICC > 
0.3).  
However, the multilevel model presents some limitations because of design issues 
related to group size. The estimated models include 42 clusters of 1 to 81 observations, 
for an average cluster size of 9.6. Sparseness - the presence of clusters with only one 
observation - might cause bias in model estimation (Bell, Ferron, & Kromrey, 2008). In 
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the data, 19% of clusters are singletons, i.e., they contain only one observation (8 clusters 
out of 42).  
Sparseness is a common problem in social sciences (Bell, Ferron, & Kromrey, 
2008). Singletons might cause problems in a multilevel structure because the individual 
and the within-group variability are equal when a cluster is composed of only one 
individual. Eliminating singletons might create even more problems if singletons are 
systematically different from other clusters. Several studies have tried to assess the 
impact of singletons and small cluster size on multilevel estimation using simulations. 
Most of them find that sparseness does not affect fixed-effect coefficients (Bell, Ferron, 
& Kromrey, 2008; Clarke & Wheaton, 2007; Maas & Hox, 2005) but it does affect 
random-effect estimates. These results indicate that the group-level variance - which is of 
interest in this research - can be overestimated. Over-estimation of the group-level 
variance increases when the model has a low ICC (i.e., ICC = 0.1) and a small number of 
groups (<100) 14  (Clarke & Wheaton, 2007). These conditions might cause Type I 
                                                 
14Biases in multilevel model results is one reason why this research does not estimate random slope 
parameters. The bias created by small group size and sparseness is accentuated when random slope 
parameters are estimated as compared to models that include only random intercept parameters (Clarke & 
Wheaton, 2007).  
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statistical error and lead to infer that there are group-level differences when there are 
none15,16.  
In this research, singletons are a reasonable percentage of the clusters, the model 
has relatively low ICC, and the number of clusters is low. Because of these issues, I 
suggest that a multilevel model should be utilized to validate the baseline ordered logit 
model, but we need to be cautious in drawing conclusions about the study. When 
compared to the baseline model, the standard errors of the multilevel model are more 
substantial, but the size and sign of coefficients are comparable.  
Finally, the SUR model accounts for the correlations across the three equations. 
Empirically, the SUR system has the smallest standard errors, which can be explained by 
the fact that it includes more information in the estimation than other models. However, 
results do not substantially differ from the clustered SE model and the multilevel model. 
Given that the SUR model shows strong evidence that the error terms are correlated and 
results do not significantly differ from previous models, the next section discuss the 
hypotheses based on results from the SUR model. Appendix G and H discuss robustness 
check that have been conducted on the final model. Appendix G re-estimates the three 
model only considering cities with population below 100,000. Appendix H shows the 
                                                 
15 Results were generated by simulating models with high sparseness (60% of singletons), medium 
sparseness (10% of singletons) and low sparseness (2% of singletons) (Clarke & Wheaton). The level of 
sparseness in this model (=0.2) suggests that bias will not be as large as in high sparseness model, but it 
won’t neither be reduced as low as in the models with medium or low sparseness. Comparing the study’s 
conditions with simulations holding similar characteristics, there is evidence of upward bias in random 
effects.  
16
 Clarke and Wheaton (2007) at least ten observations per cluster and at least 100 clusters for the intercept 
variance to approach the true value.  
  
134 
estimation of the model when utilizing multiple imputation technique to impute missing 
values.  
Hypotheses Testing  
In this section, I discuss the results against the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. 
I am mostly interested in the significance and direction of the correlations between the 
independent variables and the three dependent variables – data access from other 
departments in the city, other public agencies, and non-governmental organizations. The 
significance of the coefficients is defined at the 0.05 level, but coefficients with a p-value 
lower than 0.1 are also discussed. While 0.05 is the most commonly accepted 
significance level, it is not unusual to indicate results that meet the 0.1 threefold. These 
results still indicate a high probability of correlation and provide insights into managerial 
practices. I will also discuss the magnitude of the coefficients across variables or models; 
particularly, to facilitate the interpretation of the results from a probit model, I report the 
discrete change, that is “the change in the predicted probability for a change in xk from a 
start value xs to the end value xe” (Long, 1997, p. 136). Predicted probabilities will focus 
on the “high data access” category and will describe the probability that department 
heads report high data access, holding all other variables constant at their means. All 
comparisons are based on a Wald test between standardized coefficients. Results are 
based on the Seemingly Unrelated Regression model (table 16). As mentioned above, 
results are consistent with the ordered logit model with clustered robust standard errors 
and the multilevel model.  
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Institutions. Hypothesis 1a states that privacy laws will be positively correlated 
with data access. The analysis finds no evidence that privacy laws affect data access from 
other departments in the city, other public agencies, or non-governmental organizations; 
the Privacy Laws coefficients are statically non-significant (p-value > 0.05). This finding 
is in contrast with previous research arguing that privacy laws either positively affect data 
access – because of reduced privacy and data misuse concerns - or negatively affect data 
access – because of higher requirements and constraints and fear of noncompliance.  
It might be that privacy laws only affect data access, when data contain sensitive 
information, such as personal identifiers, social security numbers, addresses, medical 
records, and so on (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018). To rule out this explanation, I 
introduced an interaction term between Privacy Law and Sensitive Data17 to test whether 
Privacy Laws have any significant effect on data access when city departments exchange 
sensitive data. Table 17 shows the coefficients for the direct effect and the interaction 
terms across all three models (standard errors are reported into brackets). The full model 
is presented in Appendix F.  
Table 17.  
Results of the interaction between Privacy Laws and Sensitive Data.  
 
Other depts. in 
the city 
Other public 
agencies 
Non-
governmental 
orgs. 
Privacy Laws .018 (.015) .005 (0.011) .012 (0.009)  
Sensitive Data .087 (0.278) -.204 (0.260) .174 (0.238) 
Privacy Laws * Sensitive Data -.005 (0.004) .000 (0.004) -.006 (0.003) + 
                                                 
17 Sensitive Data is a continuous variable ranging from 1 (=strongly disagree) to 5 (=strongly agree). The 
survey item asked: “Most activities in my organization requires access to sensitive data that contains 
personally identifiable information” (mean = 2.99, s.d. = 1.17). 
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Significance levels: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Results show no significant correlation in the "other departments in the same city" 
and "other public agencies" models, but the coefficient is slightly significant and 
negatively correlated with data access (p-value = 0.06) in the "non-governmental 
organizations" model. This result suggests privacy laws might decrease city departments' 
capacity to access sensitive data from non-governmental organizations. 
Hypothesis 1b states that legal mandates to share data will be positively correlated 
with data access. Across all models, Legal Mandate has a positive and significant 
coefficient, showing support for the hypothesis (p-values < 0.05). In the "other 
departments in the same city" model, moving from “no legal mandates” to “all requests 
are subject to legal mandates to share data” changes the predicted probability of reporting 
high data access by 0.19, holding all other variables constant at their means. In the "other 
public agencies" model, moving from “no legal mandates” to “all requests are subject to 
legal mandates to share data” changes the predicted probability of reporting high data 
access by 0.16, holding all other variables constant at their means. Finally, in the 
"nongovernmental organizations" model, moving from “no legal mandates” to “all 
requests are subject to legal mandates to share data” changes the predicted probability of 
reporting high data access by 0.18, holding all other variables constant at their means. 
Results also show that Legal Mandate has a larger effect in the "other departments 
in the same city" and "other public agencies" models (Wald test, p < 0.05). The effect is 
lower in "non-governmental organizations" model.  
Hypothesis 1c argues that state governments’ institutional capacity will be 
positively correlated with data access. Institutional capacity is not significant in any 
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model. Therefore, there is no support for hypothesis 1c. Hypothesis 1d states that the 
quality of open data portals will be positively correlated with data access. The variable 
Open Data Portals is not significantly correlated with data access in any model (p-value > 
0.1), thereby providing no evidence in support of hypothesis 1d. Taking together findings 
from hypothesis 1c and 1d, I can conclude that state government institutions - as 
measured in this study - are not significant predictors of data access capacity among city 
departments. Legal mandate is the only significant predictor among institutional 
variables.   
Social environment. Hypothesis 2a suggests that the influence of external 
organizations will be negatively correlated with data access. When in a position of power, 
organizations might refuse to provide data to maintain their influence over city 
departments' decision-making processes.  
I find similar results across all model models. City Influence is not significantly 
correlated with data access (p-value > 0.1) while Civil Society Influence has a positive 
effect on data access (p < 0.01). In fact, moving from “no influence” to “strong 
influence” of civil society actors increases the predicted probability of reporting high data 
access from nongovernmental organizations by 0.46 in the “nongovernmental 
organization model” and by 0.58 in the “other public agencies” model, holding all other 
variables constant at their means. This latter result contradicts hypothesis 2a. By contrast, 
Government Influence has a negative effect on data access, which supports hypothesis 2a 
(0.05 > p-value > 0.01). For instance, in the "other public agencies" model, moving from 
“no influence” to “strong influence” of government actors decreases the predicted 
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probability of reporting high data access by 0.32, holding all other variables constant at 
their means. In the “nongovernmental organizations” model, the predicted probability 
decreases by 0.30. Because of mixed evidence, it is difficult to confirm hypothesis 2a.  
Coordination mechanisms. Hypothesis 3a suggests that Formal Coordination 
will be positively correlated with data access from other public agencies. I find weak 
support for hypothesis 3a. The Formal Coordination variable is only slightly significant 
and positively correlated with data access from public agencies in the SUR model (p-
value < 0.1). The predicted probability of reporting high data access increases by 0.24, 
holding all other variables constant at their means when we move from the minimum 
value of formal coordination to its maximum. 
Hypothesis 3b suggests that Lateral Coordination is positively correlated with 
data access from non-governmental organizations. I find a positive and significant 
correlation between Lateral coordination and data access from non-governmental 
organizations (p-value = 0.05) in the SUR model. The predicted probability of reporting 
high data access increases by 0.26, holding all other variables constant at their means 
when we move from the minimum value of lateral coordination to its maximum. 
However, it is worth noted that this result is not consistent in the multilevel model 
(p>0.05).  
Hypotheses 3c and 3d suggest that Informal Coordination is positively correlated 
with data access from other departments in the city and non-governmental organizations, 
respectively. Results show support for hypothesis 3c but provide limited evidence in 
support of hypothesis 3d. All models show a significant and positive correlation between 
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informal coordination and data access from city departments (p<0.05). The predicted 
probability of reporting high data access from other departments in the city increases by 
0.4 when comparing department heads who never utilize informal coordination with 
department heads who always utilize informal coordination, holding all other variables 
constant at their means. However, the correlation between informal coordination and data 
access from non-governmental organizations is non-significant at the 0.05 level. 
Unexpectedly, I find a positive and significant relationship between lateral coordination 
and data access from other public agencies. The predicted probability of reporting high 
data access from other public agencies increases by 0.31 when comparting department 
heads who never utilize informal coordination to department heads who always utilize 
informal coordination, holding all other variables constant at their means. 
Control variables. Among control variables, I find no evidence that 
Technological Barriers decrease data access; the coefficient is statistically not significant 
(p-value > 0.05). By contrast, Socio-political Barriers are negatively and significantly 
correlated with data access from other public agencies (p-value < 0.05), non-
governmental organizations (p<0.1), and other departments in the city (p <0.1). 
Technical Capacity has a negative and significant effect on data access from non-
governmental organizations (p-value < 0.05). Technical Capacity is also slightly 
significantly correlated with data access from other departments in the city (p-value < 
0.1). I also find that information sharing technologies are positively correlated with data 
access. All models show a positive relationship, but the variable File Sharing Technology 
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is significantly correlated with data access only in the "non-governmental organizations" 
model (p-value < 0.01).  
Results also show that departments in principal cities are more likely to access 
data from other departments in the city and non-governmental organizations. A slight 
significant correlation is also found in the data access from public agencies model (p-
value = 0.1).  
The analysis included five department types: Mayor’s office, community 
development, finance, parks and recreation, and police. The Mayor’s office is the 
reference category in all models. Results show variation across department types. Police 
department heads report higher data access from public agencies and non-governmental 
organizations than Mayor’s office heads. Community development department heads are 
less likely to access data from other public agencies as compared to Mayor’s office 
heads.  
Finally, findings show a significant effect of Population Size, where department 
heads working for smaller cities report lower data access from other departments in the 
city and non-governmental organizations (p-values < 0.05). This finding is further 
explored in Appendix E where I present a separate model for small cities.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Following the analysis conducted in chapter 6, this chapter discusses the main 
findings and conclusions from this research. The chapter is organized in four sections. 
The first section discusses the results of the statistical analysis. The section also 
highlights the main theoretical contributions of the study. The second section discusses 
data and methodology limitations, including common method bias, measurement issues, 
and survey data. The third section summarizes contributions to managerial practices and 
key takeaway points for public managers who wish to support data practices in general, 
and particularly data access. Finally, the last section proposes opportunities for future 
research in public management and data sharing scholarship.   
Discussion of Results 
This research focuses on data access for several reasons. First, despite the 
development of new technology for collecting, analyzing, and storing data, public 
managers greatly rely on data provided by nonprofit and for-profit organizations and 
other public agencies to feed decision-making processes and support the design and 
development of public policies (Allard et al., 2018; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018). Public 
managers expect that greater availability and diversity of data will help them to improve 
public outcomes, including efficiency, effectiveness, and equity (Allard et al., 2018; 
Jennings & Hall, 2012). Moreover, data are raw inputs for the creation of novel 
information and knowledge, which can promote and support innovation in the public 
sector. Therefore, understanding the determinants of data access is vital to improve 
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government decisions and the quality of public services for the benefit of citizens. 
Second, given the growing complexity of the policy environment, public organizations 
are required to engage in some form of data, information, and knowledge sharing with 
external and internal stakeholders. Sharing data and information is needed to collaborate 
with other organizations, coordinate common activities, and take into account different 
perspectives when addressing complex policy problems. Yet, recent research suggests 
that public managers still face severe barriers to access and exchange data and 
information (Allard et al., 2018; Feeney et al., 2016). Additional research is needed to 
increase the ability of public managers to obtain data and information and reduce time, 
human, and financial resources that are needed to bend data access barriers.  
This research develops an Integrative Framework for Data Access (IFDA) and 
uses it to investigate data access across departments in small- and medium-sized cities in 
the United States. The IFDA combines institutional theory, resource dependence theory, 
and collaboration studies to highlight factors that influence data access across various 
levels of analysis. The IFDA assumes that public managers initiate efforts to access data 
from other organizations through different coordination mechanisms and that the 
institutional and social context of city governments shape opportunities and constraints 
for data access. Moreover, the IFDA considers institutional and social differences that 
characterize the portfolio of stakeholders with whom city departments exchange data - 
other departments in the city, other public agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.  
The IFDA brings three major contributions to public management research and 
data sharing literature. First, previous studies have suggested the appropriateness of a 
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multilevel model to investigate data and information sharing (Fountain, 2007; Yang & 
Maxwell, 2011) but public management scholarship lacks a fully developed theoretical 
model followed by an empirical investigation. The IFDA acknowledges and empirically 
tests how factors at multiple levels – institutions, social relationships, and coordination – 
affect data access; these factors are analyzed separately in previous research.  
Second, it expands previous studies that mostly focus on collaborative initiatives 
for data sharing. These studies look at situations where public organizations collaborate 
with their stakeholders to set up rules, structures, and incentives to share data. However, 
in their daily activities, public managers are likely to interact with stakeholders that are 
autonomous and have no or few incentives to share data. This research looks at data 
sharing more broadly and emphasizes the daily coordination mechanisms that public 
managers utilize to share data across their portfolio of relationships. By doing so, it 
examines how formal, lateral, and informal coordination mechanisms coexist to facilitate 
data access and the conditions under which coordination is effective.  
Particularly, the IFDA focuses on how coordination mechanisms vary across 
stakeholder types and highlights social and institutional differences across the portfolio of 
relationships of a city department. Based on previous literature (Daley, 2009; Eglene, 
Dawes, & Schneider, 2007), I argue that there are differences between intra- and inter-
organizational relationships and same and cross-sector ones. If scholars and public 
managers wish to increase data access across public agencies, then it fundamental to 
understand such differences and investigate data access across the full relationship 
portfolio to inform research and practice.  
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I test the IFDA using data collected by the Center for Science, Technology, and 
Environmental Policy Studies at Arizona State University. The survey collects data about 
2,500 city departments in 500 US cities with populations from 25,000 to 250,000. 
Descriptive statistics show that city departments have relatively good access to data, but 
there are significant differences across the portfolio of relationships. In line with previous 
research (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009; Roberts, 2011), city departments report 
lower data access from non-governmental organizations and greater access from other 
departments in the city. Technical and organizational barriers are higher when 
exchanging data across sectors, and sectoral differences might exacerbate socio-political 
and cultural conflicts associated with data misuse or the negotiation of conditions for 
using and accessing data (Susha, Janssen, & Verhulst, 2017).   
Results from the analysis show only partial support for most hypotheses of the 
IFDA, as summarized in table 18. Macro-level factors, such as legal mandates and 
stakeholder influence, have a similar effect across the portfolio of stakeholders, while 
coordination mechanisms substantially differ based on the stakeholder type. I discuss the 
results in more detail in the next paragraphs. 
Table 18.  
Summary of research results.  
Hypotheses Results 
Institutions 
H1a. State privacy laws will be positively 
correlated with data access. 
Not supported 
H1b. A legal mandate to share data across 
organizations will be positively correlated 
with data access. 
Supported 
H1c. State government’s institutional capacity 
will be positively correlated with data access. 
Not supported 
  
145 
H1d. Quality of state government open data 
portals will be positively correlated with data 
access.  
Not supported 
Social environment 
H2a. Influence of external organizations will 
be negatively correlated with data access. 
Partially supported 
• Influence from city actors – Not 
supported 
• Influence from non-
governmental organization – 
Significant but positively 
correlated 
• Influence from other 
governmental agencies - 
Supported 
Coordination mechanisms 
H3a. Formal coordination mechanisms will be 
positively correlated with data access from 
other public agencies. 
Not supported 
H3b. Lateral coordination will be positively 
correlated with data access from 
nongovernmental organizations. 
Not supported 
H3c. Informal coordination mechanisms will 
be positively correlated with data access from 
other departments in the city. 
Supported 
H3d. Informal coordination mechanisms will 
be positively correlated with data access from 
nongovernmental organizations. 
Not supported 
Institutions. The IFDA argues that institutions are a fundamental part of the 
environment in which data exchange takes place, and they might limit or facilitate data 
access. Institutions are humanly devised constraints and incentives that exert normative 
and coercive pressures on organizations and individuals to act accordingly to socially 
accepted behaviors and rules. Results show that only coercive pressures in the form of 
legal mandates to share data matter for explaining data access. I find weak to no evidence 
that other coercive pressures, such as privacy laws, and normative pressures, such as state 
institutional capacity and the quality of open data portals, are related to data access. I 
advance some explanations for these results. 
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Previous research suggests that privacy laws either increase (Fountain, 2007; 
Yang & Maxwell, 2011) or decrease data sharing (6, Bellamy, Raab, Warren, & Heeney, 
2007). Findings from this study suggest an alternative hypothesis: while privacy laws 
establish an overarching framework for sharing data across organizations, they do not 
directly affect the decision to share or not to share data with public organizations. Since 
privacy laws are relatively weak in the United States (Baumer, Earp, & Poindexter, 
2004), it might be that managers are little concerned with noncompliance and, therefore, 
privacy laws do not prevent organizations from providing data to public agencies. Future 
studies might compare the effect of privacy laws between countries with weak 
requirements, such as the US, and countries with strong requirements, such as member 
states of the European Union. It might also be that managers are familiar with the few 
existing privacy laws and they know how to comply with them, so as privacy laws do not 
constitute a barrier for sharing data. Quasi-experimental studies could examine whether 
data sharing is restricted when states adopt a new privacy regulation and thereby 
discerning the effect of learning on institutional barriers.  
Results show that legal mandates to share data have a positive effect on data 
access. This finding confirms evidence from previous case studies and interviews with 
public managers, which found that legal mandates greatly facilitate access to data across 
public agencies (6 et al., 2007; Allard et al., 2018; Jennings & Hall, 2012). This study 
further suggests that legal mandates have a greater effect on data exchange among 
departments in the same city and public agencies. I found a lower effect when examining 
data access from nongovernmental organizations. It might be that state governments are 
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less involved in cross-sectoral data exchange and are less likely to force nongovernmental 
organizations to share data with city governments. By contrast, state governments are 
increasingly regulating data sharing across public organizations in an attempt to break 
down departmental silos (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018).  
The interpretation of the results on legal mandates should consider that the study 
focuses on "timely" data access - i.e., whether public managers can access data without 
the need to follow up with the other organization. It might be that legal mandates to share 
data have a lower impact on the responsiveness of nongovernmental organizations. 
Because they less frequently exchange data with city departments (Feeney et al., 2016), 
non-governmental organizations might need time to put together data requested by city 
governments; learn about institutional constraints; address organizational policies and 
requirements; and obtain authorization to share data. Thereby, public managers might be 
able to access data only after submitting follow-up requests. Future research should 
investigate how legal mandates impact on the overall capacity to access data from 
nongovernmental organizations and the quality of data that the organizations provide 
(see: measurement limitations).  
Regarding normative pressures, I do not find a significant correlation neither in 
the case of institutional capacity nor quality of the open data portals. These results 
contrast with previous research on e-government and information technology adoption 
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016; McNeal, Tolbert, Mossberger, & Dotterweich, 
2003b), collaboration (Smith, 2009), and information sharing (Dawes et al., 2009). A 
possible explanation regards the level of analysis at which institutions were measured. 
  
148 
Some studies on institutional theory found that normative and coercive pressures stem at 
different levels (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995). While coercive pressures stem from 
high-level institutions - such as state governments -, peer organizations and organizations 
in the same field are the primary sources of normative pressures.  
According to this perspective, it might be that state-level normative pressures 
have no effect on data exchange at the local level. Internal and external stakeholders refer 
to the institutional capacity and culture of the city government when looking for social 
cues and cultural norms to understand acceptable practices and behaviors. For instance, 
stakeholders might look at whether the city government provides an open data portal or 
whether it has a data sharing policy. Policy and innovation diffusion theories (Berry & 
Berry, 2014) corroborate this perspective, suggesting that organizations tend to adopt 
behaviors that are similar to those of their peers. Future research should examine the 
effect of social cues at the local level, including symbolic and cultural signals that city 
governments might diffuse in the environment through websites, social media, and open 
data portals.  
Social environment. This study recognizes that city department heads are not 
isolated agents; requests for data occur within a set of previously established relationships 
(Azad & Wiggins, 1995). The IFDA draws from resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) and focuses on power dynamics, which are a fundamental component of 
data exchange. Issues of dependence, political power, and influence across organizations 
are likely to shape willingness to share data (Gil-Garcia, Pardo, & Nam, 2016; Meijer, 
2018). I look at influence, defined as the ability of external organizations to pressure city 
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departments to address their own and their constituency’s interests.  Because of their size, 
small cities are greatly subject to influence from local constituencies (Hamin, Gurran, & 
Emlinger, 2014).  
Resource dependence theory suggests that data are a critical resource for 
organizations. The decision to hide or disclose data and information is a strategic and 
political one, and organizations might refrain from sharing them in order to maintain 
power in the environment, ensure a competitive advantage, and avoid damages to their 
performance. I find mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis. Overall, the analysis 
shows that influence dynamics broadly affect data access across the full portfolio of 
relationships, but there are relevant differences across stakeholder types. While state and 
federal government influence reduces data access, civil society influence has a positive 
effect, and city actor influence – the Mayor, the city council and other city departments – 
does not affect data access. I discuss three main implications for theory and practice.  
First, city governments that are more intermingled into sectoral power dynamics 
experience negative repercussions in engaging with internal and external stakeholders to 
access data. The relationship between city departments and the state and the federal 
government is likely characterized by hierarchy, conflicts over shared authority, legal 
requirements, bureaucratic culture, and enforced accountability across agencies 
(Fountain, 2007; Mullin & Daley, 2010). When government agencies are highly 
influential, city departments might experience lower autonomy and discretion to 
negotiate conditions for data sharing, which in turn negatively affect data access. 
Bureaucratic rules and hierarchical relationships might also constrain public managers' 
  
150 
action and reinforce jurisdictional divisions and accountability requirements across 
departments and agencies, which decrease willingness to share data. This finding 
suggests that the bureaucratic form of government is still persistent in the public sector 
and reinforce issues of accountability and rule enforcement that bind opportunities for 
sharing and collaborating across organizations (Dawes, 1996; Fountain, 2007; Roberts, 
2011). 
 Second, I suggest that there are different explanations as of why civil society 
influence increases data access from public sector organizations - both other departments 
in the city and other public agencies - and nongovernmental organizations, respectively.   
Open data literature suggests that pressures from the civil society positively affect 
government willingness to provide data (Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016). 
Government agencies are responsive to civil society pressures because they need to 
maintain political legitimacy and draw support for policy adoption and implementation 
(Rainey, 2009). Cities that experience greater influence from civil society organizations 
might need to collaborate more closely with other government actors in order to respond 
to demands from citizens, advocacy groups, professional associations, and media. By 
pressuring the government, civil society creates an environment that is more conducive of 
collaboration and data and information sharing across government agencies, which 
increases the likelihood that department heads will obtain data.   
Civil society influence also increases data access from non-governmental 
organizations. Non-governmental organizations might be more willing to provide data 
when they perceive that external stakeholders can influence policymaking. Providing data 
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might be a way to maintain and reinforce influence and shape policy decisions. 
Additionally, when civil society is highly influential, department heads cannot ignore 
their inputs and need to acquire more information to develop policies and services that 
meet their interests. Thereby, they might be more willing to engage in negotiations and 
accommodate nongovernmental organizations’ requirements regarding data use and 
exchange. Given these findings, future research should further investigate the quality of 
data that city departments are timely able to obtain from non-governmental organizations. 
Non-governmental organizations might provide only data that support their policy 
preferences and benefit their constituencies. If that is the case, public managers should 
pay attention to how information available might affect decision making and its impact 
on outcomes for citizens, especially less represented communities.  
The flows of financial resources might also explain the relationship between city 
departments and non-governmental organizations. City departments are likely to provide 
funding to nongovernmental organizations or develop contracting relationships for the 
provision of public services – e.g., public-private partnerships. Funding and contracts 
might come with requirements of accountability and transparency – e.g., accountability 
clauses - that force non-governmental organizations to regularly provide data to city 
governments (Malatesta & Smith, 2012; Reynaers & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015).  
Finally, city actor influence is not a significant predictor of data access. It is 
reasonable to assume that internal power dynamics have little effect on the outcome of 
data exchange with other public agencies and nongovernmental organizations. 
Department heads are the ones in charge of dealing with external stakeholders, while the 
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Mayor and the city council are not involved in the day-to-day interactions with external 
organizations. By contrast, it is surprising that internal influence does not affect the 
exchange of data across departments in the same city. Previous studies have found that 
internal power dynamics affect knowledge exchange across organizational units (Willem 
& Buelens, 2007). The small size of the cities included in the sample might explain this 
result. In small- and medium-sized, the small number of council members and 
departments might encourage internal communication and coordination, which moderate 
the effect of influence dynamics.  
Coordination mechanisms. Results regarding coordination mechanisms (formal, 
lateral, and informal) provide only partial support for the hypotheses, but show some 
interesting findings that shed light on how city department heads can access data from 
internal and external stakeholders. While formal and lateral coordination are slightly 
correlated with data access, informal coordination significantly explains data access 
across the portfolio of relationships.  
Previous research on collaboration and information sharing has suggested that routines 
facilitate the exchange of resources across organizations (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; 
Dawes et al., 2009; Simo & Bies, 2007). However, I find that formal coordination has a 
weak and positive relationship only with data access from other public agencies. Small- 
and medium-sized cities might not be able to adequately design formal coordination 
mechanisms (e.g., routines and data sharing agreements) and they might encounter 
challenges in enforcing common rules. Previous studies have shown that organizations 
have strong preferences concerning data sharing routines and they might refrain from 
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sharing data if routines do align with their organizational goals and values (Bekkers, 
2007, 2009; Yang, Pardo, & Wu, 2014).   
This finding opens several research questions for future studies, which should 
investigate the types of formal coordination mechanisms used by public managers to 
receive data from other organizations; how public managers design formal coordination 
and how other organizations participate in the process; and which challenges and barriers 
most likely affect the success of formal coordination. It is possible that different 
mechanisms for formal coordination will lead to different data access outcomes.  
I find that lateral coordination has a positive, although weak, effect on access to 
data from nongovernmental organizations. This result provides weak evidence for 
hypothesis 3b but should be taken with caution. The interpretation of this result should 
consider that the study has no information on how nongovernmental organizations 
regulate the provision of data to other organizations. It might be that these organizations 
place constraints on sharing data with the city or grant little discretion to their employees 
to share data. Allard and colleagues (2107) report that public agencies have lengthy and 
tedious processes to share data, which fundamentally delay data access. Scholars should 
further investigate organization-level policies regarding data sharing and access to 
understand the effect of lateral coordination.  
Previous studies have also shown that written formal requests for information are 
often declined or dismissed by employees unless coercive mechanisms, such as Freedom 
of Information regulation, support them (Worthy, John, & Vannoni, 2017). It is possible 
that similar motivations apply to this study, where employees dismiss written formal 
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requests for data because they lack coercion. Future studies could explore the interaction 
between legal mandates and lateral coordination18. 
Finally, results show that informal coordination facilitates access to data from 
other departments in the same city and other public agencies. This finding corroborates 
previous research noting the importance of interpersonal networks for sharing data, 
information, and knowledge (6, Bellamy, Raab, Warren, & Heeney, 2007; Chen & Lee, 
2018; Gil-Garcia, Pardo, & Burke, 2010; Kim & Lee, 2006; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Willem & Buelens, 2007). However, I do not find that interpersonal networks matter 
when public managers seek access to data from non-governmental organizations. I 
discuss these results.  
Same-sector relationships are characterized by similar norms and values that 
facilitate inter-personal collaboration and resource sharing (Fountain, 2007; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2002). Public managers might rely on informal relationships to 
negotiate data access and collaboratively draw from professional training and norms to 
fill-in spaces left by organizational norms and rules (6 et al., 2007). Personal relationships 
might provide opportunities to work around legal and bureaucratic constraints as well as 
unclear regulations, thus facilitating access to data in the public sector. Instead, in cross-
sector relationships, diversity of values, norms, and practices might be obstacles to 
informal coordination mechanisms (Bryson et al., 2006; Daley, 2009; Guo & Acar, 
2005), such that public managers who more often utilize informal coordination do not 
                                                 
18 Preliminary analysis that was conducted by the author with the available data shows no effect of an 
interaction term between lateral coordination and legal mandates. However, data are collected by macro 
categories; future research should consider better measurement by using network data.  
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report significantly greater access to data than the ones who rarely rely on informal 
coordination.  
Additionally, public managers might be more likely to have ties with managers 
and employees working within their organization and in other public agencies. Public 
managers are more likely to collaborate and frequently interact with other actors in the 
public sector and therefore develop more extensive networks. Network composition 
might explain why interpersonal networks matter for same-sector relationships, but are 
not significant when public managers request data from nongovernmental organizations. 
This alternative explanation cannot be tested with available data; further research is 
needed to understand the breadth and composition of public managers’ networks across 
stakeholder type.  
Overall, results regarding coordination mechanisms suggest that data access is 
mostly a function of the initiative of city department heads rather than formal routines. 
Bellamy and colleagues (2008) reached a similar conclusion and argued that “achieving 
the enhanced volume of information-sharing demanded by government policy therefore 
relies, in practice, on the persistence of individual-goal seeking behaviors enabled by 
individualist forms and on the coping mechanisms” (p. 756).  
Control variables. It is worth highlighting some results from the analysis of the 
control variables that hold implications for future research and practice. I focus the 
attention on five variables: technological barriers and file sharing technologies; socio-
political barriers; principal cities; and department type.  
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First, technological barriers are not correlated with data access in any model. This 
result contradicts previous research suggesting that technical barriers fundamentally 
affect data sharing (Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia & Sayogo, 2016). Technology investments 
and changes in recent years might have decreased technological barriers and offered new 
tools that allow small cities to engage in data sharing.  
Cloud-based technologies are an example of new tools that cities might utilize to 
share data. I find that city departments which utilize cloud-based file sharing technologies 
(e.g., Dropbox or Google docs) report greater data access from nongovernmental 
organizations. Departments in the same city might rely on internal information systems – 
e.g., intranet - and public agencies might have dedicated systems to share data and 
information that strictly comply with cybersecurity and privacy regulations and 
standards. Cloud-based technologies might provide a new tool for public managers to 
overcome economic (e.g., costs) and technical (e.g., capacity) barriers that hinder the 
implementation of data sharing systems with non-governmental actors. They can also 
help organizations to develop common data standards and address interoperability 
constraints.  
However, these tools are often designed by private organizations, and public 
agencies might have little control over privacy and security issues. Public managers 
should pay attention to the usage of private-owned file sharing tools and be aware of the 
possible consequences of data breaches and unintended disclosure of information. Some 
file-sharing tools also have specific policies regarding property rights on the materials 
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stored on their server (e.g., Dropbox). Public managers should ascertain that the chosen 
tool fits with the scope and type of collaboration that they aim to achieve.  
In contrast with technological barriers, socio-political barriers are relevant to data 
access. Socio-political barriers include issues related to political concerns and 
competition that might prevent data sharing. For instance, data might be too sensitive to 
be shared, or local politicians might oppose the exchange of information for political 
reasons. Socio-political barriers have received little attention in data sharing literature and 
should be further integrated into the IFDA and future studies. Socio-political barriers 
stem from underlying issues related to institutions and power relationships between 
public managers as bureaucrats and politicians as representatives of civil society interests 
(Rainey, 2009). In the case of city governments, researchers should consider how 
political competition between state and local governments or between city departments 
and local stakeholder groups affect the exchange of information.  
Results suggest that departments in principal cities of metropolitan or 
micropolitan areas are more likely to have access to data. Growing urbanization has 
created large metropolitan areas which require city governments to coordinate activities 
and share data and information with multiple stakeholders to provide public services, 
including transportation, welfare assistance, and public safety (Lefèvre, 1998; Parks & 
Oakerson, 1989). Cities that are main centers of metropolitan areas are more likely to 
have resources and influence to affect other organizations’ behavior. Moreover, by 
coordinating activities with multiple stakeholders, principal cities might have strong 
relationships with other public agencies and nongovernmental organizations, which 
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facilitate data access. While available data do not allow further investigation, future 
studies should concentrate on data access and exchange across local governments in the 
same metropolitan (or micropolitan) area to understand how environmental 
characteristics stemming from geographical proximity, shared policy problems, 
competition for legitimacy, residents, and funding, and collaborative initiatives affect 
data access.  
Finally, the analysis shows that there are differences in data access across 
department types. Police departments are the most likely to access data, while community 
development departments report lower data access as compared to the Mayor’s office. 
Variation in the institutional and social context in which departments operate might 
explain these differences. Police departments have a hierarchical structure that links them 
to state and federal agencies and creates a set of legal requirements that police chiefs 
need to address. (Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016; Meijer & Torenvlied, 2016). A 
hierarchical structure might facilitate data access by establishing and enforcing 
centralized rules for sharing data. Moreover, police departments have the authority to 
force nongovernmental and public organizations to provide data to address security and 
safety issues. Future research should consider how specific differences across 
departments, such as differences in the task environments, field norms and professional 
rules (Yavuz & Welch, 2014) affect a local department’s ability to access and share data. 
Summary. The Integrative Framework for Data Access provides a 
comprehensive assessment of how public managers can build systemic capacity to access 
data from internal and external stakeholders. The IFDA combines insights from different 
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frameworks (Bellamy et al., 2008; Fountain, 2007; Gil-Garcia et al., 2010; Yang et al., 
2014) to provide a more nuanced understanding of data access. Moreover, it discusses the 
importance of coordination mechanisms to share data. Informal coordination and lateral 
coordination are especially important when public organizations have low capacity and 
face financial constraints because they are less costly to implement than routines and data 
sharing agreements. Moreover, this research compares results across three different types 
of stakeholders – other departments in the city, other public agencies, and 
nongovernmental organizations. Acknowledging commonalities and differences across 
relationship types is important as previous studies do not recognize the heterogeneity of 
participants to data sharing initiatives. 
The multilevel structure of the vertical dimension shows how exogenous (not 
controlled by public managers) and endogenous (controlled by public managers) factors 
contribute to an organization’s ability to access data. Results indicate that legal mandates 
to share data, external influence dynamics, and informal coordination mechanisms 
explain the most variation in data access across city departments. The horizontal 
dimension suggests that there is variation in data access across the portfolio of 
stakeholders as previous research has shown that barriers to data exchange and access 
vary across private, nonprofit, and public organizations (Azad & Wiggins, 1995; Dawes 
et al., 2009; Roberts, 2011). Results confirm this hypothesis, and table 19 summarizes 
common factors that characterize internal vs. external stakeholders and same sector vs. 
cross-sector relationships. 
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Table 19 shows that public managers who rely on informal coordination are more 
likely to obtain data from other organizations in the public sector. As suggested above, 
public managers might have more extensive and closer networks with managers and 
employees working in the same sector. Moreover, legal mandates strongly increase the 
responsiveness of other public organizations and facilitate data access. When taken 
together, these findings suggest that in same-sector relationships data access is predicted 
by a mix of formal institutions and informal coordination mechanisms. Future research 
should follow this lead and further investigate how formal institutions and informal 
mechanisms are balanced in same-sector relationships for sharing data and information.  
When exchanging data with external stakeholders, public managers face 
challenges and opportunities related to power dynamics in the social environment. When 
exchanging data with other public agencies and nongovernmental organizations, public 
managers should consider the social environment in which they operate. Power dynamics 
greatly shape opportunities and constraints to share data, and future research should 
explore how managers can overcome these constraints. 
Finally, when looking at cross-sector relationships, we note that coordination 
mechanisms are less effective and legal mandates have a lower effect on data access. 
Results also show that file-sharing tools have a positive impact on data access in cross-
sector relationships. This result might indicate that the lack of shared infrastructure is a 
significant antecedent of cross-sector data access.  
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Table 19. 
Summary results, horizontal dimension of the IFDA 
 Internal External 
Public (same) 
sector  
• High impact of legal 
mandates 
• Low impact of the social 
environment (influence) 
• Informal coordination 
mechanisms 
• High impact of legal mandates 
• High impact of the social 
environment 
• Informal coordination 
mechanisms 
Cross sector  NA 
• Low impact of legal mandates 
• High impact of the social 
environment 
• Information sharing tools 
Limitations  
Before proceeding to implications for practice and future research, I acknowledge 
the limitations of the study. Some limitations are intrinsically part of survey 
methodology, such as common method bias, while others concern the measurement of the 
variables and data collection.  
Common method bias. Survey data suffer from common method bias. Common 
method bias occurs when the data variance is to be attributed to the measurement method 
(e.g., repeated questions to the same individual) rather than to a natural variation in the 
observed social phenomena. When this occurs, the correlations across the variables are 
artificial and would not be observed with proper measurement (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  
According to Conway and Lance (2010) researchers can apply three strategies to 
reduce the potential effect of common method biases in survey research: (i) justify the 
appropriateness of self-reported variables; (ii) provide evidence of construct validity and 
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lack of overlap across measures; and (iii) proactively consider common method bias 
issues at the design stage. I discuss how I utilized each strategy.  
First, self-reported measures are appropriate for several constructs in the study. 
For instance, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) note that managers make decisions based on how 
they perceive power and influence in the social environment. Therefore, considering 
public managers' perceptions of stakeholder influence is an appropriate measure. 
Moreover, the research aims to investigate how public managers coordinate data access; 
in this case, public managers are the best source of information to understand how 
frequently they utilize each coordination mechanism.  
 With regards to the measures of technical capacity and technology use, research 
suggests that self-reported measures of technology use and capacity are often biased as 
high users tend to underreport hours of use while light users over report hours of use 
(Collopy, 1996). However, at the aggregated level over- and under-estimated measures 
tend to regress to the mean, reducing the overall bias. Finally, institutional variables are 
not subject to common method bias because they are constructed using observational data 
from other sources, and therefore they are not subject to self-reporting issues.  
Second, whenever appropriate and possible, the study relies on constructs tested 
in previous literature and previous versions of the survey (e.g., technical capacity or 
influence items). All variables show excellent internal validity as shown by the high 
value of their Cronbach's alpha. When previous scales and measures were not available, I 
provided information on the underlying factor structure, such as in the case of Technical 
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and Socio-Political Barriers. Results of the factor analysis are provided to the readers to 
evaluate the overlap across measures and internal consistency of the constructs.  
Third, the research team was attentive to adopt strategies to reduce common 
method bias during the survey design stage, including intermixing survey items, 
protecting individual anonymity, and improving scale items (Podasakoff et al. 2003). 
Moreover, the survey included a set of ‘quality check’ items, for which respondents were 
explicitly asked to mark a given answer option. For instance, respondents were instructed 
to mark the “Strongly agree” or “Strongly disagree” option in three questions throughout 
the survey. Quality checks help to control for “the propensity for respondents to try to 
maintain consistency in their responses to questions” (Podasakoff et al., 2003, p. 884). 
The quality checks were utilized in the data cleaning phase to identify respondents who 
consistently checked the same category and did not follow the instructions provided. 
These respondents were eliminated from the final dataset.  
Measurement limitations. This research focuses only on one dimension of data 
access, which is timeliness. Timely access to data is fundamental to provide public 
managers with the information they need to guide their decisions on public policies and 
services. Delayed access to data might reduce the ability of city governments to respond 
to stakeholders’ needs and to unforeseen situations and might increase the amount of 
resources (time, human, financial) that public managers need to invest in obtaining data. 
However, it might be that public managers will be able to access data after several 
requests; this aspect is not considered by current research. Internal and external 
stakeholders might not have the capacity to promptly respond to city departments’ 
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requests and might need extra time to prepare and share the data. Future research should 
consider how the IFDA explains the overall access to data and the quality of data that 
public managers are able to obtain. By taking more time to respond to the city 
department, external organizations might be able to provide “better” data.   
There are several dimensions of quality that are important for public 
organizations. For instance, data need to be usable, so that public managers can readily 
analyze them. Data shared in PDF format, for instance, require time to be translated into a 
format readable by statistical software. There are also issues related to data collection 
methods, representativeness, and accuracy of data that are of the utmost importance to 
design effective, equitable and fair public policies. Future research should consider how 
the IFDA explains variation in quality and usability of data that public managers obtain 
from other organizations; even when public managers can timely access data, they might 
not get the data they need or want to inform their decisions.  
Second, the survey focuses only on public managers’ perceptions and does not 
collect information on the external stakeholders. Because of this, we need to be cautious 
when interpreting some results. For instance, influence dynamics do not consider the 
perspective of both actors involved. The dyadic nature of power is one of the core tenants 
of resource dependence theory (Emerson, 1962; Saidel, 1991). In the study, I have no 
information on how other organizations perceive their relative power over or dependence 
from the city government; influence dynamics could have been different, had both sides 
been taken into account. While a city department might perceive individual citizens to be 
very influential on policymaking, citizens might perceive that the city government makes 
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the final decision and political actors are the major players of policymaking. Therefore, 
they might grant access to data because they perceive the city department to have power 
and control over policy decisions. 
Moreover, I do not have information regarding the capacity of the stakeholders or 
their organizational structure. Organizations might refuse to provide data to the city 
government because they do not have the capacity to share them. Small nonprofit 
organizations, for instance, might not store data in a digital format or might not store the 
data that the city department needs. The Technical Barriers variable controls for these 
challenges, but it is self-reported by city department heads. Additionally, some 
organizations might have strict organizational rules and employees might lack the 
authority to decide to share the data. Future research should consider network data to 
explore both sides of data access: the data provider and the data receiver.  
 Finally, stakeholders are aggregated into three main categories - other 
departments in the city, other public agencies, and nongovernmental organizations; 
because of this data structure, the research cannot consider the characteristics of every 
single relationship. Within the same category, there is likely variation about how often a 
city department interacts with some actors rather than others; the influence that actors 
have over the policy-making process; or even coordination mechanisms that public 
managers apply. The research overlooks dyadic differences which should further explore 
in future research.  
Data collection. There are two main limitations with regards to data collection. 
First, some states have only one or two observations as only department heads from one 
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or two cities responded to our survey. Because of this, the coefficients and significance of 
the institutional variables are based on very small clusters, and they might be biased. The 
small number of observations per cluster also prevented cross-level interactions between 
level-1 and level-2 variables which this study does not explore. Researchers should 
further investigate to what extent the institutional context moderates the effectiveness of 
coordination mechanisms that public managers utilize.  
Second, data are cross-sectional. Cross-sectional data do not allow to empirical 
test causation; causation is theoretically justified. Endogeneity issues might affect the 
reliability of results on coordination mechanisms applied by managers to access data. 
Public managers might have selected coordination mechanism based on their previous 
experience. If the selection of the coordination mechanisms is nonrandom, then 
estimation will suffer from biased results. Unfortunately, the survey instruments do not 
provide a good instrumental variable that can be used to estimate a two-stage regression 
which is usually applied to deal with endogeneity issues (Greene, 2000).  
Kelman, Hong, and Turbitt (2013) provide evidence that public managers 
randomly select strategies, as they are not aware of which one will be the most successful 
– otherwise, they will use it since the beginning. If we make a similar assumption for this 
study, we can expect that the estimation will not be biased. Data sharing literature also 
suggests that the selection of coordination mechanisms to exchange data is based on the 
frequency of the data exchange rather than the outcome (Roberts, 2011). Therefore, we 
can expect that data access is not likely to be a key determinant of coordination 
mechanisms. Future studies might apply different methodologies, such as experimental 
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designs, to test the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms and rule out endogeneity 
issues. An experimental approach has been used to test the effectiveness of Freedom of 
Information regulations (Worthy et al., 2017) and might be adequate to expand research 
on data access.  
Implication for Public Management Research 
This study provides practical implications for public organizations that aim to 
increase data access in the public sector, both within and across organizational 
boundaries, and public managers who want to intervene at the micro level to reduce 
barriers for cooperation and exchange. 
This research suggests that state-level interventions might not be effective to 
increase data access. State government managers and policymakers might need to 
consider new strategies and initiatives to support city governments to access data beyond 
institutional support or symbolic initiatives like open data portals. For instance, results 
show that reducing government influence on a city department’s decision-making 
processes might facilitate access to data from both government and nongovernmental 
organizations. Previous studies have noted that there is great variability in how states 
manage their relationships with local governments (Mullin & Daley, 2010). State and 
federal government agencies should consider how to promote collaborative relationships 
with local governments that grant autonomy and limits state government’s interference in 
local decisions.  
Among institutions, the only significant variable is legal mandate, which increases 
data access across the portfolio of relationships. Policymakers should consider 
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developing and approving laws to legally mandate the provision of data to government 
agencies, particularly when public managers need data to address sensitive policy issues 
or when delays might negatively affect government activity.  
At the micro-level, results show that informal coordination is still an important 
determinant of intra-sector data access. Public managers could increase network 
development activities, including frequent meetings, workshops, and interagency events 
for managers and employees to socialize. Moreover, if data access mostly relies on 
interpersonal relationships, public organizations should pay attention to internal turnover, 
as changes in managerial positions might affect data access. It is possible that less 
connected department heads will be less likely to access data; for instance, younger 
managers or managers that have recently transferred from other cities could encounter 
more significant challenges to access data. Networking activities can also be encouraged 
by nonprofit organizations, such as professional associations or foundations, which aim 
to promote data practices in the public sector. These might include professional events 
and workshops, online and in-person training, and collaborative initiatives.  
Future Studies 
While previous sections have indicated several opportunities for future research, 
this last section suggests four main research areas that are particularly relevant to public 
management scholarship and data sharing literature. 
First, this study tests the IFDA looking only at three categories of stakeholders: 
other departments in the city; other public agencies; and nongovernmental organizations. 
Future studies should test the framework across other categories and typologies of 
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stakeholders to provide a more nuanced understanding of the horizontal dimension. For 
instance, researchers could separate vertical relationships - e.g., federal, state, and county 
agencies - from horizontal relationships - e.g., other city governments. Different power 
dynamics characterize vertical and horizontal relationships. Collaboration studies suggest 
that relationships between the federal government and city governments are based on 
coercive power, while relationships between the state government and city governments 
are more collaborative and equitable (Mullin & Daley, 2010). Similarly, relationships 
with for-profit organizations might differ from relationships with nonprofit ones. 
Nonprofit organizations have greater dependence from public organizations and might be 
more willing to provide data (Guo & Acar, 2005). For-profit organizations are more 
concerned about property issues and copyright and are less willing to exchange data with 
other organizations (Meijer, 2018).  
Second, this study does not investigate the perspective of the external 
stakeholders (e.g., employees and managers working outside the city or in other city 
departments). Previous studies have shown that mutual dependence and reciprocity might 
positively affect the frequency of data and information exchange (Galaskiewicz & 
Marsden, 1978; Including et al., 2013). I also do not have information on organizational 
policies and practices in providing organizations. Future studies should utilize network 
data to collect information at the dyadic level on both sides of the exchange and test the 
theoretical mechanisms proposed in this framework.  
Third, with regards to coordination mechanisms, the IFDA provides little 
explanation for data access from nongovernmental organizations. Future research should 
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dedicate more attention to investigate the antecedents of data access from nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations. Local governments are increasingly interested in accessing data 
collected by nonprofit and for-profit organizations; these organizations own data that are 
often not available to public agencies or are expensive to collect. Partnerships and 
synergies with nongovernmental organizations are expected to improve the quality and 
the availability of data and in turns decision-making processes and outcomes for public 
organizations.  
For instance, future studies should consider the composition and structure of 
managers' networks. While there is a growing number of studies investigating intra-
organizational networks among public employees (Nisar & Maroulis, 2017; Siciliano, 
2015, 2016), we know less about inter-organizational networks. It might be that 
interpersonal networks are less effective in cross-sector relationships because public 
managers have fewer or weaker connections. Researchers could also focus on city 
governments that are particularly successful in exchanging data with nongovernmental 
organizations to understand the characteristics of the coordination mechanisms in place.  
Finally, future research should consider what prompts managers to adopt each 
coordination mechanism and under what conditions these coordination mechanisms are 
more effective. Collaboration studies drawing from a contingency perspective (Scott, 
2003; Thompson, 1967) have shown that the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms 
might vary depending upon organizational and environmental characteristics (Kelman et 
al., 2013). Formal coordination might be effective when the organization has financial 
and human resources to guarantee the implementation of routines and data sharing 
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agreements. Lateral coordination might be more effective when organizations exchange 
data for the first time as public managers lack significant inter-personal relationships but 
become less effective over time. Understanding these contingencies will improve our 
theoretical and empirical understanding on how public managers can share data with 
internal and external stakeholders.  
  
172 
REFERENCES 
6, P. (2004). Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: 
A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 14(1), 103–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muh006 
6, P., Bellamy, C., Raab, C., Warren, A., & Heeney, C. (2007). Institutional Shaping of 
Interagency Working: Managing Tensions between Collaborative Working and 
Client Confidentiality. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
17(3), 405–434. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul018 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S.-W. (2009). Social Capital: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
(SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 186928). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=186928 
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management 
Research. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11(3), 295–326. 
Aiken, M., Bacharach, S. B., & French, J. L. (1980). Organizational Structure, Work 
Process, and Proposal Making in Administrative Bureaucracies. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 23(4), 631–652. 
Akbulut-Bailey, A. Y. (2011). Information Sharing Between Local and State 
Governments. The Journal of Computer Information Systems; Stillwater, 51(4), 
53–63. 
Al‐Alawi, A. I., Al‐Marzooqi, N. Y., & Mohammed, F. (2007). Organizational culture 
and knowledge sharing: critical success factors. Journal of Knowledge 
Management, 11(2), 22–42. https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270710738898 
Allard, S. W., Wiegand, E. R., Schlecht, C., Datta, A. R., Goerge, R. M., & Weigensberg, 
E. (2018). State Agencies’ Use of Administrative Data for Improved Practice: 
Needs, Challenges, and Opportunities. Public Administration Review, 78(2), 240–
250. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12883 
Alonso, J. M., Clifton, J., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2015). Did New Public Management 
Matter? An empirical analysis of the outsourcing and decentralization effects on 
public sector size. Public Management Review, 17(5), 643–660. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2013.822532 
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal 
of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032 
  
173 
Anssi Smedlund. (2008). The knowledge system of a firm: social capital for explicit, tacit 
and potential knowledge. Journal of Knowledge Management, 12(1), 63–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270810852395 
Argote, L., Gruenfeld, D., Naquin, C., & Turner, M. E. (2001). Group learning in 
organizations. Groups at Work: Theory and Research, 369–411. 
Atabakhsh, H., Larson, C., Petersen, T., Violette, C., & Chen, H. (2004). Information 
Sharing and Collaboration Policies within Government Agencies. In Intelligence 
and Security Informatics (pp. 467–475). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25952-7_37 
Attard, J., Orlandi, F., Scerri, S., & Auer, S. (2015). A systematic review of open 
government data initiatives. Government Information Quarterly, 32(4), 399–418. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2015.07.006 
Avery, G. (2000). Outsourcing Public Health Laboratory Services: A Blueprint for 
Determining Whether to Privatize and How. Public Administration Review, 
60(4), 330–337. https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00095 
Azad, B. (1998). Management of entreprise-wide GIS implementation: Lessons from 
exploration of five case studies (PhD Thesis). Department of Urban Studies and 
Planning, MIT, Cambridge, MA. 
Azad, B., & Wiggins, L. L. (1995). Dynamics of inter-organizational geographic data 
sharing: a conceptual framework for research. In H. J. Onsrud & G. Rushton 
(Eds.), Sharing Geographic Information (pp. 22–43). New Brunswick, NJ: Center 
for Urban Policy Research. 
Bajaj, A., & Ram, S. (2007). A Comprehensive Framework Towards Information Sharing 
Between Government Agencies. International Journal of Electronic Government 
Research; Hershey, 3(2), 29–44. 
Bate, S. p., & Robert, G. (2002). Knowledge management and communities of practice in 
the private sector: lessons for modernizing the National Health Service in England 
and Wales. Public Administration, 80(4), 643–663. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9299.00322 
Bauhr, M., & Grimes, M. (2013). Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of 
Transparency for Societal Accountability. Governance, 27(2), 291–320. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12033 
Baumer, D. L., Earp, J. B., & Poindexter, J. C. (2004). Internet privacy law: a comparison 
between the United States and the European Union. Computers & Security, 23(5), 
400–412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2003.11.001 
  
174 
Bekkers, V. (2007). The governance of back-office integration. Public Management 
Review, 9(3), 377–400. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030701425761 
Bekkers, V. (2009). Flexible information infrastructures in Dutch E-Government 
collaboration arrangements: Experiences and policy implications. Government 
Information Quarterly, 26(1), 60–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2007.09.010 
Bell, B., Ferron, J., & Kromrey, J. (2008). Cluster Size in Multilevel Models: The Impact 
of Sparse Data Structures on Point and Interval Estimates in Two-Level Models. 
Presented at the Section on Survey Research Method - JSM 2018. Retrieved from 
https://ww2.amstat.org/sections/srms/Proceedings/y2008/Files/300933.pdf 
Bellamy, C., 6, P., Raab, C., Warren, A., & Heeney, C. (2008). Information-Sharing and 
Confidentiality in Social Policy: Regulating Multi-Agency Working. Public 
Administration, 86(3), 737–759. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9299.2008.00723.x 
Berman, E. M., West, J. P., & Richter, M. N. (2002). Workplace relations: Friendship 
patterns and consequences (according to managers). Public Administration 
Review, 62(2), 217–230. 
Berry, F. S., & Berry, W. D. (2014). Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy 
Research. In P. A. Sabatier & C. M. Weible (Eds.), Theories of the Policy Process 
(pp. 307–359). 
Bertot, J. C., Jaeger, P. T., & Grimes, J. M. (2010). Using ICTs to create a culture of 
transparency: E-government and social media as openness and anti-corruption 
tools for societies. Government Information Quarterly, 27(3), 264–271. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2010.03.001 
Betsill, M. M., & Bulkeley, H. (2004). Transnational Networks and Global 
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program. 
International Studies Quarterly, 48(2), 471–493. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-
8833.2004.00310.x 
Bettencourt, L. M. A. (2014). The Uses of Big Data in Cities. Big Data, 2(1), 12–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1089/big.2013.0042 
Black, L. J., Cresswell, A. M., Luna, L. F., Pardo, T. A., Martinez, I. J., Thompson, F., … 
Cook, M. (2003). A dynamic theory of collaboration: a structural approach to 
facilitating intergovernmental use of information technology. In 36th Annual 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of the 
(pp. 12 pp.-). https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2003.1174222 
Blau, P. M. (1955). The dynamics of bureaucracy: A study of interpersonal relations in 
two government agencies. Chicago, U. P. 
  
175 
Bock, G.-W., Zmud, R. W., Kim, Y.-G., & Lee, J.-N. (2005). Behavioral Intention 
Formation in Knowledge Sharing: Examining the Roles of Extrinsic Motivators, 
Social-Psychological Forces, and Organizational Climate. MIS Quarterly, 29(1), 
87–111. 
Bolino, M. C., Turnley, W. H., & Bloodgood, J. M. (2002). Citizenship Behavior and the 
Creation of Social Capital in Organizations. The Academy of Management 
Review, 27(4), 505–522. https://doi.org/10.2307/4134400 
Bostic, B. (2015, August). Big Data and Modernizing Federal Statistics: Update. US 
Department of Commerce - Economics and Statistics Administration. Retrieved 
from https://www2.census.gov/cac/sac/meetings/2015-09/2015-Bostic.pdf 
Bostrom, R. P., & Heinen, J. S. (1977). MIS Problems and Failures: A Socio-Technical 
Perspective, Part II: The Application of Socio-Technical Theory. MIS Quarterly, 
1(4), 11–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/249019 
Bozeman, B., & Bretschneider, S. (1986). Public management information systems: 
Theory and prescription. Public Administration Review, 475–487. 
Brant, R. (1990). Assessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal 
Logistic Regression. Biometrics, 46(4), 1171–1178. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2532457 
Bretschneider, S. (1990). Management information systems in public and private 
organizations: An empirical test. Public Administration Review, 536–545. 
Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The Design and Implementation of 
Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature. Public 
Administration Review; Washington, 66(S1), 44. 
Burt, R. S. (2000). The Network Structure Of Social Capital. Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 22, 345–423. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-3085(00)22009-1 
Bushway, S., Johnson, B. D., & Slocum, L. A. (2007). Is the Magic Still There? The Use 
of the Heckman Two-Step Correction for Selection Bias in Criminology. Journal 
of Quantitative Criminology, 23(2), 151–178. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-
007-9024-4 
Cameron, A. C., & Miller, D. L. (2015). A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust 
Inference. Journal of Human Resources, 50(2), 317–372. 
https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.2.317 
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2012). Robust inference with multiway 
clustering. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics. Retrieved from 
http://amstat.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1198/jbes.2010.07136 
  
176 
Chan, C. M. L. (2013). From Open Data to Open Innovation Strategies: Creating E-
Services Using Open Government Data. In 2013 46th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) (pp. 1890–1899). 
https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2013.236 
Chang, H. H., & Chuang, S.-S. (2011). Social capital and individual motivations on 
knowledge sharing: Participant involvement as a moderator. Information & 
Management, 48(1), 9–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2010.11.001 
Chen, Y.-C., & Lee, J. (2018). Collaborative data networks for public service: 
governance, management, and performance. Public Management Review, 20(5), 
672–690. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2017.1305691 
Chen, Y.-C., & Thurmaier, K. (2009). Interlocal Agreements as Collaborations: An 
Empirical Investigation of Impetuses, Norms, and Success. The American Review 
of Public Administration, 39(5), 536–552. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074008324566 
Chow, W. S., & Chan, L. S. (2008). Social network, social trust and shared goals in 
organizational knowledge sharing. Information & Management, 45(7), 458–465. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2008.06.007 
Clarke, A., & Margetts, H. (2014). Governments and Citizens Getting to Know Each 
Other? Open, Closed, and Big Data in Public Management Reform. Policy & 
Internet, 6(4), 393–417. https://doi.org/10.1002/1944-2866.POI377 
Clarke, P., & Wheaton, B. (2007). Addressing Data Sparseness in Contextual Population 
Research: Using Cluster Analysis to Create Synthetic Neighborhoods. 
Sociological Methods & Research, 35(3), 311–351. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124106292362 
Cohen, G. (2017). Cultural Fragmentation as a Barrier to Interagency Collaboration: A 
Qualitative Examination of Texas Law Enforcement Officers’ Perceptions. The 
American Review of Public Administration. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074017744659 
Collopy, Fred. 1996. Biases in Retrospective Self-Reports of Time Use: An Empirical 
Study of Computer Users. Management Science 42(5), 758 – 767. 
Comfort, L. K. (2007). Crisis management in hindsight: Cognition, communication, 
coordination, and control. Public Administration Review, 67(s1), 189–197. 
Conway, J. M., & Lance, C. E. (2010). What Reviewers Should Expect from Authors 
Regarding Common Method Bias in Organizational Research. Journal of Business 
and Psychology, 25(3), 325–334. 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1007/s10869-010-9181-6 
  
177 
Cuganesan, S., Hart, A., & Steele, C. (2017). Managing information sharing and 
stewardship for public-sector collaboration: a management control approach. 
Public Management Review, 19(6), 862–879. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1238102 
Daley. (2009). Interdisciplinary Problems and Agency Boundaries: Exploring Effective 
Cross-Agency Collaboration. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 19(3), 477–493. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun020 
Data Protection and Security Solutions for State and Local Government. (n.d.). 
Davenport, T. H., & Prusak, L. (1998). Working knowledge: How organizations manage 
what they know. Harvard Business Press.  
Dawes, S. S. (1996). Interagency information sharing: Expected benefits, manageable 
risks. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 15(3), 377–394. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199622)15:3<377::AID-
PAM3>3.0.CO;2-F 
Dawes, S. S., Cresswell, A. M., & Pardo, T. A. (2009). From “Need to Know” to “Need 
to Share”: Tangled Problems, Information Boundaries, and the Building of Public 
Sector Knowledge Networks. Public Administration Review, 69(3), 392–402. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01987_2.x 
Dawes, S. S., Gharawi, M. A., & Burke, G. B. (2012). Transnational public sector 
knowledge networks: Knowledge and information sharing in a multi-dimensional 
context. Government Information Quarterly, 29, Supplement 1, S112–S120. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2011.08.002 
de Montalvo, U. W. (2003). In search of rigorous models for policy-oriented research: A 
behavioural approach to spatial data sharing. URISA Journal, 15(1), 19–28. 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. (2000). Climate Change: 
The UK programme (p. 50). London. 
Desouza, K. C., & Bhagwatwar, A. (2014). Technology-Enabled Participatory Platforms 
for Civic Engagement: The Case of U.S. Cities. Journal of Urban Technology, 
21(4), 25–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/10630732.2014.954898 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American 
Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160. 
Dodgson, M. and Gann, D. (2011): Technological Innovation and Complex Systems in 
Cities, Journal of Urban Technology, 18:3, 101-113 
  
178 
Drake, D. B., Steckler, N. A., & Koch, M. J. (2004). Information Sharing in and Across 
Government Agencies The Role and Influence of Scientist, Politician, and 
Bureaucrat Subcultures. Social Science Computer Review, 22(1), 67–84. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439303259889 
Drew, J. (2015). Sensitive but unclassified: Examinig the use of electronic information 
sharing systems by law enforcement agencies in the United States. Michigan State 
University, Michigan. Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. 
Eglene, O., Dawes, S. S., & Schneider, C. A. (2007). Authority and Leadership Patterns 
in Public Sector Knowledge Networks. The American Review of Public 
Administration, 37(1), 91–113. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074006290799 
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-Dependence Relations. American Sociological Review, 
27(1), 31–41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2089716 
Emerson, R. M. (1976). Social Exchange Theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 2, 335–
362. 
Enders, C. K. (2010). Applied Missing Data Analysis (1 edition). New York: The 
Guilford Press. 
Ertiö, T.-P. (2015). Participatory Apps for Urban Planning—Space for Improvement. 
Planning Practice & Research, 30(3), 303–321. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02697459.2015.1052942 
Esteve, M., Boyne, G., Sierra, V., & Ysa, T. (2013). Organizational Collaboration in the 
Public Sector: Do Chief Executives Make a Difference? Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 23(4), 927–952. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mus035 
Feeney, M. K., & Welch, E. W. (2014). Technology–Task Coupling Exploring Social 
Media Use and Managerial Perceptions of E-Government. The American Review 
of Public Administration, 0275074014547413. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074014547413 
Feeney, M. K., Welch, E., Zhang, F., Camarena, L., Cho, S., & Fusi, F. (2016). Data 
Sharing, Civic Engagement, and Technology Use in Local Government Agencies: 
Findings from a National Survey (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 3069941). 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3069941 
Fishenden, J., & Thompson, M. (2013). Digital government, open architecture, and 
innovation: why public sector IT will never be the same again. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 23(4), 977–1004. 
  
179 
Fountain, J. E. (2001). Building the Virtual State. Information technology and 
institutional change. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Fountain, J. E. (2007). Challenges to organizational change: multi-level integrated 
information structures (MIIS). In V. Mayer-Schönberger & D. Lazer (Eds.), 
Governance and Information Technology: From Electronic Government to 
Information Government (pp. 63–93). MIT Press. 
Frumkin, P., & Galaskiewicz, J. (2004). Institutional Isomorphism and Public Sector 
Organizations. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14(3), 
283–307. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muh028 
Fusi, F., & Feeney, M. K. (2016). Social Media in the Workplace Information Exchange, 
Productivity, or Waste? The American Review of Public Administration, 
0275074016675722. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074016675722 
Galaskiewicz, J., & Marsden, P. V. (1978). Interorganizational resource networks: 
Formal patterns of overlap. Social Science Research, 7(2), 89–107. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0049-089X(78)90006-6 
Galbraith, J. R. (1973). Designing complex organizations. Addison-Wesley Longman 
Publishing Co., Inc. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=540368 
Gazley, B. (2008). Beyond the Contract: The Scope and Nature of Informal Government-
Nonprofit Partnerships. Public Administration Review, 68(1), 141–154. 
Gil-Garcia, J. R., & Sayogo, D. S. (2016). Government inter-organizational information 
sharing initiatives: Understanding the main determinants of success. Government 
Information Quarterly, 33(3), 572–582. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2016.01.006 
Gil-Garcia, J. R., Chengalur-Smith, I., & Duchessi, P. (2007). Collaborative e-
Government: impediments and benefits of information-sharing projects in the 
public sector. European Journal of Information Systems; Basingstoke, 16(2), 121–
133. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1057/palgrave.ejis.3000673 
Gil-Garcia, J. R., Pardo, T. A., & Nam, T. (Eds.). (2016). Smarter as the New Urban 
Agenda: A Comprehensive View of the 21st Century City. Springer International 
Publishing.  
Gil-Garcia, J. R., Pardo, T., & Burke, G. B. (2010). Conceptualizing information 
integration in government. In H. Schnoll (Ed.), E-government: Information, 
Technology and Transformation (1st ed., pp. 179–202). New York: Routledge. 
Gil-Garcia, J. R., Pardo, T., Baker, A., & others. (2007). Understanding Context through 
a Comprehensive Prototyping Experience: A Testbed Research Strategy for 
  
180 
Emerging Technologies. In System Sciences, 2007. HICSS 2007. 40th Annual 
Hawaii International Conference on (pp. 104–104). IEEE.  
Girth, A. M., Hefetz, A., Johnston, J. M., & Warner, M. E. (2012). Outsourcing Public 
Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets. Public 
Administration Review, 72(6), 887–900. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2012.02596.x 
Graber, D. A. (1992). Public sector communication. How organizations manage 
information. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Graham, J. W., Olchowski, A. E., & Gilreath, T. D. (2007). How many imputations are 
really needed? Some practical clarifications of multiple imputation theory. 
Prevention Science: The Official Journal of the Society for Prevention Research, 
8(3), 206–213. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-007-0070-9 
Graham, M., Hogan, B., Straumann, R. K., & Medhat, A. (2014). Uneven Geographies of 
User-Generated Information: Patterns of Increasing Informational Poverty. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 104(4), 746–764. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2014.910087 
Greene, W. H. (2000). Econometric analysis 4th edition. International Edition, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall. Retrieved from  
Grimmelikhuijsen, S. G., & Feeney, M. K. (2016). Developing and Testing an Integrative 
Framework for Open Government Adoption in Local Governments. Public 
Administration Review, n/a-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12689 
Grimmelikhuijsen, S. G., & Welch, E. W. (2012). Developing and Testing a Theoretical 
Framework for Computer-Mediated Transparency of Local Governments. Public 
Administration Review, 72(4), 562–571. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2011.02532.x 
Guo, C., & Acar, M. (2005). Understanding Collaboration Among Nonprofit 
Organizations: Combining Resource Dependency, Institutional, and Network 
Perspectives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34(3), 340–361. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764005275411 
Hale, K. (2011). How Information Matters: Networks and Public Policy Innovation. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Hamin, E. M., Gurran, N., & Emlinger, A. M. (2014). Barriers to Municipal Climate 
Adaptation: Examples From Coastal Massachusetts’ Smaller Cities and Towns. 
Journal of the American Planning Association, 80(2), 110–122. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2014.949590 
  
181 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1977). The Population Ecology of Organizations. 
American Journal of Sociology, 82(5), 929–964. 
Hau, Y. S., Kim, B., Lee, H., & Kim, Y. G. (2013). The effects of individual motivations 
and social capital on employees’ tacit and explicit knowledge sharing intentions. 
International Journal of Information Management, 33(2), 356–366. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2012.10.009 
Heckman, J. J. (1977). Sample Selection Bias As a Specification Error (with an 
Application to the Estimation of Labor Supply Functions) (Working Paper No. 
172). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w0172 
Hedeker, D. (2015). Methods for Multilevel Ordinal Data in Prevention Research. 
Prevention Science: The Official Journal of the Society for Prevention Research, 
16(7), 997–1006. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-014-0495-x 
Hess, C., & Ostrom, E. (2003). Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a 
Common-Pool Resource. Law and Contemporary Problems, 66(1/2), 111–145. 
Higgins, E., Taylor, M., Lisboa, P., & Arshad, F. (2014). Developing a data sharing 
framework: a case study. Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 
8(1), 151–164. https://doi.org/10.1108/TG-02-2013-0007 
Homburg, V., & Bekkers, V. (2002). The back-office of e-government (managing 
information domains as political economies). In Proceedings of the 35th Annual 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 1666–1674). 
https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2002.994077 
Hood, C. (2006). Transparency in Historical Perspective. In C. Hood & D. Heald (Eds.), 
Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (pp. 2–23). British Academy. 
https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0001 
Huysman, M., & Wulf, V. (2006). IT to support knowledge sharing in communities, 
towards a social capital analysis. Journal of Information Technology, 21(1), 40–
51. 
Including, N. C. D. S. for A. D. T. S. T., Perrino, T., Howe, G., Sperling, A., Beardslee, 
W., Sandler, I., … Brown, C. H. (2013). Advancing Science Through 
Collaborative Data Sharing and Synthesis. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
8(4), 433–444. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691613491579 
Inkpen, A. C., & Tsang, E. W. K. (2005). Social Capital, Networks, and Knowledge 
Transfer. Academy of Management Review, 30(1), 146–165. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2005.15281445 
  
182 
Janssen, K. (2011). The influence of the PSI directive on open government data: An 
overview of recent developments. Government Information Quarterly, 28(4), 
446–456. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2011.01.004 
Janssen, M., Charalabidis, Y., & Zuiderwijk, A. (2012). Benefits, adoption barriers and 
myths of open data and open government. Information Systems Management, 
29(4), 258–268. 
Jasanoff, S., & Martello, M. L. (2004). Earthly Politics: Local and Global in 
Environmental Governance. MIT Press. 
Jennings, E. T., & Hall, J. L. (2012). Evidence-Based Practice and the Use of Information 
in State Agency Decision Making. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 22(2), 245–266. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mur040 
Jennings, P. D., & Zandbergen, P. A. (1995). Ecologically Sustainable Organizations: An 
Institutional Approach. The Academy of Management Review, 20(4), 1015–1052. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/258964 
Jimenez, B. S., Mossberger, K., & Wu, Y. (2012). Municipal government and the 
interactive web: Trends and issues for civic engagement. In A. Manoharan & M. 
Holzer (Eds.), E-Governance and Civic Engagement: Factors and Determinants of 
E-Democracy: Factors and Determinants of E-Democracy (pp. 251–272). 
Hershey: Information Science Reference. 
Jun, K.-N., & Weare, C. (2011). Institutional Motivations in the Adoption of Innovations: 
The Case of E-Government. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 21(3), 495–519. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq020 
Kapucu, N., & Hu, Q. (2016). Understanding Multiplexity of Collaborative Emergency 
Management Networks. The American Review of Public Administration, 46(4), 
399–417. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074014555645 
Karlsson, F., Frostenson, M., Prenkert, F., Kolkowska, E., & Helin, S. (2017). Inter-
organisational information sharing in the public sector: A longitudinal case study 
on the reshaping of success factors. Government Information Quarterly, 34(4), 
567–577. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2017.10.007 
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1966). Organizations and the System Concept. In J. Shafritz, J. 
Ott, & Y. Jang, Classics of organization theory. Cengage Learning. 
Kelman, S., Hong, S., & Turbitt, I. (2013). Are There Managerial Practices Associated 
with the Outcomes of an Interagency Service Delivery Collaboration? Evidence 
from British Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 23(3), 609–630. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mus038 
  
183 
Kim, S., & Lee, H. (2006). The Impact of Organizational Context and Information 
Technology on Employee Knowledge-Sharing Capabilities. Public 
Administration Review, 66(3), 370–385. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2006.00595.x 
Kim, S., & Lee, J. (2012). E-Participation, Transparency, and Trust in Local 
Government. Public Administration Review, 72(6), 819–828. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02593.x 
Kitchin, R. (2014). The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism. GeoJournal, 79(1), 
1–14. 
Klompas, M., McVetta, J., Lazarus, R., Eggleston, E., Haney, G., Kruskal, B. A., … 
Platt, R. (2012). Integrating clinical practice and public health surveillance using 
electronic medical record systems. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 
42(6 Suppl 2), S154-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2012.04.005 
Koliba, C., Zia, A., & Lee, B. H. (2011). Governance informatics: Managing the 
performance of Inter-organizational governance networks. The Innovation 
Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 16(1), 1–26. 
Koonin, S. E., & Holland, M. E. (2014). The Value of Big Data for Urban Science. In J. 
Lane, V. Stodden, S. Bender, & H. Nissenbaum (Eds.), Privacy, Big Data, and the 
Public Good - Framework for Engagement (pp. 137–156). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107590205.009 
Koppenjan, J., & Klijn, E.-H. (2004). Managing Uncertainties in Networks. New York: 
Routledge. 
Kornberger, M., Meyer, R. E., Brandtner, C., & Höllerer, M. A. (2017). When 
Bureaucracy Meets the Crowd: Studying “Open Government” in the Vienna City 
Administration. Organization Studies, 38(2), 179–200. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840616655496 
Landsbergen, D., & Wolken, G. (1998). Eliminating legal and policy barriers to 
interoperable government systems. Ohio Supercomputer Center, ECLIPS 
Program. Retrieved from 
https://www.osc.edu/files/press/releases/1998/phase_2_Recommendations.pdf 
Leana, C. R., & Van Buren, H. J. (1999). Organizational social capital and employment 
practices. Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 538–555. 
Lee, J. (2013). The Administrative Broker: Bureaucratic Politics in the Era of Prevalent 
Information. The American Review of Public Administration, 43(6), 690–708. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074012455092 
  
184 
Lefèvre, C. (1998). Metropolitan government and governance in western countries: a 
critical review. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22(1), 9–
25. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00120 
Leuan, J. (2017). Data protection in the United States: overview. Thomson Reuters. 
Retrieved from https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-502-
0467?originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextDat
a=%28sc.Default%29&comp=pluk#co_anchor_a233354 
Levin, M. A. (1991). The Information-Seeking Behavior of Local Government Officials. 
The American Review of Public Administration, 21(4), 271–286. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/027507409102100401 
Levine, S., & White, P. E. (1961). Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of 
Interorganizational Relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 5(4), 583–
601. 
Lewis-Beck, C., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1980). Applied regression. An introduction. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage University Paper. 
Long, J. S. (1997). Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. 
Sage Publications. 
Long, J. S., & Freese, J. (2005). Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables 
Using Stata, Second Edition (2nd edition). College Station, Tex: Stata Press. 
Lubell, M., Schneider, M., Scholz, J. T., & Mete, M. (2002). Watershed partnerships and 
the emergence of collective action institutions. American Journal of Political 
Science, 148–163. 
Maas, C. J., & Hox, J. J. (2005). Sufficient sample sizes for multilevel modeling. 
Methodology, 1(3), 86–92. 
Machlup, F. (1983). The study of information: Interdisciplinary messages. Retrieved 
from http://philpapers.org/rec/MACTSO-9 
Malatesta, D., & Smith, C. R. (2012). Government Contracts for Legal Services: Does a 
Previous Contracting Relationship Alter Accountability? State and Local 
Government Review, 44(2), 113–126. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X12446617 
Malatesta, D., & Smith, C. R. (2014). Lessons from Resource Dependence Theory for 
Contemporary Public and Nonprofit Management. Public Administration Review, 
74(1), 14–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12181 
  
185 
Malone, T. W., & Crowston, K. (1994). The Interdisciplinary Study of Coordination. 
ACM Comput. Surv., 26(1), 87–119. https://doi.org/10.1145/174666.174668 
Mandell, M., & Steelman, T. (2003). Understanding what can be accomplished through 
interorganizational innovations The importance of typologies, context and 
management strategies. Public Management Review, 5(2), 197–224. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461667032000066417 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. (1958). Cognitive Limits on Rationality. In Organizations (pp. 
157–192). McGraw-Hill. 
Marvel, M. K., & Marvel, H. P. (2008). Government-to-Government Contracting: 
Stewardship, Agency, and Substitution. International Public Management Journal; 
Stamford, 11(2), 171–192. 
McGuire, M., & Silvia, C. (2010). The Effect of Problem Severity, Managerial and 
Organizational Capacity, and Agency Structure on Intergovernmental 
Collaboration: Evidence from Local Emergency Management. Public 
Administration Review, 70(2), 279–288. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2010.02134.x 
McNeal, R. S., Tolbert, C. J., Mossberger, K., & Dotterweich, L. J. (2003a). Innovating 
in digital government in the American states. Social Science Quarterly, 84(1), 52–
70. 
Meerkerk, I. van, & Edelenbos, J. (2017). Facilitating conditions for boundary-spanning 
behaviour in governance networks. Public Management Review, 0(0), 1–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2017.1302248 
Mehra, P. (2009). A Socio-technical Perspective on New Media and Information Sharing 
in Government and Non-government Sectors in India An Empirical Investigation. 
Journal of Creative Communications, 4(1), 45–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/097325861000400104 
Meijer, A. (2015). Government Transparency in Historical Perspective: From the Ancient 
Regime to Open Data in The Netherlands. International Journal of Public 
Administration, 38(3), 189–199. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.934837 
Meijer, A. (2018). Datapolis: A Public Governance Perspective on “Smart Cities.” 
Perspectives on Public Management and Governance. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ppmgov/gvx017 
Meijer, A. J., & Torenvlied, R. (2016). Social Media and the New Organization of 
Government Communications An Empirical Analysis of Twitter Usage by the 
Dutch Police. The American Review of Public Administration, 46(2), 143–161. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074014551381 
  
186 
Meijer, A., & Thaens, M. (2018). Urban Technological Innovation: Developing and 
Testing a Sociotechnical Framework for Studying Smart City Projects, Urban 
Technological Innovation: Developing and Testing a Sociotechnical Framework 
for Studying Smart City Projects. Urban Affairs Review, 54(2), 363–387. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087416670274 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. 
Molm, L. D. (1994). Dependence and Risk: Transforming the Structure of Social 
Exchange. Social Psychology Quarterly, 57(3), 163–176. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2786874 
Molm, L. D., Whitham, M. M., & Melamed, D. (2012). Forms of Exchange and 
Integrative Bonds Effects of History and Embeddedness. American Sociological 
Review, 77(1), 141–165. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122411434610 
Moon, M. J. (2002). The Evolution of E-Government among Municipalities: Rhetoric or 
Reality? Public Administration Review, 62(4), 424–433. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00196 
Moon, M. J., & Bretschneider, S. (2002). Does the Perception of Red Tape Constrain IT 
Innovativeness in Organizations? Unexpected Results from a Simultaneous 
Equation Model and Implications. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory: J-PART, 12(2), 273–291. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003532 
Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating public value: Strategic management in government. 
Harvard university press.  
Mullin, M., & Daley, D. M. (2010). Working with the State: Exploring Interagency 
Collaboration within a Federalist System. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 20(4), 757–778. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup029 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998a). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the 
organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242–266. 
Nedović-Budić, Z., & Pinto, J. K. (1999). Interorganizational GIS: Issues and prospects. 
The Annals of Regional Science, 33(2), 183–195. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001680050100 
Nedović-Budić, Z., & Pinto, J. K. (2000). Information sharing in an interorganizational 
GIS environment. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 27(3), 
455–474. 
  
187 
Newcombe, T. (2017, November). Small Towns Confront Big Cyber-Risks [blog]. 
Retrieved July 3, 2018, from http://www.govtech.com/security/GT-
OctoberNovember-2017-Small-Towns-Confront-Big-Cyber-Risks.html 
Newell, S., & Swan, J. (2000). Trust and inter-organizational networking. Human 
Relations, 53(10), 1287–1328. 
Nisar, M. A., & Maroulis, S. (2017). Foundations of Relating: Theory and Evidence on 
the Formation of Street-Level Bureaucrats’ Workplace Networks. Public 
Administration Review, n/a-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12719 
Norris, D., Joshi, A., Laura, M., & Tim, F. (2018, May 1). Hackers Keep Targeting 
Cities. Officials Have No Idea How to Respond. [Article]. Retrieved July 3, 2018, 
from https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/05/why-cities-are-so-bad-at-
cybersecurity/559334/ 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Oliveira, G. H. M., & Welch, E. W. (2013). Social media use in local government: 
Linkage of technology, task, and organizational context. Government Information 
Quarterly, 30(4), 397–405. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2013.05.019 
Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and 
future directions. Academy of Management Review, 15(2), 241–265. 
Pardo, T. A., Cresswell, A. M., Thompson, F., & Zhang, J. (2006). Knowledge sharing in 
cross-boundary information system development in the public sector. Information 
Technology and Management, 7(4), 293–313. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10799-
006-0278-6 
Parks, R. B., & Oakerson, R. J. (1989). Metropolitan Organization and Governance: A 
Local Public Economy Approach. Urban Affairs Quarterly, 25(1), 18–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/004208168902500103 
Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without Government? Rethinking Public 
Administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 
8(2), 223–243. 
Peterson, B., & Harrell, F. E. (1990). Partial Proportional Odds Models for Ordinal 
Response Variables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series C (Applied 
Statistics), 39(2), 205–217. https://doi.org/10.2307/2347760 
Pew Charitable Trusts. (2018). How States Use Data to Inform Decisions: A national 
review of the use of administrative data to improve state decision-making. (p. 56). 
  
188 
Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2018/02/dasa_how_states_use_data_report_v5.pdf 
Pew Research Center. (2017). Public Trust in Government Remains Near Historic Lows 
as Partisan Attitudes Shift. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.people-
press.org/2017/05/03/public-trust-in-government-remains-near-historic-lows-as-
partisan-attitudes-shift/ 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). Social control of organizations. In The external 
control of organizations. New York: Harper & Row. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. Stanford University Press.  
Piotrowski Suzanne, Rosenbloom David H., Kang Sinah, & Ingrams Alex. (2018). Levels 
of Value Integration in Federal Agencies’ Mission and Value Statements: Is Open 
Government a Performance Target of U.S. Federal Agencies? Public 
Administration Review, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12937 
Pitt, D., & Bassett, E. (2013). Collaborative Planning for Clean Energy Initiatives in 
Small to Mid-Sized Cities. Journal of the American Planning Association, 79(4), 
280–294. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2014.914846 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common 
method biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879. 
Quick, K. S., & Feldman, M. S. (2014). Boundaries as Junctures: Collaborative Boundary 
Work for Building Efficient Resilience. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 24(3), 673–695. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut085 
Rainey, H. G. (2009). Understanding and Managing Public Organizations. John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Reynaers, A. M., & Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2015). Transparency in Public–Private 
Partnerships: Not so Bad After All? Public Administration, 93(3), 609–626. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12142 
Rittel, H. W., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy 
Sciences, 4(2), 155–169. 
Roberts, N. C. (2011). Beyond smokestacks and silos: Open-source, Web-enabled 
coordination in organizations and networks. Public Administration Review, 71(5), 
677–693. 
  
189 
Romzek, B. S., & Dubnick, M. J. (1987). Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons 
from the Challenger Tragedy. Public Administration Review, 47(3), 227–238. 
Roodman, D. (2011). Fitting fully observed recursive mixed-process models with cmp. 
Stata Journal, 11(2), 159–206. 
Rothenberg, S., & Zyglidopoulos, S. C. (2007). Determinants of environmental 
innovation adoption in the printing industry: the importance of task environment. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 16(1), 39–49. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.441 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Introduction to Special 
Topic Forum: Not so Different after All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust. The 
Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 393–404. 
Saidel, J. R. (1991). Resource Interdependence: The Relationship Between State 
Agencies and Nonprofit Organizations. Public Administration Review, 51(6), 
543. 
Sayogo, D. S., Pardo, T. A., & Bloniarz, P. (2014). Information flows and smart 
disclosure of financial data: A framework for identifying challenges of cross 
boundary information sharing. Government Information Quarterly, 31, 
Supplement 1, S72–S83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2013.12.004 
Schein, E. H. (1985). Defining organizational culture. Classics of Organization Theory, 3, 
490–502. 
Scott, R. W. (2003). Organizations. Rational, Natural and Open Systems. (Fifth). New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Selznick, P. (1949). Foundations of the Theory of Organization. In J. Shafritz, J. Ott, & 
Y. Jang, Classics of organization theory. Cengage Learning. 
Siciliano, M. D. (2015). Advice Networks in Public Organizations: The Role of 
Structure, Internal Competition, and Individual Attributes. Public Administration 
Review, 75(4), 548–559. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12362 
Siciliano, M. D. (2016). Ignoring the Experts: Networks and Organizational Learning in 
the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
muw052. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw052 
Simo, G., & Bies, A. L. (2007). The Role of Nonprofits in Disaster Response: An 
Expanded Model of Cross-Sector Collaboration. Public Administration Review, 
67, 125–142. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00821.x 
  
190 
Smith, C. R. (2009). Institutional Determinants of Collaboration: An Empirical Study of 
County Open-Space Protection. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 19(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum037 
Snijders, T. A. B., & Bosker, R. J. (1993). Standard Errors and Sample Sizes for Two-
Level Research. Journal of Educational Statistics, 18(3), 237–259. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/10769986018003237 
Spender, J.-C. (1996). Making knowledge the basis of a dynamic theory of the firm. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17(S2), 45–62. 
Steinhardt, B. (2010, November 6). Weak privacy protections in the U.S. The 
Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/05/AR2010110507420.html 
Stone, D. (2001). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (Revised 
edition). New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Suárez, D. F. (2011). Collaboration and Professionalization: The Contours of Public 
Sector Funding for Nonprofit Organizations. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 21(2), 307–326. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpart/muq049 
Susha, I., Janssen, M., & Verhulst, S. (2017). Data collaboratives as “bazaars”?: A review 
of coordination problems and mechanisms to match demand for data with supply. 
Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 11(1), 157–172. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/TG-01-2017-0007 
Sunlight Foundation (n.d.). Our mission. Retrieved on November, 11 2018 from 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/about/  
Szulanski, G. (2000). The Process of Knowledge Transfer: A Diachronic Analysis of 
Stickiness. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82(1), 9–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2000.2884 
Taylor, F. W. (1912). The principles of Scientific Management. In J. Shafritz, J. Ott, & 
Y. Jang, Classics of organization theory. Cengage Learning. 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Thomson, A. M., & Perry, J. L. (2006). Collaboration Processes: Inside the Black Box. 
Public Administration Review, 66(s1), 20–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2006.00663.x 
Tolbert, P. S. (1985). Institutional Environments and Resource Dependence: Sources of 
Administrative Structure in Institutions of Higher Education. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 30(1), 1–13. 
  
191 
Townsend, A. M. (2013). Smart cities: Big data, civic hackers, and the quest for a new 
utopia. WW Norton & Company.  
Tsai, W. (2002). Social Structure of “Coopetition” Within a Multiunit Organization: 
Coordination, Competition, and Intraorganizational Knowledge Sharing. 
Organization Science, 13(2), 179–190. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.13.2.179.536 
Tsai, W., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of Intrafirm 
Networks. The Academy of Management Journal, 41(4), 464–476. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/257085 
Tulloch, D. L., & Harvey, F. (2007). When data sharing becomes institutionalized: Best 
practices in local government geographic information relationships. URISA-
WASHINGTON DC-, 19(2), 51. 
UN Habitat. (2011). UN-Habitat Annual Report 2010 (Annual report series No. 036/11E) 
(p. 100). Retrieved from https://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-annual-report-2010/ 
Veljković, N., Bogdanović-Dinić, S., & Stoimenov, L. (2014). Benchmarking open 
government: An open data perspective. Government Information Quarterly, 31(2), 
278–290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2013.10.011 
Vest, J. R., & Issel, L. M. (2014). Factors Related to Public Health Data Sharing between 
Local and State Health Departments. Health Services Research, 49(1pt2), 373–
391. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12138 
Walker, A. (2017). 350 mayors adopt Paris climate accord after U.S. pulls out (updated) - 
Curbed. Retrieved August 1, 2017, from 
https://www.curbed.com/2017/6/1/15726376/paris-accord-climate-change-
mayors-trump 
Weber, M. (1922). Bureaucracy. In J. Shafritz, J. Ott, & Y. Jang, Classics of organization 
theory. Cengage Learning. 
Weitzman, B. C., Silver, D., & Brazill, C. (2006). Efforts to Improve Public Policy and 
Programs through Data Practice: Experiences in 15 Distressed American Cities. 
Public Administration Review, 66(3), 386–399. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2006.00596.x 
Welch, E. W. (2012). The relationship between transparent and participative government: 
A study of local governments in the United States. International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, 78(1), 93–115. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852312437982 
  
192 
Welch, E. W., Feeney, M. K., & Park, C. H. (2016). Determinants of data sharing in U.S. 
city governments. Government Information Quarterly, 33(3), 393–403. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2016.07.002 
West, D. W., Mayer-Schönberger, V., & Lazer, D. (2007). Global perspectives on e-
government. In Governance and information technology: from electronic 
government to information government (pp. 17–31). MIT Press. 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society, 817–838. 
White, I. R., Royston, P., & Wood, A. M. (2011). Multiple imputation using chained 
equations: Issues and guidance for practice. Statistics in Medicine, 30(4), 377–
399. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.4067 
Willem, A., & Buelens, M. (2007). Knowledge Sharing in Public Sector Organizations: 
The Effect of Organizational Characteristics on Interdepartmental Knowledge 
Sharing. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17(4), 581–606. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul021 
Williams, R. (2006). Generalized ordered logit/partial proportional odds models for 
ordinal dependent variables. The Stata Journal, 6(1), 58–82. http://www.stata-
journal.com/article.html?article=st0097 
Worthy, B., John, P., & Vannoni, M. (2017). Transparency at the Parish Pump: A Field 
Experiment to Measure the Effectiveness of Freedom of Information Requests in 
England. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(3), 485–500. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw063 
Wukich, C., Siciliano, M. D., Enia, J., & Boylan, B. (2017). The Formation of 
Transnational Knowledge Networks on Social Media. International Public 
Management Journal, 20(3), 381–408. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2016.1238428 
Yang, T.-M., & Maxwell, T. A. (2011). Information-sharing in public organizations: A 
literature review of interpersonal, intra-organizational and inter-organizational 
success factors. Government Information Quarterly, 28(2), 164–175. 
Yang, T.-M., & Wu, Y.-J. (2016). Examining the socio-technical determinants 
influencing government agencies’ open data publication: A study in Taiwan. 
Government Information Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2016.05.003 
Yang, T.-M., Pardo, T., & Wu, Y.-J. (2014). How is information shared across the 
boundaries of government agencies? An e-Government case study. Government 
Information Quarterly, 31(4), 637–652. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2014.05.002 
  
193 
Yavuz, N., & Welch, E. W. (2014). Factors affecting openness of local government 
websites: Examining the differences across planning, finance and police 
departments. Government Information Quarterly, 31(4), 574–583. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2014.07.004 
Zellner, A. (1963). Estimators for Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations: Some 
Exact Finite Sample Results. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
58(304), 977–992. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10480681 
Zuiderwijk, A., & Janssen, M. (2014). Open data policies, their implementation and 
impact: A framework for comparison. Government Information Quarterly, 31(1), 
17–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2013.04.003 
  
194 
APPENDIX A 
PROTOCOL FOR COGNITIVE INTERVIEWS 
  
195 
1. Could you please broadly describe what the term data referred to you while 
answering to those questions? 
2. Could you please explain with your own words what question 2 is asking you?  
3. Were you able to find your answer among the options provided (question 3 and 
6)? 
4. In question 4, we ask whether other organizations are legally required to fulfill 
your data requests. How hard was this to answer? How sure were you of your 
answer? 
5. Were you able to find data barriers that usually applied to your experience? 
6. Does question #8 include all quality dimensions that you generally consider when 
evaluating data? 
7. Can you provide examples for each category mentioned in question #9? Do you 
generally think about ‘public accessible data’ or ‘sensitive data’? 
8. Are individuals / units identify in question #10 generally involved in data sharing 
in your department?  
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, the survey was designed to include a screening 
question asking respondents whether their department “obtains data generated by other 
organizations to do its work.” Only respondents who replied “Yes” were asked other 
questions concerning data sharing. Nearly two-thirds (70%) of city department heads 
reported obtaining data from other organizations to do their work. The analysis only 
includes these respondents; the remaining 30% has been excluded.  
Because of the survey design, we need to consider selection biases that might 
occur in the analysis. Selection biases occur when the research is conducted on a non-
random sub-sample of the population of interest – i.e., the cities that request data from 
other organizations – and the equations explaining the selection process and outcome are 
not independent (Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007; Greene, 2000). In other words, if 
the process that generates the subsample (i.e., the cities requesting data) is not 
independent from the process that generates the outcome of interest (i.e., data access), 
then results might be biased.  
We can test the independence assumption using a selection process model as 
proposed in 1977 by Heckman. The Heckman model first estimates a probit model that 
predicts the likelihood of being selected into the subsample; then, it uses an OLS model 
(or another appropriate estimator) to predict the outcome of interest. The outcome model 
includes a correction factor, called the inverse Mills ratio that derives from the probit 
selection model and accounts for the dependence across the two models. If the Mills ratio 
is not significant, the equations can be assumed to be independent and be estimated 
separately.  
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Table 20 shows the Heckman selection models for each of the three dependent 
variables used in the study, and the selection process generated through the survey 
design. Drawing from theory presented in Chapter 2 and 3 (Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia & 
Sayogo, 2016, among others) and previous studies conducted on the same sample of 
small- and medium-sized cities (see: Welch, Feeney, & Park, 2016), I hypothesized that 
the selection process is determined by: the technical capacity of a city department (e.g., 
city departments with greater technical capacity will be more likely to request data from 
other organizations); the social context (e.g., city departments that engage more 
frequently with external stakeholders will be more likely to request data from other 
organizations); power and resource availability (e.g., larger city departments will be more 
likely to request data from other organizations); and engagement into data practices (e.g., 
city departments more engaged in data practices will be more likely to request data from 
other organizations)19. These variables significantly explained the variation in data 
sharing in previous studies (Welch et al., 2016); therefore, we can reasonably expect that 
they would significantly affect the selection process.   
                                                 
19 Variables are presented in Chapter 4. Variables not described in Chapter 4 are presented here. 
Participation items measure the extent to which stakeholders participate into a city departments’ decision 
making. Civic participation includes: individual citizens, neighborhood associations, news media, interest 
groups, religious groups, consultants or paid experts, professional associations, and nonprofit human 
service organizations (mean = 3.84, s.d. = 0.71). Government participation includes: federal government, 
agencies, employees and official, Governor’s office, and state legislators (mean = 2.88, s.d. = 0.77). City 
participation includes: internal department staff, other city departments, and the Mayor’s office (mean = 
2.38, s.d. = 0.72). Scales range from 1= Never to 5 = Very often. All scales have a Cronbach alpha greater 
than 0.8. Legal Goal indicates whether the city department values legal compliance and constitutional 
integrity over community representation and responsiveness and organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness. 63 % of department heads report legal compliance and constitutional integrity as their 
organization main goal. Open Government measures whether the city department “has an established plan 
to implement open e-government” and “a common vision about open government is shared among 
employees” in the organization. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.54, which is acceptable given that only two 
items compose the scale. The mean is 3.3 with a standard deviation equal to 0.68.  
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The Mills ratio is also not significant in all three models. This result provides 
evidence that the two models are independent, and we can estimate them separately. The 
Wald test is non-significant (p > 0.1) indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the errors of outcome and selection equations are uncorrelated, providing further 
support for separating the two models.   
.  
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Table 20. 
Heckman selection model 
 
Data access  
from departments in the city1 
Data access from  
other public agencies2 
Data access from 
nongovernmental agencies3 
 Beta SE P-value   Beta SE P-value   Beta SE P-value   
Outcome model 
Institutions                          
Privacy Laws 0.00 0.00 0.62   0.00 0.00 0.91   0.00 0.01 0.48   
Legal Mandate 0.21 0.09 0.02 * 0.19 0.08 0.02 * 0.14 0.07 0.06  + 
Open government 0.01 0.02 0.71   0.03 0.02 0.12   0.04 0.03 0.14   
Institutional capacity 0.02 0.05 0.65   -0.08 0.05 0.10   -0.06 0.06 0.32   
Social environment                         
City Influence 0.04 0.10 0.73   -0.02 0.07 0.74   0.01 0.07 0.91   
Civil Society Influence 0.20 0.14 0.15   0.32 0.09 0.00 *** 0.32 0.11 0.00 ** 
Government Influence -0.15 0.11 0.19   -0.23 0.08 0.00 ** -0.22 0.09 0.01 * 
Coordination mechanisms                         
Formal Coordination 0.05 0.09 0.60   0.14 0.09 0.12   0.12 0.10 0.26   
Lateral Coordination -0.03 0.09 0.72   0.08 0.11 0.45   0.20 0.09 0.02 * 
Informal Coordination 0.23 0.09 0.01 ** 0.17 0.10 0.09  + 0.08 0.11 0.44   
Control variables                         
Principal City 0.46 0.16 0.01 ** 0.28 0.17 0.10   0.39 0.20 0.05  + 
Social Barriers -0.23 0.15 0.13   -0.26 0.12 0.04 * -0.18 0.09 0.05  + 
Technical Barriers 0.13 0.13 0.33   0.09 0.11 0.45   0.08 0.10 0.38   
Dept Size -0.02 0.07 0.81   -0.06 0.06 0.29   -0.02 0.05 0.66   
Technical Capacity -0.20 0.12 0.12   -0.13 0.10 0.21   -0.22 0.09 0.02 * 
File Sharing Technology 0.22 0.14 0.10 
+ 
 0.08 0.15 0.57   0.39 0.14 0.01 ** 
  
 
2
0
1
 
Form of Government -0.11 0.13 0.42   -0.01 0.15 0.97   0.13 0.18 0.47   
Population -0.27 0.14 0.06  + -0.12 0.11 0.28   -0.21 0.19 0.28   
Community Development -0.34 0.24 0.15   -0.46 0.22 0.04 * -0.15 0.24 0.51   
Finance -0.37 0.30 0.22   -0.36 0.28 0.20   -0.13 0.23 0.56   
Parks and Recreation -0.40 0.26 0.13   -0.36 0.28 0.21   -0.27 0.21 0.18   
Police 0.32 0.37 0.40   0.51 0.26 0.05  + 0.40 0.22 0.07  + 
Selection model 
Technical capacity 0.00 0.11 0.97   0.00 0.11 0.98   0.01 0.11 0.95   
Civic participation 0.03 0.11 0.76   0.04 0.12 0.77   0.03 0.12 0.81   
City participation 0.11 0.11 0.34   0.11 0.11 0.33   0.11 0.11 0.32   
Government participation 0.09 0.06 0.14   0.09 0.06 0.13   0.10 0.06 0.10  + 
Population 0.17 0.09 0.06  + 0.16 0.09 0.10  + 0.16 0.10 0.10   
Legal goal 0.01 0.05 0.80   0.00 0.04 0.92   0.01 0.04 0.86   
Form of government -0.06 0.14 0.65   -0.08 0.13 0.56   -0.07 0.13 0.59   
Open government 0.22 0.13 0.10  + 0.21 0.13 0.12   0.20 0.14 0.14   
Constant -2.98 1.14 0.01 ** -2.69 1.15 0.02 * -2.75 1.21 0.02 * 
/cut1 -2.98 2.16 0.17   -1.43 1.65 0.38   -1.77 3.18 0.58   
/cut2 -2.14 2.20 0.33   -0.40 1.67 0.81   -0.73 3.12 0.81   
/athrho -0.36 0.59 0.54   -0.11 0.77 0.89   0.20 1.00 0.84   
Inverse Mill Ratio -0.34 0.52 0.66   -0.11 0.77 0.89   0.20 0.96 0.97   
Pseudo likelihood -1726.01 -1788.57 -1726.01 
Obs. 597 597 597 
Selected (non-selected) 396(201) 396(201) 396(201) 
1Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.37   Prob > chi2 = 0.5435 
2 Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.02   Prob > chi2 = 0.8870 
3 Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =  0.04   Prob > chi2 = 0.8389 
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Other inconsistencies found by comparing responses across survey items further 
support the hypothesis that the subsample of cities was randomly generated. Table 21 
compares responses to the screening question with responses from other survey item 
asking “How frequently do you receive data from people in the following types of 
organization?” (response options: Daily; Weekly; Monthly; Yearly; Less than once a 
year; Never). Among department heads that report to daily receive data from other 
organizations (other departments in the city, other public agencies, and nongovernmental 
organizations), there are several that report not obtaining data from other organizations. 
These inconsistencies suggest that respondents might have reported that they do not 
obtain data for various reasons that do not affect the outcome variable, such as the length 
of the survey, misinterpretation of the questions, and so on. 
Table 21.  
Distribution of responses across the two questions about data requests  
 
Other departments 
in the city 
Other public 
agencies 
Nongovernmental 
organizations 
 
Obtain 
Do not 
obtain 
Obtain 
Do not 
obtain 
Obtain 
Do not 
obtain 
Daily 289 97 140 47 129 38 
Weekly 105 59 175 72 156 62 
Monthly 50 28 106 50 107 53 
Yearly 7 5 25 10 37 19 
Less than once a year 5 5 10 10 23 15 
Never 6 2 5 7 8 9 
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Table 22 shows the raw data for calculating the Institutional Capacity barriers. Data are provided by the Pew Charitable Trusts. 
For each state, it indicates the number of laws currently implemented regarding data governance, warehouse, inventory, integration, 
sharing, agreement, security, and integrity applied statewide. 
Table 22.  
Data-related laws, by state and topic.   
State 
# of 
laws 
Governance Warehouse Inventory Integration Sharing Agreement Security Integrity 
AL 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
AK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AZ 5 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 
AR 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
CA 10 1 0 0 2 4 0 0 3 
CO 10 4 1 0 0 4 1 0 0 
CT 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
DE 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
DC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FL 6 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
GA 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
HI 5 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
ID 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
IL 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IN 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
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IA 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KY 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
LA 5 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
ME 3 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
MD 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
MA 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
MI 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
MN 8 1 0 0 0 3 2 2 0 
MS 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MT 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
NE 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
NV 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NH 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
NJ 4 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
NM 8 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 
NY 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
NC 4 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ND 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
OH 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
OK 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
OR 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PA 6 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
RI 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 
SC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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TN 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TX 5 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 
UT 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
VT 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
VA 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
WA 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
WV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WI 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
WY 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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Table 23. 
Open data portals – Scores assigned on quality 
Dimension Points Criteria 
COMPLETENESS     
We evaluated each state on the data collected by Open States: bills, 
legislators, committees, votes and events. We also took note if a state 
went above and beyond to provide this information and other relevant 
contextual information such as supporting documents, legislative 
journals and schedules. Points were deducted for missing data, often 
roll call votes. 
 0 
State provides full breadth of legislative 
artifacts Open States collects: bills, 
legislators, votes, and committees. 
-1 
State does not provide stand-alone roll call 
votes. 
TIMELINESS     
Legislative information is most relevant when it happens, and many 
states are publishing information in real time. Unfortunately, there are 
also states where updates are more infrequent and showing up days 
after a legislative action took place. States were dinged if data took 
more than 48 hours to go online. 
 1 
Multiple updates throughout the day, real 
time or as close to it as systems will allow. 
 0 
Site updates once or twice daily, typically at 
the end of the legislative day. 
-1 
Updates take longer than 24 hours to appear 
on the site, often up to a week. 
EASE OF ACCESS     
Common web technologies such as Flash or JavaScript can cause 
problems when reviewing legislative data. We found that the majority 
of sites work fairly well without JavaScript, but some received lower 
 1 
Site was considered exceptionally well 
layed out by multiple evaluators, no issues 
with Javascript. 
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scores due to being extremely difficult to navigate, impossible to 
bookmark bills, and in extreme cases, completely unusable.  0 
Site was deemed average by those that 
evaluated it and/or had minor Javascript 
dependencies. 
-1 
Site was considered more difficult than 
average to use by members of staff or 
volunteers or had more severe Javascript 
dependencies. 
-2 
Site was considered extremely difficult to 
use with a heavy reliance on irregular 
browser behavior and Javascript. 
MACHINE READABILITY     
For many sites, the Open States team wrote scrapers to collect 
legislative information from the website code—a slow, tedious and 
error prone process. We collected data faster and more reliably when 
data was provided in a machine-readable format such as XML, JSON, 
CSV or via bulk downloads. If a state posted PDF image files or 
scanned documents, it received the lowest score possible. 
 2 
Essentially all data can be found in 
machine-readable formats. 
 1 
Lots of data in machine readable format but 
substantial portions that still required 
scraping HTML. 
 0 
No machine readable data but standard 
screen scraping techniques applied. 
-1 
Site had information that was much more 
difficult than average to collect. (Data only 
accessible via PDF or that required screen 
scraper to emulate Javascript.) 
-2 
Site had information that was unaccessible 
to Open States due to use of scanned PDFs. 
USE OF COMMONLY OWNED STANDARDS     
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Because our ability to access most of a state’s data is represented by the 
above “Machine Readability” metric, we decided to use this provision 
to measure how a state made their bill text available. Making text 
available in HTML or PDF is the norm, and was considered an 
acceptable commonly owned standard (PDFs are a commonly owned 
standard, but it would be certainly nice to see alternative options where 
bill text is only available via PDF). States that only make documents 
available in Microsoft Word or Wordperfect formats require an 
individual to purchase expensive software or rely on free alternatives 
that may not preserve the correct formatting. It is worth noting, all 
states except for two met the common criteria of providing HTML 
and/or PDF only, one state (Kansas) went above and beyond and 
another (Kentucky) did not even meet this threshold. 
 1 
State made an effort to go above and 
beyond. 
 0 
State provided bills in PDF and/or HTML 
format and nothing better (plaintext, ODT, 
etc.). 
-1 
State only provided bills in a proprietary 
format. 
PERMANENCE     
Many states move or remove information when a new session starts, 
much to the dismay of citizens seeking information on old proposals 
and researchers that may have cited a link (e.g. 
https://somelegislature.gov/HB1 vs 
https://somelegislature.gov/2011/HB1) only to see it point to a different 
bill in the following session. Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World 
Wide Web, wrote an article declaring Cool URIs Don’t Change and we 
agree. This poses a particular challenge to us since every page on 
OpenStates.org points to the page we collected data from, but if a state 
changes their site then users lose the ability to check us against the 
original source. Most (but not all) states are good about at least 
preserving bill information, but few were equally as good about 
preserving information about out-of-office legislators and historical 
committees, equally important parts of the legislative process. 
 2 
All information is avaialble in a permanent 
location and data goes back a reasonable 
amount of time (a decade or so). 
 1 
Almost all information has a permanent 
location but a single data set doesn't. (Or a 
recent change to the site has wiped out 
historical links but information appears to 
be preservable going forward.)  
 0 
Legislator & committee information lacks a 
permanent location (such as committees and 
legislators) but most is acceptable. 
-1 
Ability to link to old information is badly 
damaged and and/or there is less than a 
decade of historical information. 
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-2 
Vital information like bills or versions lack 
a permanent location. 
 Source: Sunlight Foundation. Retrieved on March, 3rd 2018. https://openstates.org/reportcard/#criteria  
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Table 24. 
Correlation table. 
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1 1 
                        
2 -.08 1 
                       
3 .03 .75 1 
                      
4 .04 .38 .40 1 
                     
5 .59 .00 .07 .10 1 
                    
6 .41 .00 .09 .02 39 1.00 
                   
7 -.03 .05 .05 .08 .04 -.08 1.00 
                  
8 .04 .07 .09 .10 .11 .01 .45 1.00 
                 
9 .05 .02 .02 .13 .06 .01 .33 .34 1.00 
                
10 -.04 .13 .14 .08 -.03 -.03 .03 -.09 .05 1.00 
               
11 .04 .14 .11 .19 .03 -.06 .02 .02 .16 .14 1.00 
              
12 -.04 .06 -.02 -.05 -.12 -.08 .06 .01 -.05 -.04 .14 1.00 
             
13 .07 .05 .05 .04 -.02 .08 .12 .14 .07 .00 -.09 -.04 1.00 
            
14 .07 .01 .01 .07 .02 .09 .04 .16 .13 -.06 .13 .12 -.03 1.00 
           
15 -.04 .01 -.02 .09 -.02 .05 .09 .25 .12 -.04 .05 .02 .08 .36 1.00 
          
16 -.06 .03 .00 -.03 -.04 -.02 .00 -.12 -.01 .24 .00 -.06 .10 -.14 -.15 1.00 
         
17 -.16 -.06 -.09 -.02 -.14 -.10 .10 .17 .12 .06 -.03 .02 .03 -.02 .08 .01 1.00 
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18 .01 .08 .13 .06 .05 .00 .07 -.07 .00 .11 .04 .00 -.01 .02 -.02 .01 .02 1.00 
       
19 -.04 .15 .14 .07 -.04 -.02 .20 .09 .00 .09 .04 -.02 .01 -.05 -.06 .10 .00 -.18 1.00 
      
20 .02 -.13 -.14 -.04 .04 .03 .04 .07 -.05 -.07 -.12 -.02 .05 -.11 .05 -.14 -.01 -.28 -.26 1.00 
     
21 -.04 .01 .00 .02 -.06 -.03 -.26 -.18 .23 .11 .15 -.07 -.17 .07 -.05 .07 .00 -.24 -.21 -.33 1.00 
    
22 .04 -.09 -.10 -.10 .00 .00 -.02 .09 -.19 -.21 -.09 .13 .11 .09 .06 -.02 -.01 -.22 -.20 -.30 -.25 1.00 
   
23 .14 .01 -.03 .05 .20 -.01 .11 .27 .09 .07 .03 .05 .03 .07 .06 -.06 .37 .04 -.01 -.02 -.07 .05 1.00 
  
24 -.02 .05 .06 .05 -.03 -.09 -.05 .13 .09 .11 .12 -.08 -.07 .06 -.03 .09 .22 -.19 .09 -.29 .46 -.04 .38 1.00 
 
25 -.25 .05 .02 .02 .33 -.04 .04 -.02 .03 -.05 .00 .08 -.11 .05 .01 -.04 .09 -.01 -.08 .04 .03 .01 .00 -.07 1.00 
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Table 25. 
Ordered logit model with interaction between Privacy Law and Sensitive Data. 
 
Data access from 
other departments 
in the city 
Data access from 
other public 
agencies 
Data access from 
nongovernmental 
organizations 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Institutions                    
Privacy Laws 0.02 0.01  0.00 0.01  0.01 0.01  
Sensitive Data 0.09 0.28  -0.20 0.26  0.17 0.24  
Privacy * Sensitive 
data 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00  + 
Legal Mandate 0.39 0.15 * 0.34 0.14 * 0.27 0.14 * 
Open government 0.02 0.04  0.04 0.03  0.07 0.04  + 
Institutional capacity 0.04 0.08   -0.12 0.08   -0.13 0.10   
Social environment                   
City Influence 0.08 0.17  -0.02 0.12  0.05 0.13  
Civil Society 
Influence 0.35 0.20  + 0.53 0.18 ** 0.51 0.19 ** 
Government Influence -0.22 0.19   -0.38 0.15 * -0.35 0.15 * 
Coordination 
mechanisms                   
Formal Coordination 0.11 0.16  0.25 0.14  + 0.18 0.16  
Lateral Coordination -0.03 0.16  0.13 0.18  0.34 0.15 * 
Informal Coordination 0.38 0.14 ** 0.31 0.17  + 0.17 0.17  
Control variables                   
Principal City 0.78 0.28 ** 0.50 0.31  0.68 0.33 * 
Social Barriers -0.38 0.22  + -0.42 0.22 * -0.29 0.16  + 
Technical Barriers 0.19 0.21  0.11 0.21  0.10 0.16  
Dept Size -0.01 0.10  -0.09 0.10  -0.01 0.10  
Technical Capacity -0.34 0.22  -0.23 0.17  -0.39 0.15 ** 
File Sharing 
Technology 0.36 0.25   0.12 0.27   0.65 0.26 * 
Form of Government -0.13 0.24  -0.05 0.22  0.26 0.27  
Population -0.41 0.17 * -0.19 0.17  -0.41 0.15 ** 
Community 
Development -0.56 0.41  -0.78 0.40 * -0.23 0.41  
Finance -0.53 0.55  -0.54 0.47  -0.07 0.42  
Parks and Recreation -0.70 0.45  -0.62 0.44  -0.47 0.33  
Police 0.80 0.55   1.06 0.45 * 1.03 0.43 * 
/cut1 -3.53 2.60  -2.51 2.36  -3.02 1.77  
/cut2 -2.06 2.56   -0.75 2.29   -1.28 1.82   
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Observation 402 402 402 
Log Likelihood -835.38 -895.70 -938.44 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.08 0.08 
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In the sample, there are 427 respondents from small cities, i.e., cities with a 
population below 100,000 inhabitants. Among these, 289 cities (68%) report that they 
engage in data sharing, providing a large enough sample for conducting a separate 
analysis. Small cities might have different characteristics than medium-sized ones, 
including lower capacity and resources. Results from the Population Size variable in the 
SUR model further confirm this hypothesis, by showing that smaller cities report lower 
data access from other departments in the city and nongovernmental organizations. 
Therefore, it might be that when coefficients are free to vary, technical capacity or 
technical barriers will become significant for small cities, where lack of or lower 
resources influences an organizational capacity to access data.  
I run all models on the subset of observations including only cities with 
populations below 100,000 inhabitants. The models include 247 observations grouped in 
38 state-level clusters. Results are shown in tables 26, 27, and 28.  
Overall, results do not differ from the models that include all observations. There 
are no substantial differences in the institutions, social environment, and coordination 
mechanisms variables. Among control variables, technical capacity is a significant 
predictor in all models, not just the data access from "non-governmental organizations" 
model as when using the full sample. This result suggests that smaller cities are affected 
by the lack of technical capacity while larger cities have enough technical capacity to 
access data from other organizations. 
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Table 26.  
Small cities - Data access from internal departments, other public agencies, and non-governmental organization – 
Logit model with clustered standard errors. 
 
 
Data access from internal 
departments in the city 
Data access from  
public agencies 
Data access from 
nongovernmental organizations 
 Beta 
Odds 
ratios SE Beta 
Odds 
ratios SE Beta 
Odds 
ratios SE 
Institutions                          
Privacy Laws 0.01 1.01 0.01  0.00 1.00 0.01  -0.01 0.99 0.01  
Legal Mandate 0.46 1.58 0.21 * 0.36 1.43 0.17 * 0.34 1.41 0.18  + 
Open government -0.03 0.97 0.06  0.01 1.01 0.03  0.05 1.05 0.05  
Institutional capacity 0.07 1.07 0.10   -0.09 0.92 0.09   -0.11 0.89 0.11   
Social environment                       
City Influence 0.10 1.10 0.18  0.06 1.06 0.15  0.06 1.07 0.15  
Civil Society Influence 0.49 1.62 0.27  + 0.61 1.85 0.24 ** 0.72 2.06 0.26 ** 
Government Influence -0.26 0.77 0.23   -0.41 0.66 0.17 * -0.47 0.63 0.18 ** 
Coordination mechanisms                     
Formal Coordination 0.09 1.10 0.21  0.25 1.29 0.21  0.16 1.17 0.25  
Lateral Coordination -0.03 0.97 0.20  0.12 1.13 0.24  0.37 1.44 0.20  + 
Informal Coordination 0.41 1.50 0.17 * 0.32 1.38 0.19  + 0.19 1.20 0.20  
Control variables                       
Principal City 1.07 2.92 0.41 ** 0.59 1.80 0.41  0.74 2.09 0.42  + 
Social Barriers -0.52 0.59 0.28  + -0.56 0.57 0.26 * -0.37 0.69 0.20  + 
Technical Barriers 0.22 1.24 0.26  0.09 1.09 0.24  0.01 1.01 0.19  
Dept Size 0.01 1.01 0.14  -0.08 0.93 0.12  -0.01 0.99 0.11  
  
 
2
2
1
 
Technical Capacity -0.45 0.64 0.26  + -0.31 0.73 0.18  + -0.56 0.57 0.17 *** 
File Sharing 
Technology 0.32 1.37 0.32   0.11 1.12 0.30   0.78 2.18 0.33 * 
Form of Government -0.20 0.82 0.27  0.04 1.04 0.27  0.41 1.51 0.34  
Population 0.03 1.03 0.56  0.23 1.26 0.46  -0.17 0.85 0.31  
Community 
Development -0.55 0.58 0.50  -0.78 0.46 0.49  -0.24 0.78 0.47  
Finance -0.59 0.55 0.71  -0.44 0.64 0.58  0.07 1.07 0.50  
Parks and Recreation -0.78 0.46 0.55  -0.55 0.58 0.54  -0.51 0.60 0.39  
Police 0.37 1.45 0.68   0.86 2.37 0.53   0.76 2.14 0.41  + 
/cut1 0.66 1.94     2.39 5.37     -1.57 3.03     
/cut2 2.16 8.65     4.14 5.30     0.28 2.95     
Obs 247 249 248 
Clusters 38 38 38 
Log pseudo-likelihood -672.4148 -737.2568 -763.3243 
Null model log 
likelihood -751.6933 -813.9027 -849.3615 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.09 0.1 
AIC 1392.83 1522.514 1574.649 
BIC 1477.055 1606.932 1658.971 
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Table 27.  
Small cities - Data access from internal departments, other public agencies, and non-governmental organization – Multilevel 
model. 
 
Data access from  
internal departments 
Data access from  
public agencies 
Data access from 
nongovernmental 
organizations 
 Beta Odds ratio SE   Beta Odds ratio SE   Beta Odds ratio SE   
Institutions                        
Privacy Laws 0.01 1.01 0.02   0.00 1.00 0.01   -0.01 0.99 0.02   
Legal Mandate 0.43 1.54 0.23 + 0.38 1.47 0.20  + 0.32 1.38 0.18  + 
Institutional capacity 0.02 1.02 0.09  0.08 1.08 0.10  0.20 1.22 0.12  
Open Data Portal 0.15 1.17 0.14  -0.14 0.87 0.18  -0.09 0.91 0.18  
Social environment                     
City Influence 0.23 1.26 0.21   0.07 1.07 0.16   0.02 1.02 0.17   
Civil Society Influence 0.37 1.44 0.30  0.62 1.86 0.28 * 0.65 1.91 0.30 * 
Government Influence -0.36 0.70 0.26  -0.46 0.63 0.18 ** -0.50 0.61 0.19 ** 
Coordination mechanisms                     
Formal Coordination 0.13 1.14 0.25   0.26 1.30 0.23   0.21 1.24 0.26   
Lateral Coordination -0.10 0.90 0.23  0.05 1.05 0.26  0.26 1.30 0.25  
Informal Coordination 0.48 1.62 0.20 * 0.40 1.49 0.21 * 0.34 1.41 0.19  + 
Control variables                       
Principal City 1.28 3.60 0.53 * 0.79 2.20 0.49   0.78 2.18 0.47  + 
Social Barriers -0.48 0.62 0.32  -0.54 0.58 0.29  + -0.32 0.72 0.24  
Technical Barriers 0.23 1.26 0.29  0.13 1.14 0.26  0.09 1.09 0.22  
Dept Size 0.04 1.04 0.16  -0.04 0.96 0.15  -0.01 0.99 0.14  
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Technical Capacity -0.51 0.60 0.29 
 
+ -0.30 0.74 0.21  -0.49 0.61 0.18 ** 
File Sharing 
Technology 0.38 1.47 0.32  0.19 1.21 0.33  1.05 2.86 0.35 ** 
Form of Government -0.20 0.82 0.33  -0.01 0.99 0.32  0.38 1.46 0.40  
Population -0.16 0.85 0.74  0.05 1.05 0.56  -0.37 0.69 0.40  
Community 
Development -0.67 0.51 0.55  -0.88 0.41 0.59  -0.18 0.84 0.58  
Finance -0.77 0.46 0.75  -0.50 0.61 0.67  0.08 1.08 0.62  
Parks and Recreation -0.93 0.39 0.63  -0.57 0.57 0.62  -0.60 0.55 0.46  
Police 0.33 1.39 0.74  0.92 2.50 0.63  0.81 2.25 0.46  + 
/cut1 -0.93 0.40 8.33   0.83 2.29 6.58   -2.70 0.07 4.03   
/cut2 0.68 1.96 8.20  2.70 14.94 6.51  -0.63 0.53 3.93  
State 0.87 2.40 0.93 * 1.27 3.57 1.35 * 1.95 7.05 1.34 * 
Obs. 247 249.00 248.00 
Clusters 38 38.00 38.00 
Averaged cluster 6.5 6.50 6.50 
Log likelihood -665.10132 -733.2893 -740.9 
AIC 1380.203 1516.579 1531.8 
BIC 1467.937 1604.515 1619.636 
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Table 28.  
Small cities - Data access from city departments, other public agencies, and non-governmental organization – SUR system 
 
Data access from  
internal capacity 
Data access from  
public agencies 
Data access from 
nongovernmental 
organizations 
 Beta 
Odds 
ratios SE Beta 
Odds 
ratios SE Beta 
Odds 
ratios SE 
Institutions                          
Privacy Laws 0.00 1.00 0.01  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.01  
Legal Mandate 0.17 1.18 0.07 * 0.12 1.13 0.05 ** 0.18 1.20 0.08 * 
Institutional capacity -0.02 0.98 0.03  0.01 1.01 0.02  0.01 1.01 0.03  
Open Data Portal 0.04 1.04 0.05   -0.07 0.93 0.06   -0.04 0.96 0.07   
Social environment                     
City Influence 0.06 1.06 0.12  0.02 1.02 0.09  0.04 1.04 0.09  
Civil Society Influence 0.36 1.44 0.16 * 0.47 1.60 0.12 *** 0.44 1.55 0.13 *** 
Government Influence -0.20 0.82 0.12  + -0.27 0.76 0.10 ** -0.28 0.76 0.10 ** 
Coordination mechanisms                     
Formal Coordination 0.09 1.09 0.11  0.19 1.21 0.11  + 0.12 1.12 0.14  
Lateral Coordination -0.04 0.97 0.11  0.08 1.08 0.13  0.21 1.23 0.12  + 
Informal Coordination 0.26 1.29 0.11 * 0.19 1.20 0.10  + 0.11 1.12 0.11  
Control variables                       
Principal City 0.66 1.94 0.22 ** 0.35 1.41 0.23  0.45 1.56 0.25  + 
Social Barriers -0.30 0.74 0.16  + -0.32 0.73 0.14 * -0.23 0.80 0.12  + 
Technical Barriers 0.12 1.13 0.16  0.01 1.01 0.14  0.00 1.00 0.10  
Dept Size 0.00 1.00 0.07  -0.04 0.96 0.07  -0.01 0.99 0.07  
Technical Capacity -0.26 0.77 0.13 * -0.20 0.82 0.10  + -0.33 0.72 0.09 *** 
File Sharing Technology 0.14 1.16 0.17   0.05 1.05 0.17   0.41 1.50 0.19 * 
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Form of Government -0.14 0.87 0.16  0.06 1.06 0.15  0.21 1.23 0.19  
Population -0.07 0.93 0.32  0.03 1.03 0.26  -0.03 0.97 0.19  
Community Development -0.34 0.71 0.26  -0.51 0.60 0.24 * -0.14 0.87 0.28  
Finance -0.24 0.79 0.36  -0.15 0.86 0.30  0.08 1.08 0.31  
Parks and Recreation -0.45 0.64 0.27  + -0.27 0.76 0.30  -0.27 0.76 0.23  
Police 0.27 1.31 0.32   0.58 1.78 0.29 * 0.48 1.62 0.24 * 
cut1 -0.70 0.50 3.64  0.24 1.27 2.97  -0.15 0.86 1.87  
cut2 0.13 1.13 3.58   1.19 3.27 2.94   0.92 2.51 1.84   
 
 
 Beta SE    Beta SE 
/atanhrho_12 1.39 0.13   rho_12 0.88 0.03 
/atanhrho_13 0.88 0.11   rho_13 0.71 0.06 
/atanhrho_23 1.22 0.11   rho_23 0.84 0.03 
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Multiple imputation is used to impute missing data in the original dataset. Table 
29 shows the amount of missing data for each dependent and independent variable 
included in the analysis. Variables related to coordination mechanisms - particularly 
lateral and informal coordination - socio-political and technical barriers, and file sharing 
technologies score the highest percentage of missing data (approximately from 4.5% to 
5.2%). On average, the percentage of missing data is below 4%.   
Table 29.  
Missing data per variable in the analysis. 
Variable 
Missing 
values 
% 
missing 
values 
Obs 
Unique 
values 
Data access from internal departments 17 3.67% 446 3 
Data access from other public agencies 17 3.67% 446 3 
Data access from nongovernmental 
organizations 17 3.67% 446 3 
Legal mandate (city departments) 16 3.46% 447 4 
Legal mandate (other public agencies) 18 3.89% 445 4 
Legal mandate (nongovernmental 
organizations) 16 3.46% 447 4 
Formal coordination 5 1.08% 458 5 
Lateral coordination 24 5.18% 439 5 
Informal coordination 23 4.97% 440 5 
Socio-political barriers 28 6.05% 435 21 
Technical barriers 26 5.62% 437 18 
File sharing technologies 19 4.10% 444 2 
Department size 16 3.46% 447 158 
Technical capacity 1 0.22% 462 21 
Table 30 shows the missing data pattern. 87% of the observations contain no 
missing values (pattern: 111). There is a total of 28 missing data patterns in the dataset. 
There is no pattern that is common across a clear majority of observations. 
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Table 30.  
Missing data patterns. 
Percent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
87% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
<1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
<1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
<1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
<1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
<1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
<1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
<1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
 
Unfortunately, no auxiliary variables are available to predict missing data. 
Auxiliary variables are variables that are highly correlated with variables with missing 
data (r > 0.4) or are associated with missingness patterns (Enders, 2010). The variables 
with missing data are specific to data access questions and were asked in a separated 
section of the survey (see: Chapter 5). I have tested correlation with potential auxiliary 
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variables, such as frequency of receiving data, but the correlation is too low to help 
imputation (on average, 0.15). Some of the variables in model are correlated among each 
other (e.g., legal mandate variables or dependent variables) which improve imputation. 
Multiple imputation was conducted in Stata. The imputation process used chained 
equations (MICE) and a separate conditional distribution for each variable imputed in the 
model. MICE is adapted in this case because the model includes categorical variables 
(White, Royston, & Wood, 2011). I created twenty-five imputed datasets. Researchers 
suggest to impute at least as many datasets as the average percentage of missing values 
(Graham, Olchowski, & Gilreath, 2007); given that the average percentage is 4%, twenty-
five datasets are sufficient to reach an acceptable estimation of missing data. Moreover, I 
adopted a conservative approach where all variables are imputed, but imputed values are 
used only for the independent variables, not the dependent ones (White et al., 2011). 
Results from the logit model after imputation are presented in Table 31
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Table 31.  
Logit models with imputed independent variables 
 
Data access from 
internal departments 
Data access from 
public agencies 
Data access from 
nongovernmental 
organizations 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Institutions    
Privacy Laws 0.00 0.01   -0.01 0.01   -0.01 0.01  + 
Legal Mandate 0.41 0.13 *** 0.40 0.13 ** 0.29 0.14 * 
Institutional capacity 0.01 0.04   0.03 0.03   0.06 0.04   
Open government 0.03 0.07   -0.10 0.08   -0.11 0.10   
Social environment   
City Influence 0.12 0.17  -0.02 0.11   0.04 0.12   
Civil Society Influence 0.27 0.15  + 0.45 0.14 *** 0.46 0.17 ** 
Government Influence -0.18 0.15  -0.28 0.12 * -0.26 0.11 * 
Coordination mechanisms   
Formal Coordination 0.03 0.16  0.12 0.15   0.09 0.18   
Lateral Coordination -0.13 0.15  0.05 0.17   0.20 0.15   
Informal Coordination 0.47 0.13 *** 0.41 0.15 ** 0.27 0.16  + 
File Sharing Technology 0.28 0.24  0.16 0.26   0.55 0.23 * 
Control variables   
Principal City 0.61 0.30 * 0.45 0.29   0.48 0.32   
Social Barriers -0.38 0.21  + -0.46 0.21 * -0.27 0.16  + 
Technical Barriers 0.29 0.18   0.13 0.17   0.11 0.14   
Dept Size -0.06 0.08   -0.14 0.09   -0.06 0.09   
Technical Capacity -0.25 0.20   -0.16 0.16   -0.31 0.13 * 
Form of Government -0.20 0.24   -0.13 0.23   0.20 0.26   
Population -0.20 0.15   -0.03 0.15   -0.25 0.13  + 
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Community Development -0.57 0.38   -0.74 0.39  + -0.35 0.41   
Finance -0.56 0.48   -0.58 0.42   -0.25 0.38   
Parks and Recreation -0.71 0.43   -0.69 0.42   -0.62 0.32  + 
Police 0.73 0.45   1.01 0.43 * 0.73 0.34 * 
/cut1 -1.72 2.31   -0.68 1.76   -2.55 1.62   
/cut2 -0.36 2.30   0.96 1.75   -0.90 1.67   
Obs. 445 445 445 
Average RVI 0.0524 0.0427 0.039 
Largest FMI 0.0518 0.043 0.0775 
 
